Data and API

[verified] "Dying on Camera": migrants died in view of border surveillance towers

Sept 21, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id dying-on-camera

Primary source verified, reconfirmed twice (v3.1, v3.5) and against the published text Oct 3, 2026. "Law requires AI towers" was checked three times, not supported, and stays cut. Corrected Oct 3, 2026: two phrasings were stronger than the investigation's.

MIT Technology Review cross-referenced nearly 4,000 locations where human remains were found with nearly 600 towers mapped by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. More than 1,050 people died within range of the towers between 2015 and early 2026, a count the investigation says misses deaths near towers not yet mapped and some in Texas. More than 110 died within range of Anduril's autonomous towers since 2021, and nearly 350 within range of Elbit's since 2015. Times of San Diego counted at least 138 deaths in California from 2022 through 2025 within a tower's nominal range; MIT Technology Review found at least 81 of those people were most likely within a camera's field of view. The investigation found CBP has done little to assess how its towers are working or how many people have died where they keep watch, and CBP plans to spend $1 billion on 1,497 more towers by 2034. Statements from CBP's Hilton Beckham and Anduril's spokesperson are attributed to each.

Sources: MIT Technology Review, Sept 21, 2026 (investigation); MIT Technology Review, Sept 21, 2026 (methodology); MIT Technology Review and Times of San Diego, Sept 21, 2026 (San Diego); Times of San Diego, Sept 21, 2026

[verified] ICE buys four Boston Dynamics robot dogs

Aug 27 – Sept 28, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id robot-dogs

The DHS forecast (archived copy), ICE's market-research notice and its draft specifications read directly (Oct 3, 2026). The $1.3 million contract is Boston.com's report of the listed contract; we have not yet found it in federal spending records. Updated Oct 3, 2026; earlier versions ended with the forecast.

ICE's Office of Firearms and Tactical Programs posted a DHS acquisition forecast on Aug 27, 2026 titled "Boston Dynamics SPOT Robots Procurement," listed with no competition at $1 million to $2 million. The next day ICE posted a market-research (sources sought) notice for a "Quadruped Unmanned Ground Vehicle"; its draft specifications ask for stereo cameras giving 360-degree visibility, a 30x zoom camera with thermal imaging, an arm and gripper, and extended-range radios.

Boston.com reported on Sept 30 that ICE had finalized a $1.3 million contract for four Spot robots, publicly listed that week, to search tunnels at border crossings; Boston Dynamics said ICE's Homeland Security Investigations, not Enforcement and Removal Operations, would use them. The forecast page has since come down from DHS's site; the archived copy is linked here.

Sources: DHS acquisition forecast F2026075113, "Boston Dynamics SPOT Robots Procurement" (Aug 27, 2026; archived Aug 29); ICE sources sought notice 192126NFU00000158, "Quadruped Unmanned Ground Vehicle" (Aug 28, 2026); ICE draft specifications, Quadruped Unmanned Ground Vehicle; NBC News, Aug 28, 2026; WBUR, Aug 31, 2026; FedScoop, Sept 4, 2026; Boston.com, Sept 30, 2026 (the contract); Bloomberg; USA Today

[verified] ICE's $16.7M no-bid contract for electric-shock gloves

Aug 26, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id shock-gloves

Two federal records read directly (Oct 1, 2026): ICE's acquisition forecast and the award record, plus the maker's user guide. The 6,000-pair count comes from reporting. Dated to the signing; earlier versions used Aug 27, the day it was reported.

ICE signed a $16,700,640 contract with Compliant Technologies LLC of Kentucky on Aug 26, 2026, for what the award record describes as conductive energy and de-escalation devices. It was not competed; ICE received one offer. Reporting puts the order at 6,000 pairs of gloves.

ICE's own planning forecast, published Aug 10, names the device: the CTG-5 G.L.O.V.E. (Generated Low Output Voltage Emitter), to be issued to Homeland Security Investigations and Enforcement and Removal Operations officers and agents. It listed the purchase with no competition and an estimate of $10 million to $20 million, and filed it under the federal industry code for "Other Spectator Sports" (711219). The award record uses a wholesale-equipment code (423850). The forecast page came down from DHS's site between Aug 23 and Sept 2; the archived copy is hosted here.

The maker's own user guide for its Gen 4 and Gen 5 gloves says the Gen 5 stores a record of every activation and recommends downloading it at least quarterly. It warns that any use of force with the device "may cause or contribute to death or serious injury," advises against using it on the elderly, small children, pregnant women and the severely handicapped, and says it "SHALL NOT be deployed" for verbal defiance, punishment or torture. The guide says the technology "should be treated seriously like any other weapon," and also that the company "does not consider CD3 Technology to be a weapon." The award record names no model, so which version ICE bought is not confirmed.

On Aug 27, the day it was reported, Sen. Catherine Cortez Masto and 15 other Democratic senators urged ICE to cancel the purchase. A DHS spokesperson called the pushback "despicable and a deliberate attempt to undermine and endanger our officers."

Sources: ICE acquisition forecast F2026074524, DHS Acquisition Planning Forecast System (Aug 10, 2026; archived Aug 12); USAspending: ICE contract 70CMSW26C00000012, Compliant Technologies LLC; Compliant Technologies, G.L.O.V.E. Product User Guide, Gen 4 and Gen 5, version 1.4 (July 2024); CBS News, Aug 27, 2026; Al Jazeera, Aug 28, 2026; AP; Reuters; CNN

[verified] Congress lets the Section 702 spy law lapse for the first time

Apr–Jun 2026 · checked v3.31 · id section-702-lapse

Each fact checked against the linked reporting (Oct 3, 2026). Not to be confused with Hasbajrami (E.D.N.Y., declassified Jan 2025), a different case outside this window.

The House voted 235-191 to renew; renewal failed in the Senate over an unrelated CBDC-ban rider, and a 45-day stopgap passed instead. The statute lapsed at midnight on Jun 12, 2026, the first time since 2008, but the FISA Court's annual certifications keep collection running until at least Mar 2027.

Sources: Nextgov/FCW, Apr 29, 2026 (House vote, digital-currency ban); ABC News, Apr 30, 2026 (45-day extension); NPR, June 12, 2026 (the lapse); Strauss Center, June 24, 2026 (first lapse); Brennan Center (certifications to March 2027); Lawfare / Schneier & Cohn

[partial] DHS tells NPR ICE has "no relationship with Paragon"

May 22, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id dhs-no-relationship-paragon

NPR's report and the federal contract record read directly (Oct 3, 2026). Stays partial: the letter approves a tool without naming it, and nothing public says what replaced Paragon. Updated Oct 3, 2026 with the contract's close-out date.

DHS told NPR on May 22, 2026: "ICE has no relationship with Paragon Solutions, Inc. or with the company that acquired them." That came seven weeks after acting Director Lyons's April 1 letter approving spyware tools. Federal award records show ICE's $2 million sole-source contract with Paragon Solutions (US) Inc., signed September 27, 2024, was paused, revived in August 2025, and closed out on January 20, 2026.

Sources: NPR, May 22, 2026; IBTimes UK, Sept 3, 2026; USAspending: ICE contract 70CTD024P00000012 with Paragon Solutions (US), with modifications

[verified] ICE's acting director approves spyware tools to get into encrypted messages

Apr 1, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id lyons-paragon

NPR's, CyberScoop's and TechCrunch's accounts of the letter read directly (Oct 3, 2026); none says the letter names Paragon or Graphite. Bloomberg first reported it.

ICE acting director Lyons's letter authorized HSI "cutting-edge technological tools" to intercept encrypted messages, citing fentanyl trafficking and foreign-terrorist-organization concerns as the stated rationale. The letter did not name Graphite; reporters identified it.

Sources: NPR, Apr 7, 2026; CyberScoop, Apr 2, 2026; Bloomberg, Apr 1, 2026 (first reported); IBTimes UK, Sept 3, 2026 (procurement history); USAspending: ICE contract 70CTD024P00000012 with Paragon Solutions (US)

[verified] ICE signs a no-bid contract for Penlink's PLX surveillance software

Mar 31, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id penlink-plx

Federal award record read directly (Oct 3, 2026): signed March 31, work from April 1, which settles the date question flagged in v3.5. Prism's article and Penlink's statement read directly. Corrected Oct 3, 2026: earlier versions said PLX "intercepts" communications for real-time tracking, as Prism first wrote before revising it.

ICE signed the contract on March 31, 2026, with work starting April 1: $2,899,162.98 now and up to $8,310,148.26 with options through March 2029, for Penlink's PLX investigative software and support for the Homeland Security Task Force. It went to Chenega Defense and Aerospace Solutions without competition, under a statutory exception that lets Alaska Native-owned companies receive contracts directly. Penlink is owned by the private equity firm Spire Capital.

Prism Reports first reported the contract and wrote that PLX "could enable DHS to track people's movements in real time" (it first said "enables," and changed it on May 4). Penlink told Prism that PLX "does not provide additional data to law enforcement, such as the real-time communications or location data that this article alleges." The contract follows a $2.3 million no-bid ICE contract in September 2025 for Penlink's Tangles and Webloc location tools, first reported by 404 Media.

“ICE and other Department of Homeland Security agencies are expanding their surveillance dragnet...” (Sen. Ron Wyden, in an email to Prism Reports)

Sources: USAspending: ICE contract 70CMSD26C00000001 to Chenega Defense & Aerospace Solutions (Penlink PLX); Prism Reports, Apr 29, 2026 (updated May 4 and 5); 404 Media, Sept 30, 2025 (Tangles and Webloc); Wyden and others, letter to the DHS Inspector General on ICE location-data purchases (Mar 3, 2026); Wyden press release, Mar 3, 2026

[verified] Army Special Forces command renews Clearview AI facial recognition

Mar 20, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id green-berets-clearview

The Army's award record, solicitation, brand-name justification and requirements page read directly (Oct 3, 2026). Corrected Oct 3, 2026: an earlier version said "analysts only"; that was Biometric Update's inference, not the records'.

1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) at Fort Bragg bought five Clearview AI licenses by brand name; one offer came in. The award went to the reseller Octaris Technologies: $78,750 for the first year (signed March 17, 2026, for service from March 20, 2026 to March 19, 2027), with options through March 2030 worth up to $339,415 in all. The Army's requirements list "50 billion images" and "98% accuracy"; its justification memo calls Clearview "sole source facial recognition software" and cites a "99.85% accuracy rating." The 2025 subscription was also five licenses.

Sources: USAspending: Army purchase order W9124726PA016 to Octaris Technologies; Army solicitation W9124726QA005, Clearview AI software licenses; Army brand-name justification memo (Feb 25, 2026); Army salient characteristics (Jan 7, 2026); Biometric Update, Feb 27, 2026; Biometric Update, Jun 17, 2026 (reseller and award value)

[verified] FBI Director confirms warrantless purchase of Americans' location data

Mar 18, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id patel-data-broker

TechCrunch's and Biometric Update's accounts of the hearing read directly (Oct 3, 2026); the committee's hearing page lists the witnesses. Corrected Oct 3, 2026: an earlier version said the DIA "confirmed the same"; its director did not say whether DIA still buys location data.

At the committee's Worldwide Threats hearing, Sen. Ron Wyden asked whether the FBI would stop buying Americans' location data. Patel answered: "We do purchase commercially available information that is consistent with the Constitution and the laws under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act — and it has led to some valuable intelligence for us." TechCrunch reported this is the first time since 2023 the FBI has confirmed buying data from brokers; that year, then-Director Christopher Wray told senators the FBI had bought location data in the past but was not actively buying it. Asked the same question, Defense Intelligence Agency Director James Adams did not say whether DIA still buys location data; he said its purchases of commercially available information go through legal channels and follow the law.

Sources: Senate Intelligence Committee: Open Hearing, Worldwide Threats (Mar 18, 2026); TechCrunch, Mar 18, 2026; Biometric Update, Mar 18, 2026 (FBI and DIA answers); The Conversation

[verified] Bipartisan bill would require warrants for Section 702 searches and data-broker purchases (S.4082)

Mar 12, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id gsra-s4082

Wyden's release and GovTrack's bill page read directly (Oct 3, 2026). Congress.gov blocks scripted downloads, so its page is linked but was not read this pass. Status unchanged: referred to Senate Judiciary.

Introduced March 12, 2026 by Wyden and Lee, with Senators Warren and Lummis as cosponsors; the House companion (H.R. 7901) is from Reps. Davidson and Lofgren. It requires warrants for Section 702 searches of Americans; bans data-broker purchases without a warrant; bans reverse targeting; repeals the 2024 "make everyone a spy" expansion of who can be compelled to help with surveillance; and requires warrants for location data, web browsing, search and chatbot records, and car telematics. EPIC is among the groups supporting it. It is still in the Senate Judiciary Committee, with no floor action found.

Sources: Congress.gov: S.4082; GovTrack: S.4082; Sen. Ron Wyden, press release, Mar 12, 2026; Sen. Mike Lee, press release, Mar 12, 2026

[verified] Hackers leak DHS contracting data naming 6,681 companies and groups

Mar 1, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id dhs-oip-leak

DDoSecrets' release page and TechCrunch's report read directly, and the figures checked against the leaked files themselves, which we hold privately (Oct 3, 2026). The data is the hackers'; DHS has not confirmed it. Cite as "data published by DDoSecrets, reviewed by TechCrunch," not "DHS records." Corrected Oct 3, 2026: an earlier version said researchers told TechCrunch the files look genuine; TechCrunch's article does not say that.

On March 1, 2026, the transparency group DDoSecrets published 17 MB of data that a group calling itself the Department of Peace said it took from DHS's Office of Industry Partnership. It lists 6,681 organizations that applied for DHS contracts, including Palantir, Anduril, Raytheon, Microsoft and Oracle, and a second list of which ones won contracts and what for. The largest awards in the files are $70 million to Cyber Apex Solutions and $59.2 million to SAIC, as TechCrunch reported. Security researcher Micah Lee built a searchable explorer. The group cited the killings of Renée Good and Alex Pretti in Minneapolis. DHS and ICE did not respond to TechCrunch's request for comment, and we have found no independent authentication of the data.

Sources: DDoSecrets, "DHS Contracts" (published Mar 1, 2026); TechCrunch, Mar 2, 2026; Micah Lee, DHS Contracts Explorer; stateofsurveillance.org

[verified] DHS signs a $1 billion buying agreement with Palantir

Feb 12, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id palantir-dhs-bpa

The agreement and its orders read directly in federal award records (Oct 3, 2026). Palantir's internal email is WIRED's reporting. Corrected Oct 3, 2026: earlier versions put FEMA and CISA on the wrong list.

DHS signed the blanket purchase agreement on Feb 12, 2026: up to $1 billion over five years for Palantir's commercial software licenses, maintenance and implementation services across the department. It is issued under Palantir's General Services Administration schedule, and orders placed under it need no separate competition. WIRED reported that this lets agencies like CBP and ICE "essentially skip the competitive bidding process" for new Palantir purchases.

In an internal email, Palantir's chief technology officer, Akash Jain, said the agreement could expand the company's reach to the Secret Service, FEMA, TSA and CISA (WIRED, Feb 19).

Federal award records list three orders under it as of Oct 3, 2026: $18.7 million for the Secret Service ("data modeling," March 18), $86.3 million for the case-management system of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations (April 30) and $45.8 million for case-management and analytics systems at ICE's Homeland Security Investigations (June 24).

Sources: USAspending: DHS blanket purchase agreement 70RTAC26A00000001 with Palantir, and its orders; WIRED, Feb 19, 2026; SiliconANGLE, Feb 19, 2026; Nasdaq

[partial] Mobile Fortify: ICE and CBP's face-scanning phone app

Ongoing · checked v3.31 · id mobile-fortify

DHS's 2025 AI use case inventory and the linked reporting read directly (Oct 3, 2026). Partially verified: the 200 million figure comes from internal ICE material 404 Media viewed and may be a dated lower bound; the 100,000 figure is a lawsuit's allegation. Corrected Oct 3, 2026: an earlier version merged two cases into "misidentifications of US citizens."

Agents point a phone at a face, and the app matches it against government records, including about 200 million images, according to internal ICE material 404 Media viewed. DHS's 2025 AI use case inventory names the vendor: "NEC is the third‑party vendor CBP uses. ICE accesses these capabilities through CBP and does not contract directly with NEC." Illinois and Chicago allege in a lawsuit that DHS launched it around June 2025 and has used it more than 100,000 times. Civil liberties groups say the data, including photos of US citizens, is stored for 15 years. A CBP official testified that the app returned two different, incorrect names for a woman detained in Oregon (404 Media). Separately, Jesus Gutiérrez, a US citizen, told Reveal that agents scanned his face after stopping him on his way home from a Chicago gym.

Sources: DHS, 2025 AI Use Case Inventory (Jan 28, 2026); 404 Media, Jan 19, 2026 (Oregon misidentification); Reveal and 404 Media, Dec 13, 2025; ACLU, Nov 13, 2025; Biometric Update, Nov 27, 2025 (15-year retention); Biometric Update, Jan 13, 2026 (Illinois and Chicago lawsuit); Biometric Update, Jan 29, 2026 (NEC); WIRED

[verified] Supreme Court stays order blocking expanded SAVE voter checks

Jun 22 – Sept 25, 2026 · checked v3.32 · id save-scotus-stay

Supreme Court opinion, government stay application, lower-court record, DHS program documents, Oct. 2 appellate filing and USCIS's Oct. 2 restoration notice read directly. The stay permits nationwide use while the appeal continues, but it is not a final ruling on the merits. USCIS confirms that SAVE user agencies can again create cases with full or partial Social Security numbers and use bulk upload.

On Sept. 25, 2026, the Supreme Court stayed Judge Sparkle Sooknanan's June 22 order setting aside the modified SAVE program in Department of Homeland Security v. League of Women Voters, No. 26A308. The stay lasts through the D.C. Circuit appeal and any timely Supreme Court review. It changes what DHS is legally permitted to do while the case continues; it is not a final decision on the program's lawfulness.

USCIS launched the modified system by May 22, 2025. It added records for U.S.-born citizens, access to Social Security Administration records including Social Security numbers, and a file-upload process that creates individual SAVE cases for multiple people. Sooknanan later held that the changes violated the Social Security Act, the Privacy Act and administrative law. A divided D.C. Circuit panel denied a stay on Sept. 4 before the Supreme Court intervened.

In an unsigned opinion, the Supreme Court majority said the challengers likely have standing but that "their claims likely lack merit." It read 8 U.S.C. § 1373 as likely authorizing DHS to obtain citizenship information despite restrictions elsewhere in federal law, and cited the government's interest in "the proper administration of the midterm elections." Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, dissented. She objected that the Court acted "without full briefing or oral argument" while "disregarding the harms that the modified SAVE system has caused, and will likely continue to cause, to lawful voters."

The litigation had already produced conflicting operational orders. The government said it disabled modified SAVE nationwide after Sooknanan's ruling. Judge T. Kent Wetherell II then ordered DHS to restore bulk-upload and Social Security-number searches for Florida, Indiana, Iowa and Ohio under a November 2025 settlement. In its Sept. 8 application, the government said it had restored the affected features for those four states while keeping them disabled for everyone else.

A USCIS notice last reviewed or updated Oct. 2 resolved the remaining operational question. It says SAVE user agencies "can once again create SAVE cases using a full or partial Social Security number and the SAVE bulk upload tool." USCIS attributes the restoration to the Supreme Court's Sept. 25 stay. The appeal remains pending, and the stay is not a final ruling on whether the modified system is lawful.

“disregarding the harms that the modified SAVE system has caused, and will likely continue to cause, to lawful voters” (Justice Jackson, dissenting, DHS v. League of Women Voters (Sept. 25, 2026))

Sources: DHS v. League of Women Voters, No. 26A308, per curiam opinion and Jackson, J., dissenting (U.S. Sept. 25, 2026) (docket 26A308); Supreme Court docket, No. 26A308 (docket 26A308); DHS v. League of Women Voters, application for stay (U.S. Sept. 8, 2026) (docket 26A308); League of Women Voters v. DHS, D.D.C. docket and appeal record package (Doc. 114) (docket 1:25-cv-03501-SLS); USCIS, USCIS Deploys Common Sense Tools to Verify Voters (May 22, 2025); DHS/USCIS Privacy Impact Assessment for SAVE (Oct. 31, 2025); League of Women Voters v. DHS, joint motion to set briefing schedule (D.C. Cir. Oct. 2, 2026) (docket 26-5243 & 26-5301); USCIS, SAVE Functionality Restored (last reviewed/updated Oct. 2, 2026); SCOTUSblog, Sept. 25, 2026; Democracy Docket, July 7, 2026; Washington Times; SAN

[verified] D.C. Circuit keeps block on IRS-to-ICE disclosure process

Sep 8, 2026 · carried forward · id dc-circuit-affirms-irs

D.C. Circuit opinion read directly Oct. 3, 2026. This ruling addresses the IRS's implementation process, not the earlier Centro ruling that the written IRS-ICE agreement was lawful on its face.

A unanimous panel affirmed the order staying the IRS's Data-Exchange Procedure and requiring notice to the district court before further disclosures. The IRS had used that process to release 47,289 records. For 90.3% of them, it did not check whether ICE supplied a valid taxpayer address, and government counsel acknowledged that some transfers did not comply with the statute.

The appeals court held that the automated procedure was a final agency action that could be reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act and was likely contrary to 26 U.S.C. § 6103. Judge Patricia Millett and Judge Robert Wilkins joined Judge Cornelia Pillard's opinion. This case concerned the agencies' implementation of the agreement; the earlier Centro decision had addressed the agreement's terms on their face.

Sources: Center for Taxpayer Rights v. IRS, No. 26-5006 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 8, 2026) (docket 26-5006); Reuters; AP; Fox News

[verified] Treasury IG: IRS gave ICE addresses for nearly 47,000 people

Jun 4, 2026 · carried forward · id tigta-47000

Confirmed by direct fetch of the report PDF (v3.7).

TIGTA Report No. 2026-IE-R010, "The IRS Provided Addresses for Nearly 47,000 Persons to Immigration and Customs Enforcement." ICE requested address data for over 1.2 million records in June 2025; the IRS matching process failed to catch all invalid matches among the roughly 47,000 records it released (the IRS's own later estimate: under 5% had incomplete or insufficient address information). TIGTA found ICE had not met required data-safeguarding standards before the sharing agreement was signed. No formal recommendations; TIGTA said it would raise the safeguarding findings with the DHS Office of Inspector General.

Sources: TIGTA Report No. 2026-IE-R010 (PDF)

[verified] Court finds IRS unlawfully disclosed taxpayer data about 42,695 times

Feb 26, 2026 · carried forward · id irs-42695-disclosures

D.D.C. ruling read directly Oct. 3, 2026. The 42,695 figure counts requests processed without the required address check; it is not the court's estimate of how many addresses ultimately proved wrong or incomplete.

The IRS disclosed 47,289 taxpayer addresses to ICE through two matching methods. It used tax-identification-number matching for 42,695 of them, or 90.3%, without checking whether ICE's request included the taxpayer's address. Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly found that each disclosure made through that process violated 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2).

That procedural finding is different from the number of requests containing information that later proved incomplete or insufficient. The IRS told the court that its review of all 47,289 requests then estimated fewer than 5% were deficient. Examples included fields reading "Failed to Provide," "Unknown Address" or "NA NA," as well as addresses missing a street name or number.

“approximately 42,695 times” (Judge Kollar-Kotelly)

Sources: Center for Taxpayer Rights v. IRS, No. 1:25-cv-00457, Doc. 74 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2026) (docket 1:25-cv-00457); AP, Feb 26

[verified] D.C. Circuit says federal tax law permits IRS-to-ICE address sharing

Feb 24, 2026 · carried forward · id dc-court-allows-sharing

D.C. Circuit opinion read directly Oct. 3, 2026. Revived from the cut list with its date, holding and limits corrected.

Four organizations serving immigrant communities asked for a preliminary injunction, a temporary court order that would stop the address sharing while their lawsuit continued. The D.C. Circuit affirmed Judge Dabney Friedrich's May 12, 2025 refusal to issue that order. It held that 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2) permits IRS to disclose a taxpayer's mailing address for a non-tax federal criminal investigation without a court order, but not on an informal or open-ended request.

The request must be written and come from the head of a federal agency, an inspector general or certain Justice Department officials. It must give the taxpayer's name and an address already known to belong to that person, the relevant tax periods, the criminal law being investigated and the specific reason the information may matter. The information may go only to government officers directly working on that investigation or related proceedings. The court said these requirements do not permit "freewheeling disclosure of sensitive information."

The ruling approved the agreement on its face, not everything IRS and ICE had done under it. The panel said it was not deciding "the legality of any actions taken by IRS or DHS after they finalized the MOU." It noted the IRS had admitted disclosing information in response to some requests that did not contain valid addresses, but said those compliance questions were not before it in this case.

Sources: Centro de Trabajadores Unidos v. Bessent, No. 25-5181 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 2026) (docket 25-5181)

[verified] Second federal judge blocks IRS-to-ICE address sharing

Feb 5, 2026 · carried forward · id talwani-block

D. Mass. order read directly Oct. 3, 2026. The earlier D.D.C. injunction was also identified in the order, confirming that this was the second federal ruling to block part of the arrangement.

Judge Indira Talwani stayed the IRS-ICE information-sharing arrangements and temporarily barred DHS and ICE from inspecting, using, copying, distributing or otherwise acting on taxpayer information obtained through them. The order remains preliminary: it preserves the situation while the court decides the lawsuit's merits.

A D.C. federal judge had already required the IRS to comply strictly with federal tax-privacy law before making any new disclosure. Talwani's Feb. 5 order went further on ICE's side of the exchange by covering information already received, including the records transferred on Aug. 7, 2025.

Sources: Community Economic Development Center of Southeastern Massachusetts v. Bessent, No. 1:25-cv-12822, Doc. 75 (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 2026) (docket 1:25-cv-12822); Politico, Feb 5

[verified] At least 25 states sent about 67 million voter registrations through SAVE

Since Apr 2025 · carried forward · id save-67m-checks

Associated Press report read directly Oct. 3, 2026. Its 67.4 million total combines 60 million USCIS-reported checks with 7.4 million additional North Carolina records. A Sept. 8 government filing separately reported more than 65 million voters verified across 26 states and 59.7 million requests across 27 participating states; those figures use different measures and cutoffs and are not interchangeable.

The Associated Press reported that at least 25 states had used expanded SAVE to check their voter rolls since April 2025. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services said states ran 60 million registration checks in one year; that figure did not include another 7.4 million registrations North Carolina later sent through the system, bringing the total to at least 67.4 million.

A SAVE match is not a final determination that someone is ineligible to vote. State officials must investigate the result, and AP documented eligible voters who were mistakenly flagged. The figure therefore measures registration records processed through SAVE, not confirmed noncitizens or unique people removed from voter rolls.

Sources: Associated Press, May 17, 2026; Democracy Docket, July 1, 2026; DHS v. League of Women Voters, application for stay (government usage figures, Sept. 8, 2026) (docket 26A308); legalinsurrection.com

[partial] Census report cross-referenced 128M voter records against federal data

undated · carried forward · id census-128m

Listed without its own tag in the research record; sourced to multiple outlets, not named.

A Census report cross-referenced 128M individual voter records against IRS, SSA, State, and DHS data.

Sources: multiple outlets

[partial] Palantir's IRS work: $130M since 2018

Since 2018 · carried forward · id palantir-irs

Listed without its own tag in the research record.

Palantir has received $130M for IRS work since 2018.

Sources: American Oversight via TechCrunch

[verified] CBP and Border Patrol get Clearview AI access

Feb 11, 2026 · carried forward · id cbp-clearview

Fully confirmed, direct primary quote.

CBP's February 2026 Statement of Work authorizes 15 Clearview AI licenses for one year. Access extends to Border Patrol's headquarters intelligence division and the National Targeting Center. Two 2025 precursor purchase orders: Spokane Sector, $30,000, and Yuma Sector, $15,000, both issued June 23, 2025.

“total contract value of $225,000.” (CBP Statement of Work, Feb 2026)

Sources: Biometric Update; FedScoop

[verified] ICE's $9.2M Clearview contract

Sept 5, 2025 · carried forward · id ice-clearview-9m

Verified; date corrected in v3.0 (signed Sept 5, 2025, not June 2026).

Signed September 5, 2025. Total contract value $9.2M, $3.75M obligated up front. Covers CSAM investigations and "assaults against law enforcement officers" investigations.

Sources: Washington Post; Biometric Update

[verified] DHS takes down its facial-recognition directive, calls it website maintenance as use expands

Feb 2025 · checked v3.32 · id dhs-fr-policy-deleted

WIRED, Biometric Update and the Brennan Center read directly Oct. 3, 2026. The date is corrected from February 2026 to February 2025. DHS says the takedown did not change policy; the same public record shows no replacement people could inspect and continuing uncertainty about what rules governed expanding use.

DHS issued Directive 026-11 in September 2023. It said facial recognition could not be the sole basis for enforcement, barred systemic or indiscriminate monitoring and targeting people for exercising constitutional rights, gave people an opt-out in some non-law-enforcement uses, and required headquarters-level review for ICE and CBP uses. Online archives reviewed by WIRED show the directive disappeared from DHS's website three weeks after President Trump's January 2025 inauguration.

DHS told Biometric Update the removal was routine website maintenance, not a policy change. But a May 2025 Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board report said DHS had not clarified whether the directive still applied or whether it planned a replacement. In February 2026, EPIC's Jeramie Scott told WIRED that DHS had not publicly replaced it. The Brennan Center's data, current through July 26, 2026, still described the policy as taken down and said it was unclear what policy, if any, governed DHS's use of facial recognition.

DHS expanded its use while leaving that question unanswered. WIRED found that Mobile Fortify was fast-tracked in May 2025, less than two months after the directive disappeared, after ICE and CBP assumed more control over privacy review. By July 2026, the Brennan Center found more than $1 billion spent or promised on biometrics in recent years, including mobile face and iris matching that put the capability directly in agents' hands.

“They do not represent a change in policy” (DHS spokesperson, via Biometric Update, Oct. 31, 2025)

“DHS has not publicly replaced its previous facial recognition directive” (Jeramie Scott, EPIC, via WIRED, Feb. 5, 2026)

Sources: WIRED, Feb. 5, 2026; Biometric Update, Oct. 31, 2025; Brennan Center, Sept. 16, 2026

[retracted] "D.C. Circuit halted DHS nationwide face database on Fourth Amendment grounds"

undated · checked v3.0 · id fr-database-halt

Investigated, likely fabricated (v3.0). Do not cite. Cut list #5.

Traces to a single low-quality site (jurisreview.com) with no docket number, a fabricated case name, and an uncorroborated quote.

Sources: none

[verified] DHS plans up to $440M in government-wide purchases of face, iris and fingerprint scanners, including border cameras that read every car occupant's face

Sept 10, 2026 · checked v3.29 · id dhs-biometric-device-gwac

Solicitation read directly. These are planned amounts, not money spent. No awards yet.

On Sept 10, 2026, DHS's Office of Procurement Operations issued a solicitation for a government-wide, multiple-award contract for biometric capture devices, under which DHS and other agencies intend to spend up to $440,736,478 over up to five years. DHS components must use it, and contracting officers at any federal agency can order from it. It has five tracks (fingerprint, face, iris, palmprint and multi-modal), and DHS estimates $258.3 million for multi-modal devices alone.

The requirements include cameras mounted at land ports of entry that automatically photograph every occupant of a car through the windshield as it approaches the inspection booth at 5 to 20 mph. The images go to CBP's Traveler Verification Service to be matched against photos in "Government holdings." Vendors must say whether the cameras capture faces when occupants look away or are asleep, and through masks, visors, hats and sunglasses. Optional face requirements include capture at 2 to 400 meters with remote pan, tilt and zoom, and matching a person's "Scars, Marks, and Tattoos."

DHS says the contract replaces one-off device purchases scattered across agencies. Proposals were due Sept 18, 2026. No award had been posted on SAM.gov as of Sept 29.

“Capture 100% of front seat vehicle passengers and 90% of backseat and third row seat passengers” (DHS solicitation 70RDA126R00000001, Attachment 3 (face requirements))

Sources: DHS Request for Proposal 70RDA126R00000001, Biometric Capture Devices (Sept. 10, 2026); Attachment 3: Minimum Essential Requirements (face track: FACE-SPECIFIC-47, 56-65, 110-111, 124); SF 1449, 70RDA126R00000001; SAM.gov listing, Biometric Capture Device GWAC

[verified] Rapid DNA: $10.1M to SNA International

Aug 2026 · carried forward · id rapid-dna

Verified part of a split August enforcement-spending entry.

$10.1M to SNA International for Rapid DNA. An adjacent Capgemini figure may be larger than the $4.8M cited (a possible ~$14.45M additional task order, ~$19.3M obligated to date per two deep-research reports), not independently re-verified.

Sources: Newsweek, Aug 25

[verified] ICE bans Meta smart glasses agency-wide

Aug 18, 2026 · carried forward · id ice-meta-glasses-ban

Carried forward, not re-checked in v3.28.

ICE acting director David Venturella barred all agency employees from wearing Meta's camera-equipped smart glasses on the job, as they qualify as personal body-worn cameras. Separately, DHS requested $7.5M to build its own government smart glasses with real-time biometric ID lookup for agents.

Sources: NYT; The Register, Aug 19; Gizmodo; Tom's Guide; TechRepublic; SC Media

[retracted] Not yet verified: ICE's reported $57M on skip tracing in one month

Aug 2026 · carried forward · id skip-tracing-57m

Unverified, stays cut. Cut list #2.

No primary source found for this figure.

Sources: none

[verified] ICE hires a contractor to run a national 287(g) coordination center

Jul 28, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id 287g-center

Federal award record and ICE's November 2025 request for information read directly (Oct 3, 2026). Earlier versions listed this as unconfirmed; revived Oct 3, 2026 after Project Salt Box pointed to the award.

ICE signed the task order on July 28, 2026, with work from Aug. 6: $17,456,917.40 now and up to $63,035,230.95 with options through August 2030, for support services for Enforcement and Removal Operations' 287(g) National Coordination Center. ICE competed it among small businesses holding GSA's OASIS+ contract, and five offers came in; it is the only order placed so far on Koniag's OASIS+ contract.

ICE's request for information from November 2025 describes what it wanted: a center using "data-enabled technology to receive and process 6,000 to 7,000 calls per day" from 287(g) partners, staffed around the clock to "analyze data, perform database cross-checks, and confirm enforcement actions in the field." Separate cells would give partners and ICE field offices "UAC targeting focus and material" for locating unaccompanied children, and the same for reducing ICE's non-detained docket (people going through immigration court who are not in detention). Another would identify "emerging technologies" for the program. ICE asked vendors what technology would "integrate partner and alien data with our systems." The awarded contract's own terms have not been published; Tennessee Lookout reported contract documents describing the same duties.

The request for information placed the center in "the greater Nashville, TN metro area." Tennessee Lookout reported on Aug. 11 that the federal database listed Adams, a Robertson County town; WSMV reported on Aug. 21, from federal filings, that it was planned for Nashville's Donelson area (ZIP code 37214), the ZIP code on the award record. ICE data cited by Tennessee Lookout show 287(g) agreements grew from fewer than 200 before January 2025 to 2,179 by August 2026.

Separately, the Javorsky complaint alleges California plate-reader data reached over 300 out-of-state agencies including 287(g) participants; that concerns Flock data sharing, not this center.

Sources: USAspending: ICE task order 70CDCR26FR0000034 to Koniag Services, 287(g) National Coordination Center; ICE request for information, 287(g) Program National Call Center (November 2025); Tennessee Lookout, Aug 11, 2026; WSMV, Aug 21, 2026; Project Salt Box, Sept 18, 2026

[verified] Meta's smart glasses: border agents wear them on raids, and Meta licensed police-and-Pentagon face recognition for them

June 2025 – June 2026 · checked v3.29 · id meta-glasses-agents-face-recognition

Agents' use is from photos and video verified by 404 Media. The face-recognition code is WIRED's finding, reproduced by EFF. The Kenya review is the class action's allegation.

Border agents have worn Meta's Ray-Ban smart glasses on immigration raids: a CBP agent at a June 30, 2025 raid outside a Home Depot in Los Angeles, and a Border Patrol agent in Charlotte, North Carolina, with the recording light on (reported Dec. 9, 2025). CBP told 404 Media it has no arrangement with Meta and doesn't allow employees to use personal recording devices.

Meta has been building face recognition into the same glasses. An internal Meta document from May 2025, reported by The New York Times in February 2026, planned to launch the feature, called "Name Tag," "during a dynamic political environment where many civil society groups that we would expect to attack us would have their resources focused on other concerns." In April 2026, 75 groups including the ACLU and EPIC asked Meta to drop it, warning it is "primed to be coopted for police surveillance, circumventing the Fourth Amendment," and asked Meta to disclose any discussions with ICE and CBP. In June 2026, WIRED found the face-recognition code already inside the Meta AI app, downloaded over 50 million times, built to pull faceprints from Meta's servers. EFF confirmed it and found it removed in a June 5 update. Meta says nothing has shipped to consumers and it is "not building a central face database."

The face recognition Meta tested came from Rank One Computing, which gets about 80 percent of its revenue from government clients. It sells to the U.S. Marshals Service, the Navy's police force (NCIS) and police departments, and built long-range face recognition for U.S. Special Operations Command. Its CEO previously ran the FBI division that operates the bureau's biometric databases. A Rank One license obtained by WIRED, covering up to 10 million face templates, is tied to a test version of the Meta AI app, and traces of the integration shipped, dormant, to consumers in June 2026. Meta declined to say why it licensed the software or whether the relationship continues.

A class action filed March 4, 2026 alleges that footage from the glasses' AI features goes to Meta's servers and is reviewed by contract workers in Kenya (N.D. Cal. No. 3:26-cv-01897, now In re Meta AI Glasses Litigation).

“We will launch during a dynamic political environment where many civil society groups that we would expect to attack us would have their resources focused on other concerns” (Meta Reality Labs internal document, via The New York Times)

“This invasion of privacy is also primed to be coopted for police surveillance, circumventing the Fourth Amendment” (Coalition letter to Meta, Apr. 13, 2026)

Sources: 404 Media, "A CBP Agent Wore Meta Smart Glasses to an Immigration Raid in Los Angeles" (Aug. 7, 2025); 404 Media, "Border Patrol Agent Recorded Raid with Meta's Ray-Ban Smart Glasses" (Dec. 9, 2025); The New York Times, "Meta Plans to Add Facial Recognition Technology to Its Smart Glasses" (Feb. 13, 2026); Coalition letter to Meta from 75 organizations (Apr. 13, 2026); WIRED, "Meta Silently Added Face-Recognition Code for Its Smart Glasses to Millions of Phones" (June 4, 2026); EFF, "Move Fast, Surveil Things" (June 4, 2026); EFF, "Victory! Meta Strips Facial Recognition Code from Smart Glasses App After Public Outcry" (June 8, 2026); WIRED, "Meta Tapped a Pentagon Supplier to Prototype Face Recognition for Its Glasses" (June 15, 2026); Bartone v. Meta Platforms, No. 3:26-cv-01897, Class Action Complaint (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2026) (docket 3:26-cv-01897)

[partial] Palantir ELITE: ICE's raid-targeting app, and ICE's plan to load voter data into it

June 2026 · checked v3.33 · id palantir-elite

Substance confirmed; the date was flagged in v3.5. Disclosure may have been earlier than June, not independently re-verified; the raid-targeting description is carried forward, not re-checked. Updated Oct 9, 2026: ICE's own records (FOIA release to Democracy Forward, Oct 1, 2026) read directly for the voter-data plan. They show preparation, not completed entry. Palantir's denial is WIRED's report, read directly.

Integrates improperly obtained Medicaid addresses and decides which neighborhoods to raid.

Updated Oct 9, 2026. ICE records released under FOIA to Democracy Forward show Homeland Security Investigations preparing voter data for ELITE in 2026. A May 26 email says coordination continued "particularly on ingesting processed voter roll data into the ELITE enforcement system." HSI's weekly reports list a DOJ dataset of 50.6 million records, 48.4 million records "obtained by DAS Heather Honey through independent sources of information," and about 26,000 USCIS-derived records. These are counts of records, not people. A July 6 report says data for six states (Missouri, Michigan, New Mexico, Connecticut, Georgia and Kentucky) had been enriched and was "pending Palantir entry into ELITE," and that Michigan and New Mexico were on hold for legal review under a court order in State of California v. Trump.

The records do not show that any voter data was actually entered. A Palantir spokesman told WIRED: "Voter roll data has never been integrated into ELITE."

“a list of 20 million people on their iPhones.” (Senior ICE official)

“MO, MI, NM, CT, GA and KY have been enriched by the iLab and are pending Palantir entry into ELITE.” (HSI Election Integrity Investigations weekly report, July 6, 2026 (ICE FOIA release))

Sources: WBUR / 404 Media; ICE FOIA release to Democracy Forward, 2026-ICLI-00100 (Oct. 1, 2026); WIRED, ICE Emails Discuss Using Palantir-Supported Tool to Investigate Voter Fraud (Oct. 8, 2026)

[verified] ICE buys iris scanners from BI2 Technologies

May 27, 2026 · carried forward · id bi2-iris-scanners

Fully confirmed, direct primary quote.

ICE awarded a no-bid ceiling contract to BI2 Technologies, providing access to I.R.I.S., "a database of more than five million booking, arrest, and incarceration records from 47 US states." Potentially 1,770 devices on US streets by end of May 2027.

“US immigration cops have doled out about $25.1 million to a company called Bi2 Technologies for 1,570 biometric recognition devices” (The Register)

Sources: The Register; NPR, May 27; FedScoop; Biometric Update; Brennan Center

[retracted] "CBP issued a May 2026 alert about civilian smart glasses"

May 2026 · checked v3.3 · id cbp-glasses-alert

Retracted in v3.3. Stays retracted. Cut list #13.

Retracted. No support found.

Sources: none

[verified] ICE seeks contractors to monitor social media for deportation leads

Oct 2025 · checked v3.5 · id ice-social-media-rfi

Confirmed v3.0; framing corrected v3.1; headcount corrected v3.5. This is an RFI-stage contractor plan, not "ICE is hiring."

ICE is seeking contractors for two centers: the National Criminal Analysis and Targeting Center in Williston, VT (12 staff) and the Pacific Enforcement Response Center in Santa Ana, CA (16 staff), 28 planned personnel in total ("about 30" was journalistic rounding). Estimated contract value $20M to $50M; work could begin as early as May 2026.

Sources: VTDigger, Oct 6, 2025; The Register, Oct 3, 2025; The Conversation, Nov 2025

[verified] Elser v. Flock Group: Colorado lawsuit over a theft charge built on a month of Flock history

Oct 5, 2026 · checked v3.33 · id elser-v-flock

Complaint read in full from the court record (Oct 9, 2026), with the docket. What happened to Elser and what Flock did are the plaintiff's allegations; no defendant had responded as of Oct 9. Flock's reported response to the press is not in the complaint and is not used here.

Elser v. Flock Group, Inc., No. 1:26-cv-04977-NYW (D. Colo.), filed Oct 5, 2026, before Judge Nina Y. Wang. Defendants: Flock; the Towns of Columbine Valley and Bow Mar; Columbine Valley police Sgt. Jamie Milliman; and Chief Bret Cottrell.

The complaint alleges that after a package worth "twenty-five dollars or less" was stolen in Bow Mar on Sept 22, 2025, by a woman who left on foot, Milliman searched Flock for vehicles nearby, found Elser's truck, and pulled about a month of its history. Six Flock cameras cover all three entrances to Bow Mar. He served her a theft summons at her Denver home on Sept 27 and, she says, refused to look at her truck's camera footage. Her truck's GPS, her phone's location history and her tailor's cameras placed her at a fitting more than a quarter mile away. The chief voided the summons on Oct 15, 2025.

The complaint also alleges that Columbine Valley was Flock's first Colorado customer, that Flock trained both officers, and that in November 2021 Flock opened the towns' cameras to all of its police customers in Colorado. It brings six claims: federal unreasonable-search and malicious-prosecution claims, two Colorado constitutional claims against the officers, and two class claims against Flock alone (intrusion upon seclusion and negligence) on behalf of everyone whose vehicle Flock's Colorado cameras have photographed. Elser asks the court to order Flock to build a warrant requirement, case numbers, supervisory approval and auditing into its system for Colorado agencies.

All of this is the plaintiff's account. No defendant had responded as of Oct 9, 2026.

“searched Flock's database for the historical movements of her truck to surveil her every movement by and through Bow Mar over the past month” (Elser v. Flock Group, complaint (Doc. 1), para. 53 (plaintiff's allegation))

Sources: Elser v. Flock Group, No. 1:26-cv-04977-NYW, Doc. 1, class action complaint (D. Colo. Oct. 5, 2026) (docket 1:26-cv-04977-NYW); CourtListener docket 74922498 (docket 1:26-cv-04977-NYW)

[verified] U.S. v. Kyle: federal judge holds a warrantless month of plate-reader history unconstitutional

Oct 1, 2026 · checked v3.33 · id kyle-suppression

Opinion and order read in full from the court record (Oct 9, 2026), with the docket. The evidence was suppressed on two independent grounds; the plate-reader holding is one of them. The 91 pounds of methamphetamine some outlets report is not in the order and is not used here. One district court; the government may still appeal.

United States v. Melisa Susan Kyle, No. 4:26-cr-00189-SEH (N.D. Okla.), Document 62, Judge Sara E. Hill. A Tulsa County deputy who has served as a DEA task-force officer saw a rental Mazda with a California plate, followed it "for no apparent reason other than the fact that it had a California license plate," and queried two plate-reader systems, Flock and VehicleManager. They returned about a month of the car's travel, including a short trip to the California/Arizona border and back. He stopped Kyle for following too closely, gave her a warning, and then held her for a dog sniff after she refused a search.

The court suppressed the evidence on two independent grounds. First, the stop was lawful, but the deputy extended it without reasonable suspicion. Second, the plate-reader search was itself a Fourth Amendment search, made without a warrant or probable cause. Reading Carpenter and Chatrie, the court held that drivers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in "the whole of their physical movements," and called the networks "a type of indiscriminate mass surveillance."

It is one district court. The order says it departs from "nearly every court examining the issue to date," including three other Oklahoma federal courts, and that neither the Tenth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has decided the question. As of Oct 9, 2026, the trial had been cancelled, Kyle was released on conditions, and no appeal had been filed.

“Alaniz's search in just the ALPR system provided him with more than 50 individual records of Kyle's whereabouts across the country for an entire month.” (Judge Sara E. Hill, Doc. 62)

“It is not too much to draw the line at indiscriminate mass surveillance.” (Judge Sara E. Hill, Doc. 62)

Sources: U.S. v. Kyle, No. 4:26-cr-00189-SEH, Doc. 62, opinion and order (N.D. Okla. Oct. 1, 2026) (docket 4:26-cr-00189-SEH); CourtListener docket 73367327 (docket 4:26-cr-00189-SEH)

[verified] Lufkin, TX officer pleads guilty to 100 felony counts of Flock misuse; 5 years in prison per count

Aug 20 – Sept 30, 2026 · checked v3.30 · id klein-lufkin

Register of actions read directly (Oct 1, 2026). Identity match to the "K ZAC" operator confirmed in v3.26, correcting v3.25. Not shown on the register: whether the 100 sentences run concurrently or consecutively. The KWTX statement is paraphrased from its video report. Updated Oct 1, 2026; earlier versions ended with the Sept 28 arraignment.

Zachary Anthony Klein, an 11-year Lufkin PD veteran, was arrested by Texas Rangers on Aug. 20, 2026 on abuse-of-official-capacity and tampering charges, six days after USA TODAY asked Lufkin police about his Flock use. Case No. 2026-0455, State of Texas v. Zachary Klein, 159th Judicial District Court, Angelina County: 100 counts under Tex. Penal Code § 39.06(e), each a third-degree felony, filed 08/21/2026. The counts are dated 07/31/2024 to 05/19/2026. Bond was set at $500,000 and reduced to $250,000 at his Sept. 28, 2026 arraignment (KTRE). On Sept. 30, 2026, he pleaded guilty to all 100 counts before Judge Todd Kassaw and was convicted on each; the court committed him directly to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for 5 years on each count, starting that day, with 42 days of jail credit. The register does not say whether the sentences run concurrently. Lufkin PD suspended department-wide Flock use and began an audit.

Reported search counts: about 45,000 total Flock queries (Yahoo/Newsweek; haveibeenflocked.com's operator tally is 45,318); "more than 10,000" (IJ.org database); and more than 3,400 searches on a single plate over 10 months (USA TODAY). The Flock audit logs Lufkin PD released to us on Oct. 1, 2026 list 22,813 queries under his name from June 2024 to December 2025, with no file for May 2025; the most-searched plate appears 8,708 times. His targets: vehicles of 11 people (Lufkin Daily News) versus seven license plates (USA TODAY).

The Angelina County District Attorney's office said a Texas Rangers investigation found more than 25,000 Flock inquiries for non-law-enforcement purposes, about 18,000 of them on plates associated with three people: his ex-girlfriend, her family members and people she has dated. He also agreed to a lifetime protective order on the basis of stalking for his former dating partner (CBS19, Sept. 30). He had been booked on tampering with a governmental record and abuse of official capacity (Lufkin Daily News); KWTX reported that the state agreed not to pursue those two unindicted charges. A second Lufkin officer, placed on leave after some of his searches were flagged in the department's audit, was cleared by the Texas Rangers on Sept. 15 (Lufkin Daily News).

“In Texas, officer Zachary Klein of the Lufkin Police Department used Flock to repeatedly search seven license plates, USA TODAY's analysis found, including one more than 3,400 times over 10 months. His stated reason for each search was simply, 'INVESTIGATION.'” (USA TODAY, Aug. 28, 2026)

“The department recently became aware of potential issues and immediately began an audit into the use of the technology” (Lufkin PD PIO Jackie Zimmerman)

Sources: Angelina County Register of Actions, Case No. 2026-0455 (as of Oct. 1, 2026: plea and sentence) (docket 2026-0455); Lufkin PD response to our records request (Oct. 1, 2026); Lufkin PD, Flock audit logs of Klein's queries, 18 CSV files (released Oct. 1, 2026; plates masked); CBS19 / Tyler Morning Telegraph, Sept. 30, 2026 (Angelina County DA release); KWTX video, Sept. 30, 2026; Lufkin Daily News, Sept. 15, 2026; USA TODAY, Aug. 28, 2026 (updated Sept. 3); USA TODAY Flock-search database; Lufkin Daily News, Aug. 22, 2026; KTRE, Sept. 28, 2026; haveibeenflocked.com; Yahoo/Newsweek; NPR

[verified] HIDTA hubs: a White House drug program collects local plate-reader data, and DEA's national system can draw on it

Jan 2023 – Sept 2026 · checked v3.30 · id hidta-alpr-hubs

Primary records read directly: DEA's privacy impact assessment, both versions of the Atlanta-Carolinas HIDTA agreement, Georgia DOT's permit guidance, Glynn County's minutes, Baytown's ordinance, statement of work and budget, and the White House page. Flock's Georgia page is the vendor's own description. Not established: which HIDTAs actually pass data to DEA's system, and how many local agencies feed HIDTA servers nationwide. 404 Media's report (Sept 30, 2026) that cities are "forced" is supported in Georgia by the state's permit condition.

The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program, a grant program of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, runs regional servers that collect license plate reader data from local police. DEA's December 2024 privacy impact assessment for its National License Plate Reader Program says a HIDTA can serve as a "regional hub": "These contributing agencies transmit their LPR data to servers maintained by regional hubs pursuant to their individual MOUs, which stipulate that this data may be shared with the NLPRP system." DEA reported MOUs with "over 250 law enforcement agencies and hubs" and keeps plate images 90 days. It named the risk of "on-going tracking of individual's travels" and rated it mitigated, saying its coverage is too limited for nationwide tracking.

The Atlanta-Carolinas HIDTA has member agencies send plate data to its Operations Center, where it is kept as long as state law or the agency's policy sets, or otherwise up to two years, at no cost to the agencies. The data is "not open to the public," and only the originating agency may release it in response to a public records request. The 2023 version of its agreement said "Member Agencies are not required to contribute data to the AC-HIDTA LPR System"; the 2025 version drops that sentence, though each agency still decides "within its sole discretion" which records to share.

Georgia makes sharing a condition of using state roads. Under Georgia DOT guidance effective Oct 16, 2024, an agency seeking a permit for plate readers on state routes commits "to ensure data availability, at no additional cost, for all LPR's which might be installed under that permit across the law enforcement community," and if the data stops being available, "Georgia DOT will revoke its permit." The guidance does not name HIDTA, but local records show the HIDTA agreement being required: on Nov 20, 2025, Glynn County approved a "required HIDTA Memorandum of Agreement, required by the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT), to move forward with permitting for Flock Safety Cameras." Brunswick's police department told its commission in September 2026 that the agreement is "required by GDOT to approve any ALPR cameras on GDOT rights-of-way" for its Axon cameras, and described sharing only on request; the agreement itself says member agencies' plate data "will be transmitted to the HLPRIP Operations Center." Flock tells Georgia customers they "must sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with HIDTA"; as of Oct 1, 2026, its page says HIDTA users can see how many matches a plate has in Flock's database, the time of the latest match and the owning agency, but not the reads, locations or images.

In Texas, the City of Baytown, which "serves as the Administrator of HIDTA funds" for Houston HIDTA, authorized up to $306,800 on Nov 13, 2025 for a Houston HIDTA contract with Recruitful LLC "for creating and maintaining an LPR database." The statement of work names the project "National License Plate Reader Platform - Phase 5.0" and moves it from a mainframe to a government cloud, keeping integrations with Flock and other sources working. In April 2026 the White House named Houston HIDTA its HIDTA of the Year, citing its "automated license plate reader platform that brings together all levels of law enforcement."

“These contributing agencies transmit their LPR data to servers maintained by regional hubs pursuant to their individual MOUs, which stipulate that this data may be shared with the NLPRP system.” (DEA privacy impact assessment, National License Plate Reader Program (Dec. 20, 2024))

Sources: DEA, Privacy Impact Assessment for the National License Plate Reader Program and DEA Special Intelligence Link (Dec. 20, 2024); Atlanta-Carolinas HIDTA, Memorandum of Understanding (Jan. 31, 2023), via MuckRock; City of Baytown, Ordinance No. 16,319 and statement of work (Nov. 13, 2025); White House, ONDCP honors law enforcement (Apr. 6, 2026); Atlanta-Carolinas HIDTA, HIDTA License Plate Reader Integration Project MOU (2025), via Glynn County; Georgia DOT, License Plate Reader Guidance (effective Oct. 16, 2024); Glynn County Board of Commissioners, minutes (Nov. 20, 2025); City of Brunswick, commission agenda packet with HIDTA agreement (Sept. 16, 2026); City of Baytown, FY2021-22 Adopted Budget (HIDTA fund); Flock Safety, Georgia DOT LPR camera sharing process (vendor page, as of Oct. 1, 2026); 404 Media, Sept 30, 2026

[verified] Schott v. Bexar County: jury finds county policy behind an unconstitutional stop flagged by a fusion center

Mar 2022 – Sept 28, 2026 · checked v3.30 · id schott-verdict

Verdict form, the magistrate judge's report and Schott's filings read directly. The fusion-center flag is the court's account; the plate-reader and WhatsApp details are Schott's, and the jury was not asked about them. Judgment not yet entered as of Oct 1, 2026; post-trial motions and appeal are open.

In March 2022, Bexar County Sheriff's Office Deputy Joel Babb stopped Houston resident Alek Schott on I-35 while he drove home from a business trip, and deputies searched his truck. "No drugs were found," the magistrate judge's February 2026 report says. The report describes how Schott was picked: the "Laredo Fusion Center," which Sheriff Javier Salazar described as a police-intelligence unit, "took notice of Schott's trip" and told the county's Criminal Interdiction Unit he had made a "one-day turnaround," and an informant known only as "Kiki" passed it to Babb.

On Sept 28, 2026, a federal jury in San Antonio (No. 5:23-cv-00706, Judge Orlando L. Garcia) found that an officer with Babb's information would not have had reasonable suspicion for the stop or for extending it, that deputies searched the truck without probable cause, and that a Bexar County policy or custom was the "moving force" behind all three, one a county policymaker knew or should have known about. It awarded the $76 Schott asked for.

Schott, represented by the Institute for Justice, says "a license plate reader flagged his truck" and that the tip came through "a private WhatsApp group chat." His summary-judgment motion, citing deputies' depositions, says each interdiction car carried four plate readers that fed "a vast database of scans from other agencies and commercial sources." The jury was not asked about plate readers.

“The Laredo Fusion Center, meanwhile, took notice of Schott's trip and communicated to the CIU that Schott had performed a "one-day turnaround."” (Magistrate Judge Richard B. Farrer, report and recommendation, Schott v. Bexar County (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2026))

Sources: Schott v. Bexar County, No. 5:23-cv-00706, jury verdict (W.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2026) (docket 5:23-cv-00706); Same case, report and recommendation on summary judgment (Feb. 26, 2026) (docket 5:23-cv-00706); Same case, plaintiff's statement of claims (Sept. 2, 2026) (docket 5:23-cv-00706); Same case, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability (June 11, 2025) (docket 5:23-cv-00706)

[verified] 227 local governments have canceled plate-reader contracts

Sept 22, 2026 · checked v3.28 · id cancellation-count

IJ.org's live database fetched directly in v3.28. The 227 individual entries and their source links have not been independently checked, so they are not mapped here.

Institute for Justice's database (which excludes pauses and vendor swaps): 163 local governments across 31 states plus DC as of Sept 3, 2026, growing to 227 as of Sept 22, 2026. Newsweek and DeFlock (Aug 27): at least 56 cities and towns in 2026 alone; DeFlock's late-July breakdown was 47 canceled, 25 rejected, 22 deactivated. Per the Javorsky complaint's footnotes, Santa Cruz, Richmond, Los Gatos, and Los Altos Hills are weighing or ending Flock contracts, alongside Mountain View and Los Altos.

“As of Sept. 22, 2026, 227 local governments are included in IJ's database” (Institute for Justice)

Sources: Institute for Justice cancellation database; Yahoo/Newsweek; findingflock.com; deflocktheusa.com; Local News Matters, Feb 3, 2026; Los Gatan, Jan 28, 2026

[verified] Culver City and Carson: federal court denies suppression of two ALPR systems

Sept 10, 2026 · checked v3.24 · id riley-holly

Order read directly (v3.18). Carson retention framing corrected v3.20 and layered v3.24. The order appears to misdate a Weeks citation (1960 for the 1914 case); flagged, not corrected on our authority.

United States v. Melvin L. Riley and Kenneth Michael Holly, Jr., No. 2:25-cr-00380-VAP (C.D. Cal.), Document 181, Judge Virginia A. Phillips. Culver City's Flock system (52 cameras, 28 intersections, about 4% intersection coverage, about 18M photos a month, 30-day retention) and Carson's Motorola system (85 fixed cameras plus 4 trailers, 31 locations, about 75% of entry and exit points, data "maintained for five years" as of April 2025) were both used.

Five years is Carson's own configured policy, not a Motorola limit. Motorola's own FAQ says data "is held according to the retention policy set forth by you," with no vendor default or ceiling. LASD, which runs Carson's system, has a written policy (MPP 5-09/550.05): 2 years active, then archived, permanently deleted at 5 years. LASD's policy states zero inter-agency agreements with any federal agency for this system.

The court denied suppression, distinguishing Carpenter, Chatrie, and Beautiful Struggle on the same bounded-snapshot reasoning as Schmidt, Church, and Jackson.

“is held according to the retention policy set forth by you [the agency]... Retention policies may be adjusted by the Agency or Site Manager at any time” (Motorola Solutions, LPR data management FAQ)

Sources: U.S. v. Riley, No. 2:25-cr-00380-VAP, Doc. 181 (C.D. Cal.) (docket 2:25-cr-00380-VAP); Motorola Solutions LPR data management FAQ (PDF); LASD MPP 5-09/550.05; LASD Civilian Oversight Commission presentation

[verified] Norfolk points the Fourth Circuit to a pending Supreme Court petition on plate-reader searches

Sept 9, 2026 · carried forward · id schmidt-similar-case

Norfolk's filing read directly (Doc. 63, obtained Sept 28, 2026); Supreme Court docket fetched directly. Our earlier working guess, Chatrie v. United States, was wrong.

On Sept 8, 2026 the Clerk's Office asked both sides whether any similar case is pending in the Fourth Circuit or the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs-Appellants answered "NO". Defendants-Appellees answered "YES" on Sept 9 and named Porter v. United States, No. 26-5121: Elijah Porter's petition from the Fifth Circuit's March 17, 2026 decision (No. 25-60163), which held that accessing plate-reader data was not a Fourth Amendment search. The petition was distributed for the Supreme Court's Sept 28, 2026 conference. If the Court takes it, the Supreme Court will decide the question at the center of Schmidt.

“A pending petition for certiorari in Porter v. United States, No. 26-5121, presents the question whether a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment by accessing a database containing automatic license plate reader data. The petition also raises an unrelated Second Amendment question. The Supreme Court has not acted on the petition.” (Norfolk's Response - Similar Cases, Sept 9, 2026 (Doc. 63))

Sources: Fourth Circuit docket, No. 26-1227 (docket 26-1227); Response - Similar Cases, Defendants-Appellees (Doc. 63) (docket 26-1227); Supreme Court docket, No. 26-5121 (docket 26-5121)

[verified] U.S. v. Riley Thomas: court orders a hearing on how Flock was used

Sept 9, 2026 · checked v3.19 · id riley-thomas

Docket and order read directly (v3.19). A reconsideration request is pending; treat the hearing order as current but not final. Not a ruling that Flock is unconstitutional.

United States v. Riley Thomas, No. 5:25-cr-00095-PCP (N.D. Cal.), Document 79, Judge P. Casey Pitts. Unlike every other ALPR ruling here, the order does not decide the Fourth Amendment question on the papers. It holds the record insufficient to decide "whether the particular Flock database search intruded on Thomas's protected privacy rights" and orders an evidentiary hearing, with Detective Angelo Claussen to testify. On Sept 22, 2026 the government moved for leave to seek reconsideration; no ruling as of Sept 23. The defendant's first name is Riley; this case is unrelated to U.S. v. Riley (C.D. Cal.).

“Because the lawfulness of both the Flock search and the vehicle search cannot be resolved on the evidence before the Court, it will hold an evidentiary hearing on those matters.” (Judge P. Casey Pitts, Doc. 79)

Sources: CourtListener docket 69873978 (docket 5:25-cr-00095-PCP); Doc. 79 order (PDF), N.D. Cal.

[partial] Schmidt appeal: argument tentatively set for Dec 8-11, with an unresolved conflict

Sept 8, 2026 · checked v3.28 · id schmidt-argument-date

Confirmed against the docket. The date itself is not settled; likely to move to January or March 2027.

On Sept 8, 2026 the case was "TENTATIVELY CALENDARED for oral argument during the December 8-11, 2026, argument session," with a Sept 15 deadline to flag conflicts. Plaintiffs-Appellants' lead counsel is unavailable Dec 8-9 but available Dec 10-11. Defendants-Appellees' counsel (Elaine Goldenberg) is unavailable all four days and states she is "fully available during the Court's January and March sittings." No order resolving this had been entered as of Sept 23, 2026.

Sources: Fourth Circuit docket, No. 26-1227 (docket 26-1227); UNC School of Government post, Sept 14, 2026

[verified] Florida revokes ALPR permits on state rights-of-way

Sept 1, 2026 · carried forward · id fdot-alpr-permits

Part of the Flock backlash entries, verified with primaries pulled.

Aug 31 memo, widely reported Sept 1: DeSantis and FDOT revoke ALPR permits on state rights-of-way. Cameras off within 30 days; no future ALPR permits.

Sources: WUSF; Bay News 9; ClickOrlando; WFTV

[verified] Melbourne, FL police suspend Flock

Sept 1, 2026 · carried forward · id melbourne-suspends

Flock backlash entry, verified.

Melbourne PD suspended Flock use effective immediately.

Sources: Space Coast Daily

[verified] California SB 1013 dies in the Assembly

Sept 2026 · carried forward · id ca-sb-1013

Flock backlash entry, verified.

CA SB 1013 (Cervantes) was killed in the Assembly on the final day of session.

Sources: CalMatters

[verified] More than 200 cities and agencies ended plate-reader contracts in August 2026

Aug 2026 · carried forward · id august-200-ended

Flock backlash entry, verified.

More than 200 cities and agencies ended LPR contracts in August 2026 alone.

Sources: CalMatters

[verified] Wylie, TX votes to stop automatic Flock renewal

Aug 25, 2026 · carried forward · id wylie-nonrenewal

Flock backlash entry, verified.

Council voted 7-0 to submit a 30-day non-renewal notice, stopping an automatic 24-month extension past the Oct 13, 2026 contract expiration.

Sources: Yahoo; CBS Texas; KERA/KETR; Wylie News

[verified] Roseville, CA: 71% of high-stakes alerts were wrong

2023–24 data, reported Aug 2026 · carried forward · id roseville-misreads

Flock backlash entry, verified.

Roseville PD's own data: of 1,427 stolen-vehicle and felony alerts in 2023-24, 71% were wrong. One resident was flagged six separate times over a digit misread. Flock blamed Roseville's rear-plate-only deployment.

Sources: Business Insider; Techdirt, Aug 6, 2026; Gizmodo; Jalopnik; Davis Vanguard

[verified] LAPD Inspector General audit: 32.3% false alerts; LAPD declines renewal

Jul 10, 2026 · checked v3.7 · id lapd-oig-audit

Full document confirmed by direct fetch (v3.7).

"REVIEW OF LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE READER SYSTEM AND USE IN THE FIELD," signed by Inspector General Matthew Barragan, BPC #26-184, dated July 10, 2026, review period Aug 1 to Sept 30, 2025. 161 false alerts against 337 accurate (about 32.3%). Root cause: correctly read plates matched against stale or wrong hotlist data, not misreads. LAPD declined renewal in July 2026.

Sources: LAPD OIG, BPC #26-184 (PDF); 404 Media, Jul 13, 2026; SAN; TechTimes; Yahoo/AP

[verified] Chatrie: the citations both Schmidt briefs lean on

Jun 29, 2026 · checked v3.18 · id chatrie-citations

Supreme Court reporter citation resolved in v3.18, cited independently by two unrelated primary sources.

The Supreme Court decided Chatrie v. United States on June 29, 2026: 146 S. Ct. 2193 (2026). The superseded en banc Fourth Circuit decision is 136 F.4th 100 (4th Cir. 2025), with separate opinions by Wilkinson, Wynn, Berner, Richardson (concurring) and Gregory (dissenting). This Judge Gregory is unrelated to the Eleventh Circuit's United States v. Gregory. The sixteen-state brief, filed June 18, cited a panel opinion already vacated for en banc rehearing; eleven days later the Supreme Court decided Chatrie the other way.

Sources: X Corp. cert-stage amicus brief, No. 25-112; U.S. v. Riley, C.D. Cal. Doc. 181; Alisigwe (2d Cir.)

[verified] Who filed briefs in the Schmidt appeal

Apr 20 and Jun 18, 2026 · checked v3.19 · id schmidt-amici

Confirmed against the Fourth Circuit docket (CourtListener 72357963). Cato, the U.S., and the Florida chamber brief resolved in v3.13 and v3.19. The Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability brief (Doc. 27) was missing until Sept 28, 2026.

For Plaintiffs-Appellants, filed April 20, 2026: ACLU, ACLU of Virginia, and EFF jointly; the New Civil Liberties Alliance; EPIC; the Innocence Project and The Center on Race, Inequality, and the Law at NYU School of Law jointly; The Policing Project at NYU School of Law; the Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability; and the Cato Institute.

For the City, filed June 18, 2026: a sixteen-state brief (South Carolina lead, joined by Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and DC); the Commonwealth of Virginia; Human Trafficking Training Center LLC, Operation Light Shine, and Safe House Project jointly; Major Cities Chiefs Association, Major County Sheriffs of America, the North Carolina Association of Chiefs of Police, North Carolina Sheriffs' Association, and Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police and Foundation jointly; the Florida State Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, Hispanic Outreach Taskforce, and Multicultural Business Alliance; and the United States ("Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees").

The plaintiffs-side brief adds record figures: over 1 million vehicle detections in March 2026 alone with a sub-1% hotlist match rate, and a police audit failure (logs undownloaded until Feb. 2025, unreviewed until May 2025, by which point the system had been queried 230,000+ times).

Sources: Fourth Circuit docket, No. 26-1227 (CourtListener 72357963) (docket 26-1227); Sixteen-state amicus brief; EFF/ACLU/ACLU of Virginia amicus brief; footnote4a.org

[verified] The sixteen-state brief leans on a two-camera, one-house case

Jun 18, 2026 · checked v3.10 · id states-brief-gregory

Confirmed twice (v3.9 against Gregory itself, v3.10 against the brief). A full sentence-by-sentence fairness check of the brief was not done.

United States v. Gregory, 128 F.4th 1228 (11th Cir. 2025), concerns two warrantless pole cameras on one co-defendant's home for about 10 months. The Eleventh Circuit found no Fourth Amendment violation. The sixteen-state brief quotes the line below as its opening, and Judge Davis's opinion relies on it too. Judge Jordan's partial concurrence cautioned against reading the public-view doctrine as blanket immunity for pole cameras "regardless of the length of time they record," which the brief also quotes at p. 11.

“[n]othing in the Constitution forbids the government from using technology to conduct lawful investigations more efficiently” (United States v. Gregory, 128 F.4th 1228 (11th Cir. 2025))

Sources: United States v. Gregory, 128 F.4th 1228 (11th Cir. 2025); Sixteen-state amicus brief

[verified] Dayton, OH covers cameras with trash bags

June 2026 · carried forward · id dayton-bags

Flock backlash entry, verified.

City workers covered cameras with trash bags.

Sources: findingflock tracker

[verified] Redmond, WA cancels all 24 readers

May 26, 2026 · carried forward · id redmond-cancels

Flock backlash entry, verified.

Redmond city council voted unanimously to cancel all 24 readers.

Sources: findingflock tracker

[verified] Javorsky v. Flock Group: California class action over plate-data sharing

Feb 26, 2026 (amended Apr 3) · checked v3.7 · id javorsky-complaint

Primary verified: 57-page complaint text-extracted directly (v3.6). Docket number and judge chain corrected and resolved in v3.7.

Filed by named plaintiffs Daniel Javorsky and Anthony Mayor in San Francisco Superior Court, dated February 26, 2026. Removed to federal court as No. 4:26-cv-02382-HSG (N.D. Cal.). Initially before Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler on consent; reassigned March 23, 2026 to Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr.; related to the consolidated case and reassigned to Judge Vince Chhabria on May 8, 2026; consolidated May 29, 2026 with Eldridge v. Flock and Dutcher v. Flock into In re Flock Group Inc. Automated License Plate Reader Litigation, No. 3:26-cv-02375 (N.D. Cal.).

Five causes of action: the California ALPR Privacy Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.90.5 et seq.); negligence; invasion of privacy under the California Constitution; intrusion upon seclusion; and the Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.). Damages sought: actual damages or not less than $2,500 in liquidated damages, plus punitive damages.

SFPD's database was queried by out-of-state and federal agencies more than 1.6 million times between Aug 2024 and a later cutoff. California ALPR data allegedly reached over 300 out-of-state law enforcement agencies, including 287(g) program participants. Flock's own marketing claims 20+ billion plate reads per month nationwide (Flock's self-description). Mountain View and Los Altos are cited as cities whose anti-sharing configurations Flock allegedly overrode.

Sources: Complaint PDF via Courthouse News; CourtListener docket 72513400 (docket 4:26-cv-02382-HSG); CourtListener docket 72512957 (docket 3:26-cv-02375); Justia; govinfo.gov; PacerMonitor

[verified] Mountain View shuts down its entire Flock network

Feb 2, 2026 · carried forward · id mountain-view-shutdown

Confirmed, with a second independent source: the Javorsky complaint corroborates the city's account.

Police Chief Mike Canfield ordered the city's 30 ALPR cameras switched off effective Feb 2, 2026, after learning Flock, not the department, had enabled statewide and national lookup settings without authorization, despite Mountain View configuring its system to block such sharing. City Council voted 7-0 on Feb 24, 2026 to cancel the contract.

Sources: Mountainview.gov; CBS SF; Mountain View Voice; Palo Alto Daily Post; Javorsky complaint

[verified] Schmidt v. City of Norfolk: federal judge holds Norfolk's Flock network is not a search

Jan 27, 2026 · checked v3.10 · id schmidt-ruling

Fully verified: opinion read directly (v3.10). Plaintiffs are appealing (4th Cir. No. 26-1227).

Schmidt v. City of Norfolk, No. 2:24cv621, Document 191 (E.D. Va., Norfolk Div.), Judge Mark S. Davis. Two citations exist for this one document: 2026 WL 207513 and 819 F. Supp. 3d 492. The court granted summary judgment to the City and denied Plaintiffs' cross-motion.

Standing is split. Plaintiffs Lee Schmidt and Crystal Arrington, captured 475 and 325 times over four months in 2025, have standing to challenge the ongoing collection and storage of their vehicle images in Norfolk's 21-day rolling database. Their plates were never queried outside the litigation, so, following Scholl v. Ill. State Police, 776 F. Supp. 3d 701 (N.D. Ill. 2025), they lack standing to challenge the query practice. The merits ruling reaches only collection and storage.

On the merits: Norfolk's 176 ALPR cameras (75 fixed clusters, plus police access to 43 third-party cameras in city limits) do not reveal "the whole" of a person's movements. Plaintiffs' vehicles were captured 2 to 3 full-plate-match times per day on average, "30 to 50 times" fewer data points per day than Carpenter's roughly 101, typically 2.5 to 3.5 miles and 45 to 50 minutes apart. The court places the system closer to the bounded GPS tracking in United States v. Jones than to the "near continuous" tracking in Carpenter or Beautiful Struggle.

"Unblinking eyes" is Plaintiffs' complaint language. The court's answer, in footnote 15, is quoted below.

“[t]he City of Norfolk lives under the watch of a flock of unblinking eyes” (Plaintiffs' complaint)

“has many thousands more blind spots than it has 'unblinking eyes,'” (Judge Mark S. Davis, Doc. 191, footnote 15)

“a black sheet of paper with 75 (or 176) holes punched through it.” (Judge Mark S. Davis, Doc. 191, footnote 15)

Sources: Schmidt v. City of Norfolk, No. 2:24cv621, Doc. 191 (E.D. Va.) (docket 2:24cv621); Courthouse News

[verified] Schemel v. City of Marco Island: district court dismisses Fourth Amendment challenge to bridge ALPRs

Oct 17, 2025 · carried forward · id schemel-ruling

District court opinion read directly. On appeal to 11th Circuit as of Sept 28, 2026.

Judge Kyle C. Dudek (M.D. Fla.) dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim with prejudice, and Florida state claims without prejudice. Schemel v. City of Marco Island, No. 2:22-cv-79-KCD-DNF, Doc. 90, 2025 WL 2958798 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2025).

Marco Island, Florida, operates ALPR cameras on the three bridges that connect the island to the mainland. Plaintiffs, represented by NCLA, argued the three-year data retention enables retrospective surveillance of everyone who crosses the bridges in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The case is on appeal in the Eleventh Circuit. 11th Cir. No. 25-13913.

Sources: Schemel v. City of Marco Island, No. 2:22-cv-79-KCD-DNF, Doc. 90 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2025) (docket 2:22-cv-79-KCD-DNF); 11th Cir. No. 25-13913 docket

[verified] Commonwealth v. Church: Virginia appeals court reverses Flock suppression

Oct 14, 2025 · checked v3.16 · id church-reversal

Read directly at trial and appellate level (v3.16). Unpublished opinion.

Commonwealth v. Church, Record No. 0737-25-1 (Va. Ct. App., Memorandum Opinion by Judge Randolph A. Beales, Oct. 14, 2025), unpublished. A criminal case: a Norfolk officer used the Flock database (172 cameras, 30-day retention, as of Jan. 2024) to check the defendant's account of his driving route and confronted him with three Flock images. The Norfolk Circuit Court (Judge Jamilah D. LeCruise) had granted suppression on April 25, 2025 (Case No. CR24000304), relying on her earlier Bell ruling. EFF, ACLU, ACLU of Virginia, and NACDL filed a joint amicus brief supporting suppression on appeal (Sept. 29, 2025), joined by People's Coalition (Legal Aid Justice Center).

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the Flock system "not as intrusive as" cell towers or aerial surveillance and that no warrant was required. It cites Neal v. Fairfax Cnty. Police Dep't, 299 Va. 253 (2020), and four district courts reaching the same pro-ALPR result, and it criticizes the Bell ruling by name through a quote from United States v. Martin.

Sources: Commonwealth v. Church, Record No. 0737-25-1 (Va. Ct. App.) (docket 0737-25-1); Norfolk Circuit Court order, Case No. CR24000304 (docket CR24000304); EFF deeplinks post, Sept 29, 2025

[verified] California AG sues El Cajon over out-of-state plate-data sharing

Oct 2025 · carried forward · id bonta-el-cajon

State enforcement action, separate from the Javorsky litigation.

California AG Rob Bonta sued the city of El Cajon for illegally sharing license plate data with out-of-state law enforcement.

Sources: Cal. DOJ press release (cited in the Javorsky complaint)

[verified] Norfolk subpoenaed the Schmidt plaintiffs' phone location records; the court ordered one set destroyed

Aug 15, 2025 · carried forward · id schmidt-csli-subpoena

Order read directly (Doc. 104, read Sept 28, 2026). The order does not name the carrier or say what became of the other two subpoenas.

Defending the suit, the City sought the plaintiffs' cell-site location data, first through three subpoenas to their cellphone carriers and then through a motion to compel, which also asked each plaintiff to identify the ten people they interacted with most. The City told the court the location data was the most relevant information to the case. Magistrate Judge Lawrence R. Leonard denied the motion. Because both sides agreed that Schmidt's carrier had improperly disclosed his records in response to a subpoena, the court ordered the City to destroy them.

“the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs must surrender their own privacy interests to vindicate their constitutional rights.” (Magistrate Judge Lawrence R. Leonard, Doc. 104)

Sources: Schmidt v. City of Norfolk, No. 2:24cv621, Doc. 104 (E.D. Va.) (docket 2:24cv621)

[verified] Wichita, KS: Flock held constitutional "as currently configured"

May 29, 2025 · checked v3.15 · id wichita-jackson

Opinion read directly (v3.15).

United States v. Sidney Jamar Jackson, No. 6:24-cr-10010-JWB (D. Kan.), Judge John W. Broomes. A DEA taskforce used Wichita PD's Flock system, through a Haysville officer's MOU-based access, to locate a suspect's vehicle: nine hits over four hours, leading to a stop and 2.38 kg of methamphetamine. Suppression denied.

From sworn testimony: Wichita moved to Flock at the end of 2020 (66, then 110, then 160 by Jan. 2024, now 190 cameras), about 500 lane miles; over 775,000 vehicles captured in Feb. 2025 alone; 2,705 Flock searches and 37,113 hot-list hits in the 30 days before the April 16, 2025 hearing; MOUs with about 150 other jurisdictions; 30-day retention.

The opinion holds only for Flock "as currently configured," warns that broader deployment "could eventually rise to the level of systemic and continuous tracking" barred by Carpenter, and argues Congress, not courts, should set ALPR rules, noting that no federal ALPR framework exists (CRS R48160).

Sources: U.S. v. Jackson, No. 6:24-cr-10010-JWB, Docs. 47-48 (D. Kan.) (docket 6:24-cr-10010-JWB)

[verified] Commonwealth v. Bell: Norfolk court holds Flock collection is a search

May 10, 2024 · checked v3.16 · id bell-suppression

Order read directly (v3.16). Whether Bell was separately appealed is not known.

Commonwealth v. Jayvon Antonio Bell, Case No. CR23001500-00, -01, -02 (Norfolk Cir. Ct., Judge Jamilah D. LeCruise), reported at 113 Va. Cir. 316 (2024). Police used a Flock hit to tie a getaway vehicle to robberies across Chesapeake, Norfolk, and Portsmouth, then ran the plate through DMV records, all without a warrant. The court granted suppression, reasoning from Carpenter and Jones and citing Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle. The "172 cameras, 30-day retention" figures used in Bell and Church come from The Virginian-Pilot, June 19, 2023.

“the collection and storage of license plate and location information by the FLOCK system constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and should require a warrant” (Judge Jamilah D. LeCruise, Order Granting Motion to Suppress)

Sources: Commonwealth v. Bell, Case No. CR23001500 (Norfolk Cir. Ct.) (docket CR23001500)

[verified] Historical: 99.9% of LAPD's stored plate images were not on any hotlist (2020)

Feb 2020 · carried forward · id ca-auditor-2020

Background context from outside this timeline's window.

California State Auditor (Elaine Howle), report 2019-118: 99.9% of LAPD's then-320 million stored ALPR images were of vehicles not on any hotlist.

Sources: California State Auditor report 2019-118; TechCrunch, Feb 2020; KTLA; CBS LA

[verified] Federal officials use local Flock access for immigration lookups

Summer 2026 · carried forward · id flock-side-door

Carried forward, not re-checked in v3.28. The term "side door" comes from 404 Media and NPR reporting, not from the Javorsky complaint; attribute it to that reporting.

No formal ICE contract needed: federal officials asked state and local police to run Flock searches, 4,000+ lookups for immigration purposes as of summer 2026.

Sources: 404 Media; NPR, Feb 17

[verified] Norfolk's more favorable capture figure comes from its expert's report, now public with redactions

undated · carried forward · id schmidt-capture-frequency

Updated Sept 28, 2026: the Estevez report was refiled publicly in redacted form (Doc. 180-1), and the appellate brief is now quoted in full. Earlier versions said the figure rested on a sealed declaration and shortened the brief's wording.

The opinion's "2-3 times per day" figure is footnoted to ECF No. 113 at 9, the City of Norfolk's own district-court summary-judgment brief, and describes the plaintiffs' own vehicles. The City's appellate brief adds a figure for all vehicles: "even the 5% of vehicles that were most photographed were on average photographed no more than once a day," citing the report of its expert, Valentin Estevez. That report was first filed under seal, then refiled publicly with redactions on Nov 21, 2025 (Doc. 180-1), where Estevez puts it as the top 5 percent being "captured once or less on 65% of days." The passage saying whose plates that analysis covered is still redacted. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Reply Brief (Doc. 59) never mentions or disputes the figure, most plausibly because their theory rests on the system's capability, not observed capture frequency.

Sources: Schmidt, Doc. 191, citing ECF No. 113 at 9; Response Brief of Defendants-Appellees, 4th Cir. No. 26-1227 (June 11, 2026); Schmidt, Doc. 180-1 (E.D. Va.), redacted Estevez declaration and report (docket 2:24cv621); Plaintiffs-Appellants' Reply Brief, Doc. 59

[verified] Norfolk's Flock retention: 30 days in 2024, 21 days after a 2025 Virginia law

2024–2026 · carried forward · id norfolk-retention-change

Resolved Sept 28, 2026 from primary documents: both police orders (Schmidt Exhibits 16 and 18) and the statute on the official Virginia code site.

Norfolk police Special Order 23-002 (issued July 25, 2023) set Flock retention at 30 days, the figure in the Church and Bell records (Jan to May 2024). In 2025 Virginia enacted Va. Code § 2.2-5517 (2025 Va. Acts Ch. 720, H.B. 2724, approved May 2, 2025), which requires plate-reader data to be purged after 21 days unless it is part of an ongoing investigation, prosecution, or civil action. Norfolk replaced the 2023 order with General Order OPR-493, issued June 30, 2025, which purges data after 21 days. The Schmidt summary-judgment record (Jan 2026) describes the resulting 21-day rolling database.

Sources: Norfolk Police Special Order 23-002 (2023), Schmidt Doc. 114-16 (E.D. Va.); 2025 Va. Acts Ch. 720 (H.B. 2724), Schmidt Doc. 114-17; Va. Code § 2.2-5517(E); Norfolk Police General Order OPR-493 (2025), Schmidt Doc. 114-18; Bell and Church records; Schmidt, Doc. 191

[verified] The "ankle monitor" line is from Beautiful Struggle, not the Norfolk judge

undated · checked v3.10 · id ankle-monitor-origin

Resolved v3.8, reconfirmed against the opinion in v3.10.

The phrase is a verbatim quote from Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Dep't, 2 F.4th 330, 341-42 (4th Cir. 2021), invoked in the Schmidt appellate briefing on both sides. Judge Davis's opinion discusses Beautiful Struggle at length but does not coin the phrase.

Sources: Schmidt, Doc. 191; Schmidt appellate briefs

[verified] Stow, MA officer resigns over Flock misuse

undated · carried forward · id stow-resignation

Listed among misconduct drivers in the verified backlash entries.

A Stow, MA officer resigned.

Sources: Yahoo/Newsweek; NPR; findingflock tracker

[verified] Oak Park, IL cancels after 99% of alerts led to no police action

undated · carried forward · id oak-park-cancels

Listed in the verified backlash entries.

Oak Park canceled after more than 99% of alerts produced no police action.

Sources: Yahoo/Newsweek; NPR; findingflock tracker

[verified] Evanston, IL cancels; Flock reinstalls units; city sends cease-and-desist

undated · carried forward · id evanston-cancels

Listed in the verified backlash entries.

Evanston canceled. Flock later reinstalled units, drawing a cease-and-desist.

Sources: Yahoo/Newsweek; NPR; findingflock tracker

[verified] Sedona, AZ cancels after CBP access is acknowledged

undated · carried forward · id sedona-cancels

Listed in the verified backlash entries.

Sedona canceled after CBP access was acknowledged.

Sources: Yahoo/Newsweek; NPR; findingflock tracker

[verified] Hillsborough, NC ends its Flock relationship

undated · carried forward · id hillsborough-ends

Listed in the verified backlash entries.

Hillsborough ended its relationship with Flock.

Sources: Yahoo/Newsweek; NPR; findingflock tracker

[verified] Countervailing: some cities switch to Axon; Flock claims 7x more customers gained than lost

undated · carried forward · id flock-countervailing

The 7x figure is Flock's own claim; attribute it to Flock.

Some cities are switching to Axon. Flock claims it has gained 7x more customers than it has lost.

Sources: Guardian; Yahoo/Newsweek

[verified] FBI memo warns of women "doxxing" ICE agents, with no sourcing

Feb 2026 memo, reported Sept 2026 · carried forward · id fbi-tradwife-memo

Carried forward, not re-checked in v3.28.

The Guardian, via a Property of the People FOIA request, revealed an FBI Chicago field office memo dated February 2026 warning that a small group of women was allegedly creating fake dating profiles to lure and dox ICE agents. Property of the People's Ryan Shapiro and former FBI agent Michael German criticized it for lacking any sourcing.

Sources: The Guardian, ~Sept 17-19, 2026; NBC News, Sept 19; Washington Examiner

[verified] Lawsuit over DHS's "secret Protester Surveillance Policy"

Jul 24, 2026 · carried forward · id la-protester-policy-suit

Listed under related verified items.

A federal suit in Los Angeles alleges a DHS "secret Protester Surveillance Policy": agents scanned observers' faces and plates, and Global Entry and PreCheck were revoked in retaliation.

Sources: LA Times; WIRED; Reveal

[verified] U.S. Attorney Pirro subpoenas Reddit and X over anonymous ICE critics

May 2026 · carried forward · id pirro-subpoenas

Carried forward, not re-checked in v3.28.

U.S. Attorney Jeanine Pirro (D.C.) subpoenaed Reddit and X for full names, addresses, and banking information of at least two anonymous accounts critical of ICE tactics. No underlying crime specified.

Sources: Bloomberg, May 28, 2026; MediaPost; Bloomberg Law; Engadget; IBTimes UK

[verified] Undercover police infiltrate protests at Delaney Hall, Newark

May–Jun 2026 · carried forward · id delaney-hall

Carried forward, not re-checked in v3.28.

Undercover Newark PD detectives infiltrated protests outside the ICE detention center, reported to surveillance units in real time, and made targeted ambush arrests with ICE. The FBI contacted arrested protesters and their families attempting informant recruitment.

Sources: Schneier/Cohn via Lawfare

[verified] Maine suit: agents threatened legal observers with watchlist placement

Feb 23, 2026 · carried forward · id maine-observer-suit

Listed under related verified items.

DHS agents threatened legal observers with placement on a domestic-terrorist watchlist.

Sources: Politico

[verified] DHS subpoenas Google, Meta, Reddit, and Discord for ICE critics' identities

Feb 2026 · carried forward · id dhs-platform-subpoenas

Carried forward, not re-checked in v3.28.

DHS sent hundreds of administrative subpoenas, which need no judicial sign-off, demanding names, emails, phone numbers, and other identifying details for accounts that criticized ICE or reported agent locations. Google, Meta, and Reddit complied with some requests. The ACLU filed a motion on affected users' behalf.

Sources: NYT, ~Feb 13-17, 2026; Engadget; Boing Boing; Military.com; IBTimes UK; PCGamer; Gizmodo

[verified] Brennan Center: DHS committed at least $2.9B to surveillance and data

Data through Jul 26, 2026 · checked v3.32 · id brennan-surveillance-tally

Brennan Center report and interactive charts read directly Oct. 3, 2026. The report was published Sept. 16 and says its data are current through July 26. Earlier versions dated the entry July 29 and included figures not present in the current report.

The Brennan Center found that DHS committed more than $2.9 billion to surveillance, data collection and analytics from January 2021 through July 26, 2026, and cautioned that the total is a minimum because federal contracting data are incomplete. Its current category totals are $1.1 billion for biometrics, $793.2 million for video surveillance, $622.8 million for data analytics, $228.6 million for data purchases, $130.4 million for access to phone content, and $44.8 million for location tracking.

Sources: Brennan Center, Sept. 16, 2026

[partial] Secure America Act adds $70B to DHS; ICE and CBP funds pass $200B

June 2026 · carried forward · id secure-america-act

Listed in the funding section without its own verification tag. The $183B total is a derived sum, not a reported figure.

The June 2026 Secure America Act adds $70B to DHS overall and $65B to ICE and CBP (ICE share about $39B), leaving about $183B available to ICE and CBP (derived). House Appropriations FY2027 adds $28B more, pushing available ICE and CBP funds over $200 billion.

Sources: Brennan Center

[partial] ICE and CBP had $118B unspent from OBBBA

April 2026 · carried forward · id ice-cbp-unspent

Listed in the funding section without its own verification tag.

As of April 2026, ICE and CBP had $118B unspent from OBBBA (Brennan Center, most recent data).

Sources: Brennan Center

[verified] OBBBA: $170B to $191B for DHS, two confirmed scopes

July 2025 · carried forward · id obbba-dhs

Both figures confirmed real; they measure different scopes.

The July 2025 OBBBA sent $170B to DHS per the Brennan Center. Richardson reports $191B with an ICE/CBP breakout (about $75B ICE, $65B CBP). Both figures are real, with different scopes.

Sources: Brennan Center; Richardson

[verified] GAO: DHS lacks bias-risk policies for most public-surveillance technologies

Dec 3, 2024 · checked v3.7 · id gao-25-107302

Confirmed by direct fetch (v3.7). One report, not two; background from before this timeline's 2026 window.

GAO-25-107302, "Law Enforcement: DHS Could Better Address Bias Risk and Enhance Privacy Protections for Technologies Used in Public." Reviews DHS law enforcement components' use of 20+ detection and monitoring technologies (face recognition, ALPRs, drones, pole cameras). Finds DHS lacks required bias-risk-assessment policies for most of them, CBP/ICE/Secret Service policies "did not always address key privacy protections," and civil-rights review isn't consistently required.

Sources: GAO-25-107302

[partial] DHS budget: $19.5B in 2002 to a $118.39B FY2027 request

FY2027 request · carried forward · id dhs-budget-growth

Listed in the funding section (reconciled against Brennan Center) without its own verification tag.

DHS baseline: $19.5B (2002) to $118.39B (FY2027 request).

Sources: PRISM Reports

[partial] ICE and CBP contracts with 11 surveillance companies: $310M to $513M

2025–2026 · carried forward · id mijente-contracts

Not independently re-verified by direct fetch; three research passes reached the same figures.

ICE and CBP contracts with 11 tracked surveillance companies grew from $310M (2025) to $513M (2026), driven by Palantir and Anduril.

Sources: Mijente / Just Futures Law / Surveillance Resistance Lab

[verified] Pentagon vs. Anthropic: a district court vacates one designation, the D.C. Circuit upholds the exclusion

Feb 27 – Sept 25, 2026 · checked v3.30 · id pentagon-anthropic

Court records read directly: the D.C. Circuit opinion and dissent, and Judge Lin's order, relief order and judgment. Not yet confirmed: whether either side has sought further review, and what happens to the government's Ninth Circuit appeal of the March 26 preliminary injunction (No. 26-2011), which was on hold pending the D.C. Circuit's ruling. Updated Oct 1, 2026; earlier versions ended with the Aug 27 ruling. Conflict-control review (see Method): drafted with an Anthropic model, then checked against the court records by OpenAI's GPT-5.6 Sol, including for wording that runs one way. OpenAI has its own stake: the D.C. Circuit notes the Department expanded its relationship with OpenAI after the exclusion.

The Pentagon asked Anthropic to allow its Claude AI models for "all lawful uses." Anthropic refused to drop two contract limits: no use for "lethal autonomous warfare" and no "mass surveillance of Americans." On Feb 27, 2026, President Trump directed every federal agency to stop using Anthropic's technology, and Secretary of War Hegseth directed the Department to designate Anthropic a supply chain risk. Hegseth made the formal determinations on March 3. A March 6 Department of War memo ordered Claude removed from its systems and barred contractors from using it in their work for the Department. Anthropic challenged the actions in two courts, under two different laws.

On Aug 27, Judge Rita F. Lin (N.D. Cal., No. 26-cv-01996) largely ruled for Anthropic in a 59-page opinion, finding the broad measures "illegal and baseless." She vacated the "supply chain risk" designation under 10 U.S.C. § 3252 and the order barring military contractors from any commercial activity with Anthropic, and declared the actions First Amendment retaliation and a denial of due process. The government won on Anthropic's separation-of-powers claim and on claims against some agencies.

On Sept 25, the D.C. Circuit, which Congress gave exclusive jurisdiction to review procurement actions under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act (41 U.S.C. § 4713), denied Anthropic's petitions 2-1 (Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War, No. 26-1049). Judge Katsas, joined by Judge Rao, pointed to a record in which Claude's built-in restrictions had "stopped Claude from performing tasks requested by government users," and to a dispute over whether Anthropic's contract barred Claude's use "in an ongoing overseas military operation." The court held that the Department "reasonably feared that Anthropic might manipulate Claude's design to prevent it from performing national-security functions" it considers authorized. It said it had "no quarrel" with Judge Lin's finding that Anthropic acted with no bad motive, but held that section 4713, unlike section 3252, does not require one. It also rejected Anthropic's First Amendment claim, finding the exclusion turned on a contract term, not on Anthropic's advocacy.

Judge Henderson dissented, writing that under the majority's reading a contractor faces a choice: "Agree to the Secretary's demands or risk being designated a national security threat under FASCSA."

“the Department reasonably feared that Anthropic might manipulate Claude's design to prevent it from performing national-security functions that the Department deems contractually authorized and necessary” (Judge Katsas for the majority, Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 2026))

“a contractor's honest and upfront enforcement of restrictions on a covered article's use disfavored by the government” (Judge Henderson, dissenting, describing the conduct the majority treats as a supply chain risk (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 2026))

Sources: Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War, No. 26-1049, opinion and Henderson, J., dissenting (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 2026) (docket 26-1049); Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War, No. 26-cv-01996, order on cross motions for summary judgment (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2026) (docket 26-cv-01996); Same case, order of final relief (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2026) (docket 26-cv-01996); CNN, Aug 27; TechCrunch, Aug 28 & Mar 5; Washington Post, Feb 26; NBC News; Arms Control Association; Mayer Brown; Fortune, Mar 6

[verified] White House bans CNN, MS NOW, and Politico; outlets sue

Sept 18–21, 2026 · carried forward · id press-ban

Carried forward, not re-checked in v3.28.

A Truth Social announcement banned CNN, MS NOW, and Politico; badges were deactivated the next morning. The outlets sued in D.C. district court on Sept 21.

Sources: Al Jazeera

[verified] Executive Order 14409: voluntary early government access to the most powerful AI models

Jun 2, 2026 · carried forward · id eo-14409

Carried forward, not re-checked in v3.28.

"Promoting Advanced Artificial Intelligence Innovation and Security." A voluntary 30-day pre-release framework for "covered frontier models"; directs the AG to prioritize enforcement of 18 U.S.C. §§1028, 1030, 1343 against AI-enabled illegal computer access; explicitly creates no mandatory licensing or preclearance regime. CISA's BOD 26-04 (June 10, 2026) is a confirmed follow-on with a three-day-plus-forensic-triage window for the highest-risk tier.

Sources: WhiteHouse.gov; CRS IF13268; CISA BOD 26-04

[verified] Federal government refuses to share shooting evidence with Minnesota; Minnesota sues

Jan–Sept 2026 · checked v3.29 · id federal-evidence-blockade

The allegations are Minnesota's. The refusal letters and the government's motion were read directly.

After federal agents shot three people in Minneapolis during Operation Metro Surge in January 2026 (Renée Good and Alex Pretti, killed; Julio Cesar Sosa-Celis, wounded), federal authorities refused to share evidence with Minnesota's investigators. On March 24, 2026, the State of Minnesota, the Hennepin County Attorney and the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension sued the Justice Department and DHS (D.D.C. No. 1:26-cv-01007).

The state alleges that federal agents first agreed to joint investigations, then reneged; that the U.S. Attorney told the BCA the night Good was killed that there would be "no joint investigation"; that Good's car sits "shrink-wrapped" in an FBI facility, never examined, despite a state search warrant; that federal officers "physically blocked" state investigators from the Pretti scene, even after a judge issued a warrant; that the government has not identified the masked agents who shot Pretti; and that in February the U.S. Attorney said evidence would be shared "in only one direction."

The government's own letters show the refusals. On March 3, ICE declined to treat Hennepin County's request for evidence in Good's death as a formal demand and referred the county to DOJ. On June 3, the U.S. Attorney denied the request, citing an open federal investigation. A day earlier, the same office had asked the BCA for all the evidence it collected in the Sosa-Celis shooting.

In court, the government argues that sharing investigative records with state law enforcement is discretionary and not reviewable, that Minnesota didn't follow the agencies' request procedures, and that the Tenth Amendment gives states no right to federal investigative materials (motion to dismiss or transfer, Sept 28, 2026). Before Judge Emmet G. Sullivan; Minnesota's response is due Oct 13, 2026.

Sources: State of Minnesota v. U.S. Department of Justice, No. 1:26-cv-01007, Amended Complaint, paras. 6, 55, 61, 62, 75, 79 (D.D.C. June 18, 2026) (docket 1:26-cv-01007); Complaint (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2026) (docket 1:26-cv-01007); ICE letter to the Hennepin County Attorney, Mar. 3, 2026 (Doc. 1-8); U.S. Attorney's denial, June 3, 2026 (Doc. 17-13); U.S. Attorney's request to the BCA, June 2, 2026 (Doc. 17-16); Defendants' memorandum in support of motion to dismiss or transfer, Sept. 28, 2026 (Doc. 23-1); Docket, D.D.C. No. 1:26-cv-01007 (CourtListener 72590076) (docket 1:26-cv-01007)

[partial] CIA centralizes vendor vetting and plans "AI co-workers"

Feb–Apr 2026 · carried forward · id cia-ai

Listed under intel/defense without its own verification tag. These are two separate events.

Feb 9, 2026: a CIA acquisition framework centralizes vendor vetting. Apr 2026: CIA Deputy Director Michael Ellis described "AI co-workers" in analytic platforms within a couple of years and 300+ AI projects.

Sources: Federal News Network; Politico; GovExec

[verified] "ICE Out of Our Faces Act" (S.3779) introduced

Feb 5, 2026 · carried forward · id ice-out-of-our-faces

Carried forward, not re-checked in v3.28.

Markey, Merkley, and Wyden in the Senate, Jayapal in the House. Would ban ICE and CBP from acquiring or using face recognition and other biometric identification; require deletion within 30 days of biometric data already collected; and create a private right of action plus state attorney general civil-penalty authority. EPIC endorsed.

Sources: Markey, Merkley, Jayapal press releases; Congress.gov S.3779; EPIC

[verified] Fatal shootings of US citizens during Minneapolis immigration enforcement operations

Jan 2026 · checked v3.29 · id minneapolis-shootings

Framing corrected in v3.0 (not "during traffic stops") and in v3.29 (not a "confrontation").

During Operation Metro Surge: Renée Good (ICE, Jan 7, shot in her car as she backed up and then pulled forward steering away from the agent, moments after telling him "That's fine, dude. I'm not mad at you"; not a routine traffic stop) and Alex Pretti (CBP, Jan 24, shot on foot while filming, not vehicle-related).

Sources: State of Minnesota v. U.S. Department of Justice, No. 1:26-cv-01007, Complaint, paras. 1, 49, 70 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2026) (docket 1:26-cv-01007); Testimony of Renee Good's family and of Stella Carlson, who recorded Alex Pretti's killing, congressional spotlight forum, Sept. 22, 2026 (videos linked from Sen. Tina Smith's release); The Washington Post, "The ICE agent's cellphone video: Five key moments" (Jan. 10, 2026), captioning the agent's 47-second video published by Alpha News; ABC News, "Minneapolis ICE shooting: A minute-by-minute timeline of how Renee Nicole Good died" (Jan. 9, 2026), video analysis

[verified] Warner and Kaine ask DHS Inspector General to audit immigration procurements

undated · carried forward · id warner-kaine-letter

Carried forward, not re-checked in v3.28.

Senators Warner and Kaine asked DHS Inspector General Cuffari for an audit of DHS immigration-related procurements. Footnotes cite the BI2 sole-source notice (Aug 6, 2025), the Clearview purchase order (Sept 5, 2025), Penlink licenses (Sept 30, 2025), an OSINT/social-media contract (Oct 2, 2025), the FY26 Big Data & Ad Tech RFI (Jan 23, 2026), and ICM additional capabilities (Apr 17, 2025).

Sources: kaine.senate.gov

[verified] Other pushback from Congress, security experts and community groups

Oct 2025 – Sept 2026 · carried forward · id pushback-list

Listed as "other verified pushback."

Sixteen senators urged cancellation of the shock-glove contract; DHS called them "despicable." House Democrats (Lee, Jacobs, Garcia) opened a Paragon inquiry in Oct 2025, answered by Lyons in Apr 2026. Sen. Peters requested Graphite records (Jul 23, 2026). Rep. Shontel Brown sent a Penlink oversight letter to DHS Secretary Noem on Feb 19, 2026. Schneier and Cohn criticized the 2026 Counterterrorism Strategy for aiming foreign-targeted powers at domestic political groups. Prism Reports (Sept 10) covered neighborhood ICE watch groups and community pressure on state and local funding, and a Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights letter representing 240+ organizations.

Sources: shontelbrown.house.gov; Prism Reports, Sept 10; Lawfare