STATE OF WATCH · v3.35 · 2026-10-15 · works with scripts off
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1. Surveillance expansion
[verified] "Dying on Camera": migrants died in view of border surveillance towers
Sept 21, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id dying-on-camera
Primary source verified, reconfirmed twice (v3.1, v3.5) and against the published text Oct 3 and Oct 9, 2026. Corrected Oct 3, 2026: two phrasings were stronger than the investigation's. The investigation's line that "the law now requires all these towers to be equipped with AI" was checked against the statutes Oct 10, 2026: the laws restrict towers bought with their money, not every tower.
MIT Technology Review cross-referenced nearly 4,000 locations where human remains were found with nearly 600 towers mapped by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Deaths fell within the advertised range of nearly two-thirds of the towers analyzed. More than 1,050 people died within range of the towers between 2015 and early 2026, a count the investigation says misses deaths near towers not yet mapped and some in Texas. More than 110 died within range of Anduril's autonomous towers since 2021, and nearly 350 within range of Elbit's since 2015. Times of San Diego counted at least 138 deaths in California from 2022 through 2025 within a tower's nominal range; MIT Technology Review found at least 81 of those people were most likely within a camera's field of view. The investigation found CBP has done little to assess how its towers are working or how many people have died where they keep watch, and CBP plans to spend $1 billion on 1,497 more towers by 2034, and General Dynamics, which now sells AI towers too, received a CBP order for them in June worth up to $115 million. The July 2025 and June 2026 reconciliation laws bar spending their border-technology money on surveillance towers that CBP has not tested and accepted to deliver "autonomous capabilities," meaning systems that use AI, machine learning, computer vision or other algorithms to detect, identify, classify and track items of interest in real time so the system can make operational adjustments "without the active engagement of personnel or continuous human command or control"; the investigation says the law now requires all the new towers to have AI. CBP says its autonomous towers detect and classify people, vehicles and animals and alert agents, and that it judges them on detection, response, agent safety and mission outcomes. Anduril says a death near a tower does not mean the tower missed a detection, and that real ranges depend on terrain, obstructions and boundaries CBP sets. Anduril also alleged inaccuracies in the reporting but did not say what they were, and directed questions about specific incidents to CBP; Elbit did not respond to a detailed list of questions.
Sources: MIT Technology Review, Sept 21, 2026 (investigation); MIT Technology Review, Sept 21, 2026 (methodology); MIT Technology Review and Times of San Diego, Sept 21, 2026 (San Diego); Times of San Diego, Sept 21, 2026
[verified] ICE buys four Boston Dynamics robot dogs for $1.3 million to search border tunnels, the contract says; the maker denies they will be used for deportations
Aug 27 – Sept 28, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id robot-dogs
The DHS forecast (archived copy), ICE's market-research notice and its draft specifications read directly (Oct 3, 2026). The $1.3 million contract is Boston.com's report of the listed contract; we have not yet found it in federal spending records. Updated Oct 3, 2026; earlier versions ended with the forecast.
ICE's Office of Firearms and Tactical Programs posted a DHS acquisition forecast on Aug 27, 2026 titled "Boston Dynamics SPOT Robots Procurement," listed with no competition at $1 million to $2 million. The next day ICE posted a market-research (sources sought) notice for a "Quadruped Unmanned Ground Vehicle"; its draft specifications ask for stereo cameras giving 360-degree visibility, a 30x zoom camera with thermal imaging, an arm and gripper, and extended-range radios.
Boston.com reported on Sept 30 that ICE had finalized a $1.3 million contract for four Spot robots, publicly listed that week, to search tunnels at border crossings; Boston Dynamics said ICE's Homeland Security Investigations, not Enforcement and Removal Operations, would use them. Boston Dynamics said DHS has used Spot robots "for several years," and that if ICE misused them it would void the warranty, refuse software updates and terminate the license. The robots are being fitted with a kit that detects chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive hazards. The forecast page has since come down from DHS's site; the archived copy is linked here.
Sources: DHS acquisition forecast F2026075113, "Boston Dynamics SPOT Robots Procurement" (Aug 27, 2026; archived Aug 29); ICE sources sought notice 192126NFU00000158, "Quadruped Unmanned Ground Vehicle" (Aug 28, 2026); ICE draft specifications, Quadruped Unmanned Ground Vehicle; NBC News, Aug 28, 2026; WBUR, Aug 31, 2026; FedScoop, Sept 4, 2026; Boston.com, Sept 30, 2026 (the contract); Bloomberg; USA Today
[verified] ICE's $16.7M no-bid contract for electric-shock gloves
Aug 26, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id shock-gloves
Two federal records read directly (Oct 1, 2026): ICE's acquisition forecast and the award record, plus the maker's user guide. The 6,000-pair count comes from reporting. Dated to the signing; earlier versions used Aug 27, the day it was reported.
ICE signed a $16,700,640 contract with Compliant Technologies LLC of Kentucky on Aug 26, 2026, for what the award record describes as conductive energy and de-escalation devices. It was not competed; ICE received one offer. Reporting puts the order at 6,000 pairs of gloves.
ICE's own planning forecast, published Aug 10, names the device: the CTG-5 G.L.O.V.E. (Generated Low Output Voltage Emitter), to be issued to Homeland Security Investigations and Enforcement and Removal Operations officers and agents. It listed the purchase with no competition and an estimate of $10 million to $20 million, and filed it under the federal industry code for "Other Spectator Sports" (711219). The award record uses a wholesale-equipment code (423850). The forecast page came down from DHS's site between Aug 23 and Sept 2; the archived copy is hosted here.
The maker's own user guide for its Gen 4 and Gen 5 gloves says the Gen 5 stores a record of every activation and recommends downloading it at least quarterly. It warns that any use of force with the device "may cause or contribute to death or serious injury," advises against using it on the elderly, small children, pregnant women and the severely handicapped, and says it "SHALL NOT be deployed" for verbal defiance, punishment or torture. The guide says the technology "should be treated seriously like any other weapon," and also that the company "does not consider CD3 Technology to be a weapon." The award record names no model, so which version ICE bought is not confirmed.
On Aug 27, the day it was reported, Sen. Catherine Cortez Masto and 15 other Democratic senators urged ICE to cancel the purchase. A DHS spokesperson called the pushback "despicable and a deliberate attempt to undermine and endanger our officers."
Sources: ICE acquisition forecast F2026074524, DHS Acquisition Planning Forecast System (Aug 10, 2026; archived Aug 12); USAspending: ICE contract 70CMSW26C00000012, Compliant Technologies LLC; Compliant Technologies, G.L.O.V.E. Product User Guide, Gen 4 and Gen 5, version 1.4 (July 2024); CBS News, Aug 27, 2026; Al Jazeera, Aug 28, 2026; AP; Reuters; CNN
[verified] Congress lets the Section 702 spy law lapse for the first time
Apr–Jun 2026 · checked v3.35 · id section-702-lapse
Congressional Record, both public laws, NPR, Nextgov, ABC and the Brennan Center read directly (Oct 9, 2026). Not to be confused with Hasbajrami (E.D.N.Y., declassified Jan 2025), a different case outside this window.
The House voted 235-191 to renew, but Senate Majority Leader John Thune said the Senate could not move it because of its CBDC-ban provision, and a 45-day stopgap passed instead (the second short extension, after one on Apr 18). Talks then fell apart after President Trump named Bill Pulte acting director of national intelligence; Democrats said they would not reauthorize Section 702 while Pulte was Trump's pick, and Thune said "We don't need a weaponized DNI," and the statute lapsed at the end of Jun 12, 2026, the first time since 2008. The FISA Court's annual certifications keep collection running until at least Mar 2027, though some lawmakers worry that companies compelled to hand over communications could challenge the law in court and stop providing them. The government calls Section 702 a vital tool against "hostile foreign adversaries, including terrorists, proliferators, and spies, and to inform cybersecurity efforts."
Sources: Nextgov/FCW, Apr 29, 2026 (House vote, digital-currency ban); ABC News, Apr 30, 2026 (45-day extension); NPR, June 12, 2026 (the lapse); Strauss Center, June 24, 2026 (first lapse); Brennan Center (certifications to March 2027); Lawfare / Schneier & Cohn
[partial] DHS tells NPR ICE has "no relationship with Paragon"
May 22, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id dhs-no-relationship-paragon
NPR's report and the federal contract record read directly (Oct 3, 2026). Stays partial: the letter approves a tool without naming it, and nothing public says what replaced Paragon. Updated Oct 3, 2026 with the contract's close-out date.
DHS told NPR on May 22, 2026: "ICE has no relationship with Paragon Solutions, Inc. or with the company that acquired them." That came seven weeks after acting Director Lyons's April 1 letter approving spyware tools. Federal award records show ICE's $2 million sole-source contract with Paragon Solutions (US) Inc., signed September 27, 2024, was paused, revived in August 2025, and closed out on January 20, 2026.
Sources: NPR, May 22, 2026; IBTimes UK, Sept 3, 2026; USAspending: ICE contract 70CTD024P00000012 with Paragon Solutions (US), with modifications
[verified] ICE's acting director approves spyware tools to get into encrypted messages
Apr 1, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id lyons-paragon
NPR's, CyberScoop's and TechCrunch's accounts of the letter read directly (Oct 3, 2026); none says the letter names Paragon or Graphite. Bloomberg first reported it.
ICE acting director Lyons's letter authorized HSI "cutting-edge technological tools" to intercept encrypted messages, citing fentanyl trafficking and foreign-terrorist-organization concerns as the stated rationale. The letter did not name Graphite; reporters identified it.
Sources: NPR, Apr 7, 2026; CyberScoop, Apr 2, 2026; Bloomberg, Apr 1, 2026 (first reported); IBTimes UK, Sept 3, 2026 (procurement history); USAspending: ICE contract 70CTD024P00000012 with Paragon Solutions (US)
[verified] ICE signs a no-bid contract for Penlink's PLX, which Prism reported could let DHS track people's movements in real time; Penlink disputes that
Mar 31, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id penlink-plx
Federal award record read directly (Oct 3, 2026): signed March 31, work from April 1, which settles the date question flagged in v3.5. Prism's article and Penlink's statement read directly. Corrected Oct 3, 2026: earlier versions said PLX "intercepts" communications for real-time tracking, as Prism first wrote before revising it.
ICE signed the contract on March 31, 2026, with work starting April 1: $2,899,162.98 now and up to $8,310,148.26 with options through March 2029, for Penlink's PLX investigative software and support for the Homeland Security Task Force. It went to Chenega Defense and Aerospace Solutions without competition, under a statutory exception that lets Alaska Native-owned companies receive contracts directly. Penlink is owned by the private equity firm Spire Capital.
Prism Reports first reported the contract and wrote that PLX "could enable DHS to track people's movements in real time" (it first said "enables," and changed it on May 4); its subheadline still says the contract "could allow Trump's Homeland Security Task Force to intercept, aggregate, and analyze calls, texts, and web activity to track people's movements." Penlink told Prism that PLX "does not provide additional data to law enforcement, such as the real-time communications or location data that this article alleges." The contract follows a $2.3 million no-bid ICE contract in September 2025 for Penlink's Tangles and Webloc location tools, first reported by 404 Media. ICE told Prism it uses technology to investigate crime "while respecting civil liberties and privacy interests."
“ICE and other Department of Homeland Security agencies are expanding their surveillance dragnet...” (Sen. Ron Wyden, in an email to Prism Reports)
Sources: USAspending: ICE contract 70CMSD26C00000001 to Chenega Defense & Aerospace Solutions (Penlink PLX); Prism Reports, Apr 29, 2026 (updated May 4 and 5); 404 Media, Sept 30, 2025 (Tangles and Webloc); Wyden and others, letter to the DHS Inspector General on ICE location-data purchases (Mar 3, 2026); Wyden press release, Mar 3, 2026
[verified] Army Special Forces command renews Clearview AI facial recognition
Mar 20, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id green-berets-clearview
The Army's award record, solicitation, brand-name justification and requirements page read directly (Oct 3, 2026). Corrected Oct 3, 2026: an earlier version said "analysts only"; that was Biometric Update's inference, not the records'.
1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) at Fort Bragg bought five Clearview AI licenses by brand name; one offer came in. The award went to the reseller Octaris Technologies: $78,750 for the first year (signed March 17, 2026, for service from March 20, 2026 to March 19, 2027), with options through March 2030 worth up to $339,415 in all. The Army's requirements list "50 billion images" and "98% accuracy"; its justification memo calls Clearview "sole source facial recognition software" and cites a "99.85% accuracy rating." The 2025 subscription was also five licenses.
Sources: USAspending: Army purchase order W9124726PA016 to Octaris Technologies; Army solicitation W9124726QA005, Clearview AI software licenses; Army brand-name justification memo (Feb 25, 2026); Army salient characteristics (Jan 7, 2026); Biometric Update, Feb 27, 2026; Biometric Update, Jun 17, 2026 (reseller and award value)
[verified] FBI Director confirms buying commercial data when asked about Americans' location data
Mar 18, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id patel-data-broker
TechCrunch's and Biometric Update's accounts of the hearing read directly (Oct 3, 2026); the committee's hearing page lists the witnesses. Corrected Oct 3, 2026: an earlier version said the DIA "confirmed the same"; its director did not say whether DIA still buys location data.
At the committee's Worldwide Threats hearing, Sen. Ron Wyden asked whether the FBI would stop buying Americans' location data. Patel answered, in TechCrunch's transcription: "We do purchase commercially available information that is consistent with the Constitution and the laws under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act — and it has led to some valuable intelligence for us." Wyden took that to mean the FBI buys Americans' location data and called doing so without a warrant "an outrageous end-run around the Fourth Amendment." The dispute turns on Carpenter v. United States (2018), in which the Supreme Court held that getting a person's historical cell-site location records is a search that generally requires a warrant; Congress has set no clear rule for buying similar data from brokers; the sponsors of the bipartisan Government Surveillance Reform Act say it would close that "data broker loophole." TechCrunch reported this is the first time since 2023 the FBI has confirmed buying data from brokers; that year, then-Director Christopher Wray told senators the FBI had bought location data in the past but was not actively buying it. The FBI says it needs no warrant to use such data, a position not yet tested in court (TechCrunch); in November 2025 the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board had reported the FBI does not buy continuous or real-time location data. Committee Chairman Tom Cotton said that if anyone can buy the data and it helps the FBI find a child molester or cartel leader, he would hope the FBI uses it. The FBI declined to say how often it buys location data or from which brokers. Asked the same question, Defense Intelligence Agency Director James Adams did not say whether DIA still buys location data; he said its purchases of commercially available information go through legal channels and follow the law, and DIA has said in writing that it does not read Carpenter to require a warrant for buying commercially available data for intelligence.
Sources: Senate Intelligence Committee: Open Hearing, Worldwide Threats (Mar 18, 2026); TechCrunch, Mar 18, 2026; Biometric Update, Mar 18, 2026 (FBI and DIA answers); The Conversation
[verified] Bipartisan bill would require warrants for Section 702 searches and bar federal law enforcement from buying data-broker data (S.4082)
Mar 12, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id gsra-s4082
Wyden's release and GovTrack's bill page read directly (Oct 3, 2026). Congress.gov blocks scripted downloads, so its page is linked but was not read this pass. Status unchanged: referred to Senate Judiciary.
Introduced March 12, 2026 by Wyden and Lee, with Senators Warren and Lummis as cosponsors; the House companion (H.R. 7901) is from Reps. Davidson and Lofgren. It requires warrants for Section 702 searches of Americans, with exceptions such as emergencies; bars federal law enforcement agencies from buying Americans' data from data brokers, with listed exceptions; bans reverse targeting; repeals the 2024 "make everyone a spy" expansion of who can be compelled to help with surveillance; requires warrants for location information, web browsing and search query records, and vehicle data (the sponsors also describe it as covering chatbot records); and reauthorizes Section 702 for four years. EPIC is among the groups supporting it. It is still in the Senate Judiciary Committee, with no floor action found.
Sources: Congress.gov: S.4082; GovTrack: S.4082; Sen. Ron Wyden, press release, Mar 12, 2026; Sen. Mike Lee, press release, Mar 12, 2026
[verified] Hackers leak DHS contracting data naming 6,681 companies and groups
Mar 1, 2026 · checked v3.31 · id dhs-oip-leak
DDoSecrets' release page and TechCrunch's report read directly, and the figures checked against the leaked files themselves, which we hold privately (Oct 3, 2026). The data is the hackers'; DHS has not confirmed it. Cite as "data published by DDoSecrets, reviewed by TechCrunch," not "DHS records." Corrected Oct 3, 2026: an earlier version said researchers told TechCrunch the files look genuine; TechCrunch's article does not say that.
On March 1, 2026, the transparency group DDoSecrets published 17 MB of data that a group calling itself the Department of Peace said it took from DHS's Office of Industry Partnership. It lists 6,681 organizations that applied for DHS contracts, including Palantir, Anduril, Raytheon, Microsoft and Oracle, and a second list of which ones won contracts and what for. The largest awards in the files are $70 million to Cyber Apex Solutions and $59.2 million to SAIC, as TechCrunch reported. Security researcher Micah Lee built a searchable explorer. The group cited the killings of Renée Good and Alex Pretti in Minneapolis. DHS and ICE did not respond to TechCrunch's request for comment, and we have found no independent authentication of the data.
Sources: DDoSecrets, "DHS Contracts" (published Mar 1, 2026); TechCrunch, Mar 2, 2026; Micah Lee, DHS Contracts Explorer; stateofsurveillance.org
[verified] DHS signs a single-award agreement for up to $1 billion of Palantir software, maintenance and services
Feb 12, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id palantir-dhs-bpa
The agreement and its orders read directly in federal award records (Oct 3, 2026). Palantir's internal email is WIRED's reporting. Corrected Oct 3, 2026: earlier versions put FEMA and CISA on the wrong list.
DHS signed the blanket purchase agreement on Feb 12, 2026: up to $1 billion over five years for Palantir's commercial software licenses, maintenance and implementation services across the department. It is a single-award agreement issued under Palantir's General Services Administration schedule. WIRED reported that this lets agencies like CBP and ICE "essentially skip the competitive bidding process" for new Palantir purchases.
Palantir announced the agreement to staff amid internal tension over its ICE work after Minneapolis nurse Alex Pretti was shot and killed in January; CEO Alex Karp, in a video for employees, had not answered direct questions about how the company's technology powers ICE (WIRED). In the internal email, chief technology officer Akash Jain acknowledged "increased concern, both externally and internally, around our existing work with ICE," said the agreement could expand the company's reach to the Secret Service, FEMA, TSA and CISA, and argued Palantir's software supports "adherence to constitutional protections, especially the Fourth Amendment"; critics argue the company's tools create "a massive surveillance dragnet, which could ultimately harm civil liberties" (WIRED, Feb 19). Palantir did not respond to WIRED's request for comment. Palantir's ICE work also runs through a separate, older contract for ICE's case-management system (70CTD022FR0000170, signed 2022; $170.8 million obligated, running to September 2027). Federal records show ICE added $29.9 million to it in April 2025 for new targeting and enforcement prioritization, self-deportation tracking and immigration lifecycle capabilities, which WIRED reported as the $30 million "ImmigrationOS," and another $29.9 million in September 2025 for Enhanced Leads Identification and Targeting for Enforcement (ELITE), the tool WIRED reports maps potential deportation targets from DHS and Health and Human Services data. ICE has kept funding that work on the older contract into September 2026.
Federal award records list three orders under it as of Oct 3, 2026: $18.7 million for the Secret Service ("data modeling," March 18), $86.3 million for the case-management system of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations (April 30) and $45.8 million for case-management and analytics systems at ICE's Homeland Security Investigations (June 24).
Sources: USAspending: DHS blanket purchase agreement 70RTAC26A00000001 with Palantir, and its orders; WIRED, Feb 19, 2026; SiliconANGLE, Feb 19, 2026; Nasdaq
[partial] Mobile Fortify: ICE and CBP's face-scanning phone app
Ongoing · checked v3.31 · id mobile-fortify
DHS's 2025 AI use case inventory and the linked reporting read directly (Oct 3, 2026). Partially verified: the 200 million figure comes from internal ICE material 404 Media viewed and may be a dated lower bound; the 100,000 figure is a lawsuit's allegation. Corrected Oct 3, 2026: an earlier version merged two cases into "misidentifications of US citizens."
Agents point a phone at a face, and the app matches it against government records, including about 200 million images, according to internal ICE material 404 Media viewed. DHS's 2025 AI use case inventory names the vendor: "NEC is the third‑party vendor CBP uses. ICE accesses these capabilities through CBP and does not contract directly with NEC." Illinois and Chicago allege in a lawsuit that DHS launched it around June 2025 and has used it more than 100,000 times. Civil liberties groups say the data, including photos of US citizens, is stored for 15 years. A CBP official testified that the app returned two different, incorrect names for a woman detained in Oregon (404 Media). Separately, Jesus Gutiérrez, a US citizen, told Reveal that agents scanned his face after stopping him on his way home from a Chicago gym.
Sources: DHS, 2025 AI Use Case Inventory (Jan 28, 2026); 404 Media, Jan 19, 2026 (Oregon misidentification); Reveal and 404 Media, Dec 13, 2025; ACLU, Nov 13, 2025; Biometric Update, Nov 27, 2025 (15-year retention); Biometric Update, Jan 13, 2026 (Illinois and Chicago lawsuit); Biometric Update, Jan 29, 2026 (NEC); WIRED
2. Data sharing and legal battles
[verified] Supreme Court stays order blocking expanded SAVE voter checks
Jun 22 – Sept 25, 2026 · checked v3.32 · id save-scotus-stay
Supreme Court opinion, government stay application, lower-court record, DHS program documents, Oct. 2 appellate filing and USCIS's Oct. 2 restoration notice read directly. The stay permits nationwide use while the appeal continues, but it is not a final ruling on the merits. USCIS confirms that SAVE user agencies can again create cases with full or partial Social Security numbers and use bulk upload.
On Sept. 25, 2026, the Supreme Court stayed Judge Sparkle Sooknanan's June 22 order setting aside the modified SAVE program in Department of Homeland Security v. League of Women Voters, No. 26A308. The stay lasts through the D.C. Circuit appeal and any timely Supreme Court review. It changes what DHS is legally permitted to do while the case continues; it is not a final decision on the program's lawfulness.
USCIS launched the modified system by May 22, 2025. It added records for U.S.-born citizens, access to Social Security Administration records including Social Security numbers, and a file-upload process that creates individual SAVE cases for multiple people. Sooknanan later held that the changes violated the Social Security Act, the Privacy Act and administrative law. A divided D.C. Circuit panel denied a stay on Sept. 4 before the Supreme Court intervened.
In an unsigned opinion, the Supreme Court majority said the challengers likely have standing but that "their claims likely lack merit." It read 8 U.S.C. § 1373 as likely authorizing DHS to obtain citizenship information despite restrictions elsewhere in federal law, and cited the government's interest in "the proper administration of the midterm elections." Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, dissented. She objected that the Court acted "without full briefing or oral argument" while "disregarding the harms that the modified SAVE system has caused, and will likely continue to cause, to lawful voters."
The litigation had already produced conflicting operational orders. The government said it disabled modified SAVE nationwide after Sooknanan's ruling. Judge T. Kent Wetherell II then ordered DHS to restore bulk-upload and Social Security-number searches for Florida, Indiana, Iowa and Ohio under a November 2025 settlement. In its Sept. 8 application, the government said it had restored the affected features for those four states while keeping them disabled for everyone else.
A USCIS notice last reviewed or updated Oct. 2 resolved the remaining operational question. It says SAVE user agencies "can once again create SAVE cases using a full or partial Social Security number and the SAVE bulk upload tool." USCIS attributes the restoration to the Supreme Court's Sept. 25 stay. The appeal remains pending, and the stay is not a final ruling on whether the modified system is lawful.
“disregarding the harms that the modified SAVE system has caused, and will likely continue to cause, to lawful voters” (Justice Jackson, dissenting, DHS v. League of Women Voters (Sept. 25, 2026))
Sources: DHS v. League of Women Voters, No. 26A308, per curiam opinion and Jackson, J., dissenting (U.S. Sept. 25, 2026) (docket 26A308); Supreme Court docket, No. 26A308 (docket 26A308); DHS v. League of Women Voters, application for stay (U.S. Sept. 8, 2026) (docket 26A308); League of Women Voters v. DHS, D.D.C. docket and appeal record package (Doc. 114) (docket 1:25-cv-03501-SLS); USCIS, USCIS Deploys Common Sense Tools to Verify Voters (May 22, 2025); DHS/USCIS Privacy Impact Assessment for SAVE (Oct. 31, 2025); League of Women Voters v. DHS, joint motion to set briefing schedule (D.C. Cir. Oct. 2, 2026) (docket 26-5243 & 26-5301); USCIS, SAVE Functionality Restored (last reviewed/updated Oct. 2, 2026); SCOTUSblog, Sept. 25, 2026; Democracy Docket, July 7, 2026; Washington Times; SAN
[verified] D.C. Circuit keeps block on IRS-to-ICE disclosure process
Sep 8, 2026 · carried forward · id dc-circuit-affirms-irs
D.C. Circuit opinion read directly Oct. 3, 2026. This ruling addresses the IRS's implementation process, not the earlier Centro ruling that the written IRS-ICE agreement was lawful on its face.
A unanimous panel affirmed the order staying the IRS's Data-Exchange Procedure and requiring notice to the district court before further disclosures. The IRS had used that process to release 47,289 records. For 90.3% of them, it did not check whether ICE supplied a valid taxpayer address, and government counsel acknowledged that some transfers did not comply with the statute.
The appeals court held that the automated procedure was a final agency action that could be reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act and was likely contrary to 26 U.S.C. § 6103. Judge Patricia Millett and Judge Robert Wilkins joined Judge Cornelia Pillard's opinion. This case concerned the agencies' implementation of the agreement; the earlier Centro decision had addressed the agreement's terms on their face.
Sources: Center for Taxpayer Rights v. IRS, No. 26-5006 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 8, 2026) (docket 26-5006); Reuters; AP; Fox News
[partial] Census Bureau runs 2020 voters through federal records; Trump cites the unauthored brief as proof of noncitizen voting
Aug 18, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id census-128m
The brief and NPR's report read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
A seven-page, unauthored Census Bureau brief (Aug 18, 2026) matched a commercial 2020 voter file against Social Security, State Department, USCIS and ICE records, with IRS taxpayer ID numbers included. It classified over 128 million records as citizens and over 24,000 as noncitizens, just under 0.02% by NPR's count, with 32 million more records still to check. A Census employee, speaking anonymously for fear of retaliation, told NPR the work was not done by career staff and that the team included people affiliated with the America First Policy Institute. President Trump said the analysis "proves that over 24,000 Noncitizens voted illegally"; election experts told NPR the matching is unreliable, and a former bureau economist said an unsigned report is "not common practice." Georgia's secretary of state asked the bureau for more information; his office's 2024 audit found fewer than a dozen noncitizens who had voted, against the report's estimate of 400 in Georgia in 2020. The bureau, the America First Policy Institute and the White House did not respond to NPR.
Sources: multiple outlets
[verified] Treasury IG: IRS gave ICE addresses for nearly 47,000 people
Jun 4, 2026 · carried forward · id tigta-47000
Confirmed by direct fetch of the report PDF (v3.7).
TIGTA Report No. 2026-IE-R010, "The IRS Provided Addresses for Nearly 47,000 Persons to Immigration and Customs Enforcement." ICE requested address data for over 1.2 million records in June 2025; the IRS matching process failed to catch all invalid matches among the roughly 47,000 records it released (the IRS's own later estimate: under 5% had incomplete or insufficient address information). TIGTA found ICE had not met required data-safeguarding standards before the sharing agreement was signed. No formal recommendations; TIGTA said it would raise the safeguarding findings with the DHS Office of Inspector General.
Sources: TIGTA Report No. 2026-IE-R010 (PDF)
[partial] IRS criminal investigators use Palantir to mine tax returns, bank records and FinCEN data
Apr 24, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id palantir-irs
The Intercept, TechCrunch and USAspending read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
Since 2018 the IRS Criminal Investigation division has used Palantir's Lead and Case Analytics platform to search and link sensitive federal data sets, including individual tax returns, Affordable Care Act data, bank statements and transactions, and "all available" data from the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, according to contract records American Oversight obtained and shared with The Intercept (Apr 24, 2026). The contract describes "analysis of massive-scale data to find the needle in the hay stack." The IRS has paid Palantir over $130 million for this work; federal award records show about $199 million in IRS obligations to Palantir on orders that began before the report, and about $247 million in all. The platform lets the IRS search and visualize "connections from millions of records with thousands of links." The IRS says agents use it to find connections between data sets to generate leads and investigate tax fraud and money laundering (2024 privacy impact assessment). The Intercept notes the office now holding it has, per the Wall Street Journal, scaled back pursuit of tax cheats and pivoted toward investigating "left-leaning groups," and that ProPublica reported the IRS working with ICE to provide "on demand" data for deportations. American Oversight's Chioma Chukwu said: "The question isn't just what it can do — it's who it will be used against." Palantir and the IRS did not respond to The Intercept.
Sources: American Oversight via TechCrunch
[verified] Court finds IRS unlawfully disclosed taxpayer data about 42,695 times
Feb 26, 2026 · carried forward · id irs-42695-disclosures
D.D.C. ruling read directly Oct. 3, 2026. The 42,695 figure counts requests processed without the required address check; it is not the court's estimate of how many addresses ultimately proved wrong or incomplete.
The IRS disclosed 47,289 taxpayer addresses to ICE through two matching methods. It used tax-identification-number matching for 42,695 of them, or 90.3%, without checking whether ICE's request included the taxpayer's address. Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly found that each disclosure made through that process violated 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2).
That procedural finding is different from the number of requests containing information that later proved incomplete or insufficient. The IRS told the court that its review of all 47,289 requests then estimated fewer than 5% were deficient. Examples included fields reading "Failed to Provide," "Unknown Address" or "NA NA," as well as addresses missing a street name or number.
“approximately 42,695 times” (Judge Kollar-Kotelly)
Sources: Center for Taxpayer Rights v. IRS, No. 1:25-cv-00457, Doc. 74 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2026) (docket 1:25-cv-00457); AP, Feb 26
[verified] D.C. Circuit says federal tax law permits IRS-to-ICE address sharing
Feb 24, 2026 · carried forward · id dc-court-allows-sharing
D.C. Circuit opinion read directly Oct. 3, 2026. Revived from the cut list with its date, holding and limits corrected.
Four organizations serving immigrant communities asked for a preliminary injunction, a temporary court order that would stop the address sharing while their lawsuit continued. The D.C. Circuit affirmed Judge Dabney Friedrich's May 12, 2025 refusal to issue that order. It held that 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2) permits IRS to disclose a taxpayer's mailing address for a non-tax federal criminal investigation without a court order, but not on an informal or open-ended request.
The request must be written and come from the head of a federal agency, an inspector general or certain Justice Department officials. It must give the taxpayer's name and an address already known to belong to that person, the relevant tax periods, the criminal law being investigated and the specific reason the information may matter. The information may go only to government officers directly working on that investigation or related proceedings. The court said these requirements do not permit "freewheeling disclosure of sensitive information."
The ruling approved the agreement on its face, not everything IRS and ICE had done under it. The panel said it was not deciding "the legality of any actions taken by IRS or DHS after they finalized the MOU." It noted the IRS had admitted disclosing information in response to some requests that did not contain valid addresses, but said those compliance questions were not before it in this case.
Sources: Centro de Trabajadores Unidos v. Bessent, No. 25-5181 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 2026) (docket 25-5181)
[verified] Second federal judge blocks IRS-to-ICE address sharing
Feb 5, 2026 · carried forward · id talwani-block
D. Mass. order read directly Oct. 3, 2026. The earlier D.D.C. injunction was also identified in the order, confirming that this was the second federal ruling to block part of the arrangement.
Judge Indira Talwani stayed the IRS-ICE information-sharing arrangements and temporarily barred DHS and ICE from inspecting, using, copying, distributing or otherwise acting on taxpayer information obtained through them. The order remains preliminary: it preserves the situation while the court decides the lawsuit's merits.
A D.C. federal judge had already required the IRS to comply strictly with federal tax-privacy law before making any new disclosure. Talwani's Feb. 5 order went further on ICE's side of the exchange by covering information already received, including the records transferred on Aug. 7, 2025.
Sources: Community Economic Development Center of Southeastern Massachusetts v. Bessent, No. 1:25-cv-12822, Doc. 75 (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 2026) (docket 1:25-cv-12822); Politico, Feb 5
[verified] States ran about 67 million voter registrations through DHS's SAVE citizenship-check system
Since Apr 2025 · checked v3.35 · id save-67m-checks
Associated Press report read directly Oct. 3, 2026. Its 67.4 million total combines 60 million USCIS-reported checks with 7.4 million additional North Carolina records. A Sept. 8 government filing separately reported more than 65 million voters verified across 26 states and 59.7 million requests across 27 participating states; those figures use different measures and cutoffs and are not interchangeable.
The Associated Press reported that at least 25 states had used expanded SAVE to check their voter rolls since April 2025. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services said states ran 60 million registration checks in one year; that figure did not include another 7.4 million registrations North Carolina later sent through the system, bringing the total to at least 67.4 million.
A SAVE match is not a final determination that someone is ineligible to vote. State officials must investigate the result, and AP documented eligible voters who were mistakenly flagged. The figure therefore measures registration records processed through SAVE, not confirmed noncitizens or unique people removed from voter rolls.
Sources: Associated Press, May 17, 2026; Democracy Docket, July 1, 2026; DHS v. League of Women Voters, application for stay (government usage figures, Sept. 8, 2026) (docket 26A308); legalinsurrection.com
3. Facial recognition
[verified] CBP posts, then cancels, a notice of intent to buy Clearview AI face search for Border Patrol
Feb 11, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id cbp-clearview
Statement of Work, SAM.gov notice history and USAspending read directly (Oct 9-10, 2026).
CBP's February 2026 Statement of Work describes 15 Clearview AI licenses for one year, "Total Contract Value: $225,000," for Border Patrol's headquarters intelligence division and the National Targeting Center, under a notice of intent to negotiate a sole-source award with Clearview. The SAM.gov notice's latest version (Feb 12, 2026) is marked cancelled, and a USAspending search on Oct 10, 2026 found no $225,000 award; the only 2026 CBP-Clearview order found is $15,750 (July 2, 2026). The notice had planned a 12-month period from Sept 30, 2026 to Sept 29, 2027, so an award could still be posted. Clearview's database holds more than 60 billion images scraped from the internet, turned into face templates without the knowledge or consent of the people pictured. WIRED reported the access would more likely be tied to CBP's Automated Targeting System, which links biometric galleries, watch lists and enforcement records, including files from ICE operations far from the border. WIRED notes the contract describes "tactical targeting" and "strategic counter-network analysis," indicating the tool is meant for analysts' day-to-day intelligence work rather than isolated investigations. The documents do not say what photos agents may upload, whether US citizens may be searched or how long results are kept, and no Clearview-specific privacy impact assessment or records-notice update has been publicly identified (WIRED, Biometric Update). Biometric Update notes that this does not mean no privacy review occurred, since internal privacy screenings are not usually published, but that there is no public record of how DHS fits the use within its privacy authorities. Federal testing by NIST found face-search systems can perform well on "high-quality visa-like photos" but with error rates "often in excess of 20 percent, even with the more accurate algorithms," on photos taken at border crossings. NIST also found these systems cannot cut false matches without missing more correct ones, and that when set to always return candidates, a search for someone not in the database still returns candidate matches, results NIST calls "100 percent wrong." CBP's Statement of Work says the tool helps it "identify, target, screen, and interdict inbound and outbound passengers" who pose a threat. CBP's AI inventory says it piloted Clearview from October 2025 and that "No enforcement action is taken based solely on the leads generated by this tool" and that "All potential identifications undergo thorough investigation and validation"; FedScoop, citing the inventory, reports the tool was tuned to limit misidentification. Two 2025 precursor purchase orders: Spokane Sector, $30,000, and Yuma Sector, $15,000, both issued June 23, 2025. CBP and Clearview did not respond to WIRED's questions.
“Total Contract Value: $225,000” (CBP Statement of Work, Feb 2026)
Sources: Biometric Update; FedScoop
[verified] ICE's $9.2M Clearview AI face-recognition contract for child-exploitation and assault-on-officer cases
Sept 5, 2025 · checked v3.35 · id ice-clearview-9m
Verified; date corrected in v3.0 (signed Sept 5, 2025, not June 2026). USAspending award and transactions read directly (Oct 9, 2026). Updated Oct 9, 2026 with the option exercise.
Signed September 5, 2025. Total contract value $9.2M over a one-year base and three option years, $3.75M obligated up front. Covers CSAM investigations and "assaults against law enforcement officers" investigations. ICE exercised option 1 on Sept 1, 2026 ($3,937,500), bringing obligations to $7,687,500. Homeland security officials say Clearview's tools are vital in cases with large volumes of digital evidence, especially crimes against children; Clearview defends its practices as lawful. The award record lists the contract as not competed, with only one source; ICE's notice cited Clearview's "unique proprietary capabilities." Critics warn the software can turn any online photo into law-enforcement material without consent, and civil-liberties groups have challenged no-bid awards made without public debate (Biometric Update).
Sources: Washington Post; Biometric Update
[verified] DHS takes down its facial-recognition directive, calls it website maintenance as use expands
Feb 2025 · checked v3.32 · id dhs-fr-policy-deleted
WIRED, Biometric Update and the Brennan Center read directly Oct. 3, 2026. The date is corrected from February 2026 to February 2025. DHS says the takedown did not change policy; the same public record shows no replacement people could inspect and continuing uncertainty about what rules governed expanding use.
DHS issued Directive 026-11 in September 2023. It said facial recognition could not be the sole basis for enforcement, barred systemic or indiscriminate monitoring and targeting people for exercising constitutional rights, gave people an opt-out in some non-law-enforcement uses, and required headquarters-level review for ICE and CBP uses. Online archives reviewed by WIRED show the directive disappeared from DHS's website three weeks after President Trump's January 2025 inauguration.
DHS told Biometric Update the removal was routine website maintenance, not a policy change. But a May 2025 Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board report said DHS had not clarified whether the directive still applied or whether it planned a replacement. In February 2026, EPIC's Jeramie Scott told WIRED that DHS had not publicly replaced it. The Brennan Center's data, current through July 26, 2026, still described the policy as taken down and said it was unclear what policy, if any, governed DHS's use of facial recognition.
DHS expanded its use while leaving that question unanswered. WIRED found that Mobile Fortify was fast-tracked in May 2025, less than two months after the directive disappeared, after ICE and CBP assumed more control over privacy review. By July 2026, the Brennan Center found more than $1 billion spent or promised on biometrics in recent years, including mobile face and iris matching that put the capability directly in agents' hands.
“They do not represent a change in policy” (DHS spokesperson, via Biometric Update, Oct. 31, 2025)
“DHS has not publicly replaced its previous facial recognition directive” (Jeramie Scott, EPIC, via WIRED, Feb. 5, 2026)
Sources: WIRED, Feb. 5, 2026; Biometric Update, Oct. 31, 2025; Brennan Center, Sept. 16, 2026
[retracted] "D.C. Circuit halted DHS nationwide face database on Fourth Amendment grounds"
undated · checked v3.0 · id fr-database-halt
Investigated, likely fabricated (v3.0). Do not cite. Cut list #5.
Traces to a single low-quality site (jurisreview.com) with no docket number, a fabricated case name, and an uncorroborated quote.
Sources: none
4. ICE arsenal
[verified] DHS plans up to $440M in government-wide purchases of face, iris and fingerprint scanners, including border cameras that read every car occupant's face
Sept 10, 2026 · checked v3.29 · id dhs-biometric-device-gwac
Solicitation read directly. These are planned amounts, not money spent. No awards yet.
On Sept 10, 2026, DHS's Office of Procurement Operations issued a solicitation for a government-wide, multiple-award contract for biometric capture devices, under which DHS and other agencies intend to spend up to $440,736,478 over up to five years. DHS components must use it, and contracting officers at any federal agency can order from it. It has five tracks (fingerprint, face, iris, palmprint and multi-modal), and DHS estimates $258.3 million for multi-modal devices alone.
The requirements include cameras mounted at land ports of entry that automatically photograph every occupant of a car through the windshield as it approaches the inspection booth at 5 to 20 mph. The images go to CBP's Traveler Verification Service to be matched against photos in "Government holdings." Vendors must say whether the cameras capture faces when occupants look away or are asleep, and through masks, visors, hats and sunglasses. Optional face requirements include capture at 2 to 400 meters with remote pan, tilt and zoom, and matching a person's "Scars, Marks, and Tattoos."
DHS says the contract replaces one-off device purchases scattered across agencies. Proposals were due Sept 18, 2026. No award had been posted on SAM.gov as of Sept 29.
“Capture 100% of front seat vehicle passengers and 90% of backseat and third row seat passengers” (DHS solicitation 70RDA126R00000001, Attachment 3 (face requirements))
Sources: DHS Request for Proposal 70RDA126R00000001, Biometric Capture Devices (Sept. 10, 2026); Attachment 3: Minimum Essential Requirements (face track: FACE-SPECIFIC-47, 56-65, 110-111, 124); SF 1449, 70RDA126R00000001; SAM.gov listing, Biometric Capture Device GWAC
[verified] ICE commits $57.1M to skip-tracing contractors to find people on an ICE docket of about 1.5 million
Aug 26, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id skip-tracing-57m
Verified Oct. 10 against fourteen USAspending award records. Restored from the cut list; see correction c-3.35-skip-tracing-confirmed.
All fourteen USAspending descriptions say the orders are for skip-tracing services for ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations. The ten largest orders total $54,277,325.30; four smaller orders add $2,803,916.00, for an exact total of $57,081,241.30. Project Salt Box reported the rounded $57 million figure and charted the top ten. "Obligated" means federal funds were committed; it does not prove the money was paid out or the work completed. All 14 orders fall under contracts ICE awarded in December 2025 and January 2026 from solicitation 26-SOL-DCR-01, whose Statement of Work says "The total docket size is approximately 1.5M," with multiple vendors given "a monthly caseload of approximately 50k last known addresses." Vendors are to verify a person's residence, or failing that their workplace, with photos and documents.
Sources: USAspending: Capgemini, 70CDCR26FR0000072 ($14,450,347.50); USAspending: Global Recovery Group, 70CDCR26FR0000071 ($8,437,500); USAspending: Bluehawk, 70CDCR26FR0000070 ($7,968,982.50); USAspending: SOS International, 70CDCR26FR0000068 ($4,926,678.75); USAspending: B.I. Incorporated, 70CDCR26FR0000063 ($4,873,500); USAspending: Omniplex World Services, 70CDCR26FR0000073 ($4,462,740); USAspending: National Protective Services, 70CDCR26FR0000078 ($2,729,250); USAspending: Constellation, 70CDCR26FR0000077 ($2,302,406.25); USAspending: Government Support Services, 70CDCR26FR0000076 ($2,223,000); USAspending: AI Solutions 87, 70CDCR26FR0000065 ($1,902,920.30); USAspending: Gravitas Professional Services, 70CDCR26FR0000075 ($1,282,500); USAspending: Fraud Inc, 70CDCR26FR0000074 ($1,044,000); USAspending: Response AI Solutions, 70CDCR26FR0000067 ($373,760); USAspending: EnProVera, 70CDCR26FR0000061 ($103,656); Project Salt Box, Follow the Money - August 2026 (Sept. 18, 2026)
[verified] DHS plans smart glasses with biometric identification for immigration agents, while ICE bars staff from wearing Meta's
Apr–Aug 2026 · checked v3.35 · id ice-meta-glasses-ban
The Register and DHS's FY2027 budget justification read directly (Oct 9, 2026); The New York Times read in full via ProQuest (Oct 11, 2026).
DHS's stated goal is smart glasses that identify people biometrically, for immigration agents in the field. Its FY2027 budget sets a goal to "develop an operational prototype of smart glasses that enables biometric identification of illegal aliens," part of a $7.5M Science and Technology request for detention and removal operations, to give agents real-time access to information and biometric identification in the field. 404 Media had reported Border Patrol agents photographed wearing Meta glasses in recording mode, and in March The Independent reported DHS agents wearing them in at least six states, some apparently recording members of the public (via Tom's Guide). In August 2026, ICE acting director David Venturella told all agency employees not to wear Meta glasses on the job, as they count as personal body-worn cameras that "could unintentionally capture, record or transmit sensitive information"; ICE first told employees the glasses were banned in June, according to an internal email the Times obtained; its agents had come under fire for wearing them to protests and during immigration raids. ICE said the memo restated existing policy, but declined to say what prompted it or whether more agents had been bringing Meta glasses to work (The Register). ICE's body-camera policy bars live facial recognition on body-camera video but authorizes face-recognition searches on still images taken from footage once it is downloaded into a system of record, under applicable privacy requirements and in support of authorized law-enforcement work. The same policy bars filming a person solely because of their race, religion, national origin or political affiliation, among other traits, but exempts immigration and customs work in which nationality is relevant. The glasses themselves are under privacy scrutiny: the UK's privacy watchdog began investigating them in March after reports that contractors reviewing recordings saw extremely private moments, and contractors say they were asked to review intimate footage used for Meta's AI training (The Register, Gizmodo). Meta declined to comment.
Sources: The New York Times, Aug 18, 2026; The Register, Aug 19; Gizmodo; Tom's Guide; TechRepublic; SC Media
[verified] ICE orders $10.1M of Rapid DNA tests and equipment to check claimed family relationships
Aug 7, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id rapid-dna
Verified part of a split August enforcement-spending entry. SNA International award read directly in USAspending (Oct 9, 2026). Corrected Oct 10, 2026: a sentence about a Capgemini order moved to skip-tracing-57m, where it belongs.
ICE ordered $10.1M of Rapid DNA tests, equipment and services from SNA International on Aug 7, 2026, for Enforcement and Removal Operations field offices "to verify biological relatives." An earlier order for the same purpose, in May 2025, was $6.24M. Civil liberties and immigrant advocacy groups have raised concerns about privacy and about families that are not biologically related. The public award records set no rules on consent, retention, destruction or secondary use of the DNA, or on what happens when a test does not confirm a relationship (Newsweek). A former ICE official defended the program as making sure people who claim to be guardians of minors are who they say. Newsweek reports SNA first received a DHS research contract in 2019 and that ICE later gave it a sole-source award; GAO rejected a competitor's protest. SNA told Newsweek it does not comment publicly on government programs.
Sources: Newsweek, Aug 25
[verified] ICE hires a contractor to run a national 24-hour call center for local police and sheriffs' deputies deputized to enforce immigration law
Jul 28, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id 287g-center
Federal award record and ICE's November 2025 request for information read directly (Oct 3, 2026). Earlier versions listed this as unconfirmed; revived Oct 3, 2026 after Project Salt Box pointed to the award.
ICE signed the task order on July 28, 2026, with work from Aug. 6: $17,456,917.40 now and up to $63,035,230.95 with options through August 2030, for support services for Enforcement and Removal Operations' 287(g) National Coordination Center. ICE competed it among small businesses holding GSA's OASIS+ contract, and five offers came in; it is the only order placed so far on Koniag's OASIS+ contract.
ICE's request for information from November 2025 describes what it wanted: a center using "data-enabled technology to receive and process 6,000 to 7,000 calls per day" from 287(g) partners, staffed around the clock to "analyze data, perform database cross-checks, and confirm enforcement actions in the field." Separate cells would give partners and ICE field offices "UAC targeting focus and material" for locating unaccompanied children, and the same for reducing ICE's non-detained docket (people going through immigration court who are not in detention). Another would identify "emerging technologies" for the program. ICE asked vendors what technology would "integrate partner and alien data with our systems." The awarded contract's own terms have not been published; Tennessee Lookout reported contract documents describing the same duties.
The request for information placed the center in "the greater Nashville, TN metro area." Tennessee Lookout reported on Aug. 11 that the federal database listed Adams, a Robertson County town; WSMV reported on Aug. 21, from federal filings, that it was planned for Nashville's Donelson area (ZIP code 37214), the ZIP code on the award record. ICE data cited by Tennessee Lookout show 287(g) agreements grew from fewer than 200 before January 2025 to 2,179 by August 2026.
Separately, the Javorsky complaint alleges California plate-reader data reached over 300 out-of-state agencies including 287(g) participants; that concerns Flock data sharing, not this center.
Sources: USAspending: ICE task order 70CDCR26FR0000034 to Koniag Services, 287(g) National Coordination Center; ICE request for information, 287(g) Program National Call Center (November 2025); Tennessee Lookout, Aug 11, 2026; WSMV, Aug 21, 2026; Project Salt Box, Sept 18, 2026
[verified] Meta's smart glasses: border agents wear them on raids, and Meta licensed police-and-Pentagon face recognition for them
June 2025 – June 2026 · checked v3.35 · id meta-glasses-agents-face-recognition
Agents' use is from photos and video verified by 404 Media. The face-recognition code is WIRED's finding, reproduced by EFF. The Kenya review is the class action's allegation. The FTC review changes are The New York Times's reporting (full text via ProQuest, Oct 11, 2026).
Border agents have worn Meta's Ray-Ban smart glasses on immigration raids: a CBP agent at a June 30, 2025 raid outside a Home Depot in Los Angeles, and a Border Patrol agent in Charlotte, North Carolina, with the recording light on (reported Dec. 9, 2025). CBP told 404 Media it has no arrangement with Meta and doesn't allow employees to use personal recording devices.
Meta has been building face recognition into the same glasses. An internal Meta document from May 2025, reported by The New York Times in February 2026, planned to launch the feature, called "Name Tag," "during a dynamic political environment where many civil society groups that we would expect to attack us would have their resources focused on other concerns." In April 2026, 75 groups including the ACLU and EPIC asked Meta to drop it, warning it is "primed to be coopted for police surveillance, circumventing the Fourth Amendment," and asked Meta to disclose any discussions with ICE and CBP. In June 2026, WIRED found the face-recognition code already inside the Meta AI app, downloaded over 50 million times, built to pull faceprints from Meta's servers. EFF confirmed it and found it removed in a June 5 update. Meta says nothing has shipped to consumers and it is "not building a central face database." Under Facebook's 2019 $5 billion settlement with the Federal Trade Commission, Meta agreed to review every new or modified product for privacy risks. In January 2025 it relaxed that review, leaving its privacy teams less influence over product releases, according to an internal post seen by The New York Times. Andie Millan, a director of risk review in Reality Labs, told employees she believed the changes would "push the bounds" of Meta's agreement with the FTC, and said: "Mark wants to push on it a little bit," according to a recording of an internal meeting the Times obtained.
The face recognition Meta tested came from Rank One Computing, which gets about 80 percent of its revenue from government clients. It sells to the U.S. Marshals Service, the Navy's police force (NCIS) and police departments, and built long-range face recognition for U.S. Special Operations Command. Its CEO previously ran the FBI division that operates the bureau's biometric databases. A Rank One license obtained by WIRED, covering up to 10 million face templates, is tied to a test version of the Meta AI app, and traces of the integration shipped, dormant, to consumers in June 2026. Meta declined to say why it licensed the software or whether the relationship continues.
A class action filed March 4, 2026 alleges that footage from the glasses' AI features goes to Meta's servers and is reviewed by contract workers in Kenya (N.D. Cal. No. 3:26-cv-01897, now In re Meta AI Glasses Litigation).
“We will launch during a dynamic political environment where many civil society groups that we would expect to attack us would have their resources focused on other concerns” (Meta Reality Labs internal document, via The New York Times)
“This invasion of privacy is also primed to be coopted for police surveillance, circumventing the Fourth Amendment” (Coalition letter to Meta, Apr. 13, 2026)
Sources: 404 Media, "A CBP Agent Wore Meta Smart Glasses to an Immigration Raid in Los Angeles" (Aug. 7, 2025); 404 Media, "Border Patrol Agent Recorded Raid with Meta's Ray-Ban Smart Glasses" (Dec. 9, 2025); The New York Times, "Meta Plans to Add Facial Recognition Technology to Its Smart Glasses" (Feb. 13, 2026); Coalition letter to Meta from 75 organizations (Apr. 13, 2026); WIRED, "Meta Silently Added Face-Recognition Code for Its Smart Glasses to Millions of Phones" (June 4, 2026); EFF, "Move Fast, Surveil Things" (June 4, 2026); EFF, "Victory! Meta Strips Facial Recognition Code from Smart Glasses App After Public Outcry" (June 8, 2026); WIRED, "Meta Tapped a Pentagon Supplier to Prototype Face Recognition for Its Glasses" (June 15, 2026); Bartone v. Meta Platforms, No. 3:26-cv-01897, Class Action Complaint (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2026) (docket 3:26-cv-01897)
[partial] Palantir ELITE: ICE's raid-targeting app, and ICE's plan to load voter data into it
June 2026 · checked v3.33 · id palantir-elite
Substance confirmed; the date was flagged in v3.5. Disclosure may have been earlier than June, not independently re-verified; the raid-targeting description is carried forward, not re-checked. Updated Oct 9, 2026: ICE's own records (FOIA release to Democracy Forward, Oct 1, 2026) read directly for the voter-data plan. They show preparation, not completed entry. Palantir's denial is WIRED's report, read directly.
Integrates improperly obtained Medicaid addresses and decides which neighborhoods to raid.
Updated Oct 9, 2026. ICE records released under FOIA to Democracy Forward show Homeland Security Investigations preparing voter data for ELITE in 2026. A May 26 email says coordination continued "particularly on ingesting processed voter roll data into the ELITE enforcement system." HSI's weekly reports list a DOJ dataset of 50.6 million records, 48.4 million records "obtained by DAS Heather Honey through independent sources of information," and about 26,000 USCIS-derived records. These are counts of records, not people. A July 6 report says data for six states (Missouri, Michigan, New Mexico, Connecticut, Georgia and Kentucky) had been enriched and was "pending Palantir entry into ELITE," and that Michigan and New Mexico were on hold for legal review under a court order in State of California v. Trump.
The records do not show that any voter data was actually entered. A Palantir spokesman told WIRED: "Voter roll data has never been integrated into ELITE."
“a list of 20 million people on their iPhones.” (Senior ICE official)
“MO, MI, NM, CT, GA and KY have been enriched by the iLab and are pending Palantir entry into ELITE.” (HSI Election Integrity Investigations weekly report, July 6, 2026 (ICE FOIA release))
Sources: WBUR / 404 Media; ICE FOIA release to Democracy Forward, 2026-ICLI-00100 (Oct. 1, 2026); WIRED, ICE Emails Discuss Using Palantir-Supported Tool to Investigate Voter Fraud (Oct. 8, 2026)
[verified] ICE buys iris scanners that check people against millions of booking and arrest records
May 22, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id bi2-iris-scanners
Award record and SAM.gov notices read directly (Oct 9, 2026); the justification for other than full competition is an image-only scan. The quote is The Register's.
ICE awarded BI2 Technologies a no-bid, firm-fixed-price contract on May 22, 2026, fully obligated at $25,112,150, for iris-recognition devices and access to I.R.I.S., which The Register describes as "a database of more than five million booking, arrest, and incarceration records from 47 US states." A $4.6 million FY2025 contract had put 200 devices in use; with this one, 1,770 could be on US streets by the end of May 2027. ICE justified the no-bid award by BI2's capabilities being "unmatched by any competitor" and by that earlier contract (The Register). DHS declined an interview but told NPR the devices are used "to assist in accurately identifying individuals encountered during immigration enforcement and removal operations, including confirming identities and backgrounds of individuals who may be subject to enforcement actions." NPR reports that in a Chicago apartment raid last fall, officers pointed a smartphone at Norelly Mejías Cáceres's face after she fainted and told her to open her eyes wide, then identified her; she had a pending asylum case and was detained and deported. Her lawyer, Nicole Hallett of the University of Chicago, believes it was an iris scan, and says others arrested in the raid reported being photographed and then having details about them known to officers. The Register reports the system can also reach driver's license and vehicle plate information, and FedScoop reports BI2 has no public plans for FedRAMP security authorization, which DHS acknowledged in procurement documents. EFF's Cooper Quintin told NPR ICE could start iris-scanning everyone it detains and add them to its database for further surveillance. BI2 did not respond to NPR, and ICE and DHS did not answer The Register's questions.
“US immigration cops have doled out about $25.1 million to a company called Bi2 Technologies for 1,570 biometric recognition devices” (The Register)
Sources: The Register; NPR, May 27; FedScoop; Biometric Update; Brennan Center
[retracted] "CBP issued a May 2026 alert about civilian smart glasses"
May 2026 · checked v3.3 · id cbp-glasses-alert
Retracted in v3.3. Stays retracted. Cut list #13.
Retracted. No support found.
Sources: none
5. Flock and license plate readers
[verified] Elser v. Flock Group: Colorado lawsuit over a theft charge built on a month of Flock history
Oct 5, 2026 · checked v3.33 · id elser-v-flock
Complaint read in full from the court record (Oct 9, 2026), with the docket. What happened to Elser and what Flock did are the plaintiff's allegations; no defendant had responded as of Oct 9. Flock's reported response to the press is not in the complaint and is not used here.
Elser v. Flock Group, Inc., No. 1:26-cv-04977-NYW (D. Colo.), filed Oct 5, 2026, before Judge Nina Y. Wang. Defendants: Flock; the Towns of Columbine Valley and Bow Mar; Columbine Valley police Sgt. Jamie Milliman; and Chief Bret Cottrell.
The complaint alleges that after a package worth "twenty-five dollars or less" was stolen in Bow Mar on Sept 22, 2025, by a woman who left on foot, Milliman searched Flock for vehicles nearby, found Elser's truck, and pulled about a month of its history. Six Flock cameras cover all three entrances to Bow Mar. He served her a theft summons at her Denver home on Sept 27 and, she says, refused to look at her truck's camera footage. Her truck's GPS, her phone's location history and her tailor's cameras placed her at a fitting more than a quarter mile away. The chief voided the summons on Oct 15, 2025.
The complaint also alleges that Columbine Valley was Flock's first Colorado customer, that Flock trained both officers, and that in November 2021 Flock opened the towns' cameras to all of its police customers in Colorado. It brings six claims: federal unreasonable-search and malicious-prosecution claims, two Colorado constitutional claims against the officers, and two class claims against Flock alone (intrusion upon seclusion and negligence) on behalf of everyone whose vehicle Flock's Colorado cameras have photographed. Elser asks the court to order Flock to build a warrant requirement, case numbers, supervisory approval and auditing into its system for Colorado agencies.
All of this is the plaintiff's account. No defendant had responded as of Oct 9, 2026.
“searched Flock's database for the historical movements of her truck to surveil her every movement by and through Bow Mar over the past month” (Elser v. Flock Group, complaint (Doc. 1), para. 53 (plaintiff's allegation))
Sources: Elser v. Flock Group, No. 1:26-cv-04977-NYW, Doc. 1, class action complaint (D. Colo. Oct. 5, 2026) (docket 1:26-cv-04977-NYW); CourtListener docket 74922498 (docket 1:26-cv-04977-NYW)
[verified] U.S. v. Kyle: federal judge holds a warrantless month of plate-reader history unconstitutional
Oct 1, 2026 · checked v3.33 · id kyle-suppression
Opinion and order read in full from the court record (Oct 9, 2026), with the docket. The evidence was suppressed on two independent grounds; the plate-reader holding is one of them. The 91 pounds of methamphetamine some outlets report is not in the order and is not used here. One district court; the government may still appeal.
United States v. Melisa Susan Kyle, No. 4:26-cr-00189-SEH (N.D. Okla.), Document 62, Judge Sara E. Hill. A Tulsa County deputy who has served as a DEA task-force officer saw a rental Mazda with a California plate, followed it "for no apparent reason other than the fact that it had a California license plate," and queried two plate-reader systems, Flock and VehicleManager. They returned about a month of the car's travel, including a short trip to the California/Arizona border and back. He stopped Kyle for following too closely, gave her a warning, and then held her for a dog sniff after she refused a search.
The court suppressed the evidence on two independent grounds. First, the stop was lawful, but the deputy extended it without reasonable suspicion. Second, the plate-reader search was itself a Fourth Amendment search, made without a warrant or probable cause. Reading Carpenter and Chatrie, the court held that drivers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in "the whole of their physical movements," and called the networks "a type of indiscriminate mass surveillance."
It is one district court. The order says it departs from "nearly every court examining the issue to date," including three other Oklahoma federal courts, and that neither the Tenth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has decided the question. As of Oct 9, 2026, the trial had been cancelled, Kyle was released on conditions, and no appeal had been filed.
“Alaniz's search in just the ALPR system provided him with more than 50 individual records of Kyle's whereabouts across the country for an entire month.” (Judge Sara E. Hill, Doc. 62)
“It is not too much to draw the line at indiscriminate mass surveillance.” (Judge Sara E. Hill, Doc. 62)
Sources: U.S. v. Kyle, No. 4:26-cr-00189-SEH, Doc. 62, opinion and order (N.D. Okla. Oct. 1, 2026) (docket 4:26-cr-00189-SEH); CourtListener docket 73367327 (docket 4:26-cr-00189-SEH)
[verified] Lufkin, TX officer pleads guilty to 100 felony counts of Flock misuse; 5 years in prison per count
Aug 20 – Sept 30, 2026 · checked v3.30 · id klein-lufkin
Register of actions read directly (Oct 1, 2026). Identity match to the "K ZAC" operator confirmed in v3.26, correcting v3.25. Not shown on the register: whether the 100 sentences run concurrently or consecutively. The KWTX statement is paraphrased from its video report. Updated Oct 1, 2026; earlier versions ended with the Sept 28 arraignment.
Zachary Anthony Klein, an 11-year Lufkin PD veteran, was arrested by Texas Rangers on Aug. 20, 2026 on abuse-of-official-capacity and tampering charges, six days after USA TODAY asked Lufkin police about his Flock use. Case No. 2026-0455, State of Texas v. Zachary Klein, 159th Judicial District Court, Angelina County: 100 counts under Tex. Penal Code § 39.06(e), each a third-degree felony, filed 08/21/2026. The counts are dated 07/31/2024 to 05/19/2026. Bond was set at $500,000 and reduced to $250,000 at his Sept. 28, 2026 arraignment (KTRE). On Sept. 30, 2026, he pleaded guilty to all 100 counts before Judge Todd Kassaw and was convicted on each; the court committed him directly to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for 5 years on each count, starting that day, with 42 days of jail credit. The register does not say whether the sentences run concurrently. Lufkin PD suspended department-wide Flock use and began an audit.
Reported search counts: about 45,000 total Flock queries (Yahoo/Newsweek; haveibeenflocked.com's operator tally is 45,318); "more than 10,000" (IJ.org database); and more than 3,400 searches on a single plate over 10 months (USA TODAY). The Flock audit logs Lufkin PD released to us on Oct. 1, 2026 list 22,813 queries under his name from June 2024 to December 2025, with no file for May 2025; the most-searched plate appears 8,708 times. His targets: vehicles of 11 people (Lufkin Daily News) versus seven license plates (USA TODAY).
The Angelina County District Attorney's office said a Texas Rangers investigation found more than 25,000 Flock inquiries for non-law-enforcement purposes, about 18,000 of them on plates associated with three people: his ex-girlfriend, her family members and people she has dated. He also agreed to a lifetime protective order on the basis of stalking for his former dating partner (CBS19, Sept. 30). He had been booked on tampering with a governmental record and abuse of official capacity (Lufkin Daily News); KWTX reported that the state agreed not to pursue those two unindicted charges. A second Lufkin officer, placed on leave after some of his searches were flagged in the department's audit, was cleared by the Texas Rangers on Sept. 15 (Lufkin Daily News).
“In Texas, officer Zachary Klein of the Lufkin Police Department used Flock to repeatedly search seven license plates, USA TODAY's analysis found, including one more than 3,400 times over 10 months. His stated reason for each search was simply, 'INVESTIGATION.'” (USA TODAY, Aug. 28, 2026)
“The department recently became aware of potential issues and immediately began an audit into the use of the technology” (Lufkin PD PIO Jackie Zimmerman)
Sources: Angelina County Register of Actions, Case No. 2026-0455 (as of Oct. 1, 2026: plea and sentence) (docket 2026-0455); Lufkin PD response to our records request (Oct. 1, 2026); Lufkin PD, Flock audit logs of Klein's queries, 18 CSV files (released Oct. 1, 2026; plates masked); CBS19 / Tyler Morning Telegraph, Sept. 30, 2026 (Angelina County DA release); KWTX video, Sept. 30, 2026; Lufkin Daily News, Sept. 15, 2026; USA TODAY, Aug. 28, 2026 (updated Sept. 3); USA TODAY Flock-search database; Lufkin Daily News, Aug. 22, 2026; KTRE, Sept. 28, 2026; haveibeenflocked.com; Yahoo/Newsweek; NPR
[verified] HIDTA hubs: a White House drug program collects local plate-reader data, and DEA's national system can draw on it
Jan 2023 – Sept 2026 · checked v3.30 · id hidta-alpr-hubs
Primary records read directly: DEA's privacy impact assessment, both versions of the Atlanta-Carolinas HIDTA agreement, Georgia DOT's permit guidance, Glynn County's minutes, Baytown's ordinance, statement of work and budget, and the White House page. Flock's Georgia page is the vendor's own description. Not established: which HIDTAs actually pass data to DEA's system, and how many local agencies feed HIDTA servers nationwide. 404 Media's report (Sept 30, 2026) that cities are "forced" is supported in Georgia by the state's permit condition.
The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program, a grant program of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, runs regional servers that collect license plate reader data from local police. DEA's December 2024 privacy impact assessment for its National License Plate Reader Program says a HIDTA can serve as a "regional hub": "These contributing agencies transmit their LPR data to servers maintained by regional hubs pursuant to their individual MOUs, which stipulate that this data may be shared with the NLPRP system." DEA reported MOUs with "over 250 law enforcement agencies and hubs" and keeps plate images 90 days. It named the risk of "on-going tracking of individual's travels" and rated it mitigated, saying its coverage is too limited for nationwide tracking.
The Atlanta-Carolinas HIDTA has member agencies send plate data to its Operations Center, where it is kept as long as state law or the agency's policy sets, or otherwise up to two years, at no cost to the agencies. The data is "not open to the public," and only the originating agency may release it in response to a public records request. The 2023 version of its agreement said "Member Agencies are not required to contribute data to the AC-HIDTA LPR System"; the 2025 version drops that sentence, though each agency still decides "within its sole discretion" which records to share.
Georgia makes sharing a condition of using state roads. Under Georgia DOT guidance effective Oct 16, 2024, an agency seeking a permit for plate readers on state routes commits "to ensure data availability, at no additional cost, for all LPR's which might be installed under that permit across the law enforcement community," and if the data stops being available, "Georgia DOT will revoke its permit." The guidance does not name HIDTA, but local records show the HIDTA agreement being required: on Nov 20, 2025, Glynn County approved a "required HIDTA Memorandum of Agreement, required by the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT), to move forward with permitting for Flock Safety Cameras." Brunswick's police department told its commission in September 2026 that the agreement is "required by GDOT to approve any ALPR cameras on GDOT rights-of-way" for its Axon cameras, and described sharing only on request; the agreement itself says member agencies' plate data "will be transmitted to the HLPRIP Operations Center." Flock tells Georgia customers they "must sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with HIDTA"; as of Oct 1, 2026, its page says HIDTA users can see how many matches a plate has in Flock's database, the time of the latest match and the owning agency, but not the reads, locations or images.
In Texas, the City of Baytown, which "serves as the Administrator of HIDTA funds" for Houston HIDTA, authorized up to $306,800 on Nov 13, 2025 for a Houston HIDTA contract with Recruitful LLC "for creating and maintaining an LPR database." The statement of work names the project "National License Plate Reader Platform - Phase 5.0" and moves it from a mainframe to a government cloud, keeping integrations with Flock and other sources working. In April 2026 the White House named Houston HIDTA its HIDTA of the Year, citing its "automated license plate reader platform that brings together all levels of law enforcement."
“These contributing agencies transmit their LPR data to servers maintained by regional hubs pursuant to their individual MOUs, which stipulate that this data may be shared with the NLPRP system.” (DEA privacy impact assessment, National License Plate Reader Program (Dec. 20, 2024))
Sources: DEA, Privacy Impact Assessment for the National License Plate Reader Program and DEA Special Intelligence Link (Dec. 20, 2024); Atlanta-Carolinas HIDTA, Memorandum of Understanding (Jan. 31, 2023), via MuckRock; City of Baytown, Ordinance No. 16,319 and statement of work (Nov. 13, 2025); White House, ONDCP honors law enforcement (Apr. 6, 2026); Atlanta-Carolinas HIDTA, HIDTA License Plate Reader Integration Project MOU (2025), via Glynn County; Georgia DOT, License Plate Reader Guidance (effective Oct. 16, 2024); Glynn County Board of Commissioners, minutes (Nov. 20, 2025); City of Brunswick, commission agenda packet with HIDTA agreement (Sept. 16, 2026); City of Baytown, FY2021-22 Adopted Budget (HIDTA fund); Flock Safety, Georgia DOT LPR camera sharing process (vendor page, as of Oct. 1, 2026); 404 Media, Sept 30, 2026
[verified] Schott v. Bexar County: jury finds county policy behind an unconstitutional stop flagged by a fusion center
Mar 2022 – Sept 28, 2026 · checked v3.30 · id schott-verdict
Verdict form, the magistrate judge's report and Schott's filings read directly. The fusion-center flag is the court's account; the plate-reader and WhatsApp details are Schott's, and the jury was not asked about them. Judgment not yet entered as of Oct 1, 2026; post-trial motions and appeal are open.
In March 2022, Bexar County Sheriff's Office Deputy Joel Babb stopped Houston resident Alek Schott on I-35 while he drove home from a business trip, and deputies searched his truck. "No drugs were found," the magistrate judge's February 2026 report says. The report describes how Schott was picked: the "Laredo Fusion Center," which Sheriff Javier Salazar described as a police-intelligence unit, "took notice of Schott's trip" and told the county's Criminal Interdiction Unit he had made a "one-day turnaround," and an informant known only as "Kiki" passed it to Babb.
On Sept 28, 2026, a federal jury in San Antonio (No. 5:23-cv-00706, Judge Orlando L. Garcia) found that an officer with Babb's information would not have had reasonable suspicion for the stop or for extending it, that deputies searched the truck without probable cause, and that a Bexar County policy or custom was the "moving force" behind all three, one a county policymaker knew or should have known about. It awarded the $76 Schott asked for.
Schott, represented by the Institute for Justice, says "a license plate reader flagged his truck" and that the tip came through "a private WhatsApp group chat." His summary-judgment motion, citing deputies' depositions, says each interdiction car carried four plate readers that fed "a vast database of scans from other agencies and commercial sources." The jury was not asked about plate readers.
“The Laredo Fusion Center, meanwhile, took notice of Schott's trip and communicated to the CIU that Schott had performed a "one-day turnaround."” (Magistrate Judge Richard B. Farrer, report and recommendation, Schott v. Bexar County (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2026))
Sources: Schott v. Bexar County, No. 5:23-cv-00706, jury verdict (W.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2026) (docket 5:23-cv-00706); Same case, report and recommendation on summary judgment (Feb. 26, 2026) (docket 5:23-cv-00706); Same case, plaintiff's statement of claims (Sept. 2, 2026) (docket 5:23-cv-00706); Same case, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability (June 11, 2025) (docket 5:23-cv-00706)
[verified] 227 local governments have canceled plate-reader contracts
Sept 22, 2026 · checked v3.28 · id cancellation-count
IJ.org's live database fetched directly in v3.28. The 227 individual entries and their source links have not been independently checked, so they are not mapped here.
Institute for Justice's database (which excludes pauses and vendor swaps): 163 local governments across 31 states plus DC as of Sept 3, 2026, growing to 227 as of Sept 22, 2026. Newsweek and DeFlock (Aug 27): at least 56 cities and towns in 2026 alone; DeFlock's late-July breakdown was 47 canceled, 25 rejected, 22 deactivated. Per the Javorsky complaint's footnotes, Santa Cruz, Richmond, Los Gatos, and Los Altos Hills are weighing or ending Flock contracts, alongside Mountain View and Los Altos.
“As of Sept. 22, 2026, 227 local governments are included in IJ's database” (Institute for Justice)
Sources: Institute for Justice cancellation database; Yahoo/Newsweek; findingflock.com; deflocktheusa.com; Local News Matters, Feb 3, 2026; Los Gatan, Jan 28, 2026
[verified] Culver City and Carson: federal court denies suppression of two ALPR systems
Sept 10, 2026 · checked v3.24 · id riley-holly
Order read directly (v3.18). Carson retention framing corrected v3.20 and layered v3.24. The order appears to misdate a Weeks citation (1960 for the 1914 case); flagged, not corrected on our authority.
United States v. Melvin L. Riley and Kenneth Michael Holly, Jr., No. 2:25-cr-00380-VAP (C.D. Cal.), Document 181, Judge Virginia A. Phillips. Culver City's Flock system (52 cameras, 28 intersections, about 4% intersection coverage, about 18M photos a month, 30-day retention) and Carson's Motorola system (85 fixed cameras plus 4 trailers, 31 locations, about 75% of entry and exit points, data "maintained for five years" as of April 2025) were both used.
Five years is Carson's own configured policy, not a Motorola limit. Motorola's own FAQ says data "is held according to the retention policy set forth by you," with no vendor default or ceiling. LASD, which runs Carson's system, has a written policy (MPP 5-09/550.05): 2 years active, then archived, permanently deleted at 5 years. LASD's policy states zero inter-agency agreements with any federal agency for this system.
The court denied suppression, distinguishing Carpenter, Chatrie, and Beautiful Struggle on the same bounded-snapshot reasoning as Schmidt, Church, and Jackson.
“is held according to the retention policy set forth by you [the agency]... Retention policies may be adjusted by the Agency or Site Manager at any time” (Motorola Solutions, LPR data management FAQ)
Sources: U.S. v. Riley, No. 2:25-cr-00380-VAP, Doc. 181 (C.D. Cal.) (docket 2:25-cr-00380-VAP); Motorola Solutions LPR data management FAQ (PDF); LASD MPP 5-09/550.05; LASD Civilian Oversight Commission presentation
[verified] Norfolk points the Fourth Circuit to a pending Supreme Court petition on plate-reader searches
Sept 9, 2026 · carried forward · id schmidt-similar-case
Norfolk's filing read directly (Doc. 63, obtained Sept 28, 2026); Supreme Court docket fetched directly. Our earlier working guess, Chatrie v. United States, was wrong.
On Sept 8, 2026 the Clerk's Office asked both sides whether any similar case is pending in the Fourth Circuit or the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs-Appellants answered "NO". Defendants-Appellees answered "YES" on Sept 9 and named Porter v. United States, No. 26-5121: Elijah Porter's petition from the Fifth Circuit's March 17, 2026 decision (No. 25-60163), which held that accessing plate-reader data was not a Fourth Amendment search. The petition was distributed for the Supreme Court's Sept 28, 2026 conference. If the Court takes it, the Supreme Court will decide the question at the center of Schmidt.
“A pending petition for certiorari in Porter v. United States, No. 26-5121, presents the question whether a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment by accessing a database containing automatic license plate reader data. The petition also raises an unrelated Second Amendment question. The Supreme Court has not acted on the petition.” (Norfolk's Response - Similar Cases, Sept 9, 2026 (Doc. 63))
Sources: Fourth Circuit docket, No. 26-1227 (docket 26-1227); Response - Similar Cases, Defendants-Appellees (Doc. 63) (docket 26-1227); Supreme Court docket, No. 26-5121 (docket 26-5121)
[verified] U.S. v. Riley Thomas: court orders a hearing on how Flock was used
Sept 9, 2026 · checked v3.34 · id riley-thomas
Docket and order read directly (v3.19); order re-read in full from the court record (Oct 9, 2026). A reconsideration request is pending; treat the hearing order as current but not final. Not a ruling that Flock is unconstitutional. Corrected Oct 9, 2026: an earlier version put quotation marks around a paraphrase of the order.
United States v. Riley Thomas, No. 5:25-cr-00095-PCP (N.D. Cal.), Document 79, Judge P. Casey Pitts. Unlike every other ALPR ruling here, the order does not decide the Fourth Amendment question on the papers. It holds that without more information on how Flock works and how the detective used the data, the court "cannot determine whether its use constituted an intrusion into Thomas's constitutionally protected privacy rights," and orders an evidentiary hearing, with Detective Angelo Claussen to testify. On Sept 22, 2026 the government moved for leave to seek reconsideration; no ruling as of Sept 23. The defendant's first name is Riley; this case is unrelated to U.S. v. Riley (C.D. Cal.).
“Because the lawfulness of both the Flock search and the vehicle search cannot be resolved on the evidence before the Court, it will hold an evidentiary hearing on those matters.” (Judge P. Casey Pitts, Doc. 79)
Sources: CourtListener docket 69873978 (docket 5:25-cr-00095-PCP); Doc. 79 order (PDF), N.D. Cal.
[partial] Schmidt appeal: argument tentatively set for Dec 8-11, with an unresolved conflict
Sept 8, 2026 · checked v3.28 · id schmidt-argument-date
Confirmed against the docket. The date itself is not settled; likely to move to January or March 2027.
On Sept 8, 2026 the case was "TENTATIVELY CALENDARED for oral argument during the December 8-11, 2026, argument session," with a Sept 15 deadline to flag conflicts. Plaintiffs-Appellants' lead counsel is unavailable Dec 8-9 but available Dec 10-11. Defendants-Appellees' counsel (Elaine Goldenberg) is unavailable all four days and states she is "fully available during the Court's January and March sittings." No order resolving this had been entered as of Sept 23, 2026.
Sources: Fourth Circuit docket, No. 26-1227 (docket 26-1227); UNC School of Government post, Sept 14, 2026
[verified] Melbourne, FL police suspend Flock
Sept 1, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id melbourne-suspends
Melbourne Police Department's release (Sept 1, 2026) read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
Melbourne PD suspended Flock use effective immediately on Sept 1, 2026. It deactivated user accounts and said it would work with Flock to take the cameras offline and remove them. Chief Gillespie said the decision "was not made lightly" given the impact on investigations.
Sources: Space Coast Daily
[verified] Florida revokes ALPR permits on state rights-of-way
Aug 31, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id fdot-alpr-permits
FDOT's memo (a scan, read from the page image) and four Aug 31 news reports read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
Florida Department of Transportation memo No. 26-01 (Aug 31, 2026), signed by its chief operating officer, revokes all local agencies' permits for plate-reader cameras on state rights-of-way. The cameras must be removed within 30 days or FDOT will remove them, and FDOT will issue no new permits. Gov. DeSantis had previewed the move days earlier. The memo cites a "recent exponential increase in deployments along our roadways" and "concerning reports of misuse, data privacy concerns, and surveillance schemes." In the Tampa Bay area, at least two officers had been fired and arrested for allegedly misusing the cameras to stalk romantic interests (Bay News 9). Volusia Sheriff Mike Chitwood, a supporter of the cameras, called the order a case of throwing "the baby out with the bathwater." Pasco County Sheriff Chris Nocco, pulling his agency's cameras, said "The value of the technology does not override the importance of public trust" (Bay News 9). WUSF notes the memo is essentially an executive order, so a future governor could allow the cameras back.
Sources: WUSF; Bay News 9; ClickOrlando; WFTV
[verified] California bill to restrict plate-reader data use (SB 1013) dies in the Assembly
Aug 31, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id ca-sb-1013
CalMatters (Sept 3) read directly (Oct 9, 2026); the Aug 31 date is from CalMatters. The bill's leginfo page (Oct 9) still lists it as in floor process, last action Aug 27.
CA SB 1013 (Cervantes) died in the Assembly on the last day of session, Aug 31, 2026, when Assembly Majority Leader Cecilia Aguiar-Curry stopped it before a floor vote. CalMatters called it one of a handful of bills that looked poised to pass but died under mysterious circumstances, and the fifth failed attempt since 2022 to regulate plate readers; it had already been weakened, from deleting data after 30 days to archiving it after 60. Nearly 40 law enforcement agencies and police unions opposed it, saying it would cripple a tool that helps solve crimes and find missing persons.
Sources: CalMatters
[verified] About 90 cities and counties ended Flock contracts in August 2026, a record month
Aug 2026 · checked v3.35 · id august-200-ended
Ars Technica and Secure Justice's tracker (Oct 9 export) read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
Secure Justice, an Oakland anti-surveillance advocacy group, counted 90 jurisdictions that ended Flock contracts in August 2026 (updated Aug 28 to 93), out of 214 since 2021, Ars Technica reported; communities were dropping Flock largely over surveillance, unwanted data sharing, cost and police abuse of the tool. CalMatters' report that "more than 200 cities or law enforcement agencies ended license plate reader contracts in August" matches neither count. Secure Justice's live tracker, which also counts suspensions and pauses, listed 138 actions dated August 2026 as of Oct 9. Flock said new city partnerships had outpaced nonrenewals "by approximately 10 to one" in 2026. Flock has said it will cut its default data retention from 30 days to seven. That month Sen. Josh Hawley said he was investigating Flock's data practices, and Gov. Ron DeSantis called Flock cameras "out of control" in Florida after two officers were arrested for misusing them. Flock says its products are "trusted by over 5,000 communities," and after the arrests its top lawyer said new terms of use "expressly prohibit customers and their users from using Flock Services to mislead, harass, stalk, or otherwise impose upon or violate the legal rights of another person."
Sources: CalMatters
[verified] Wylie, TX votes to stop automatic Flock renewal
Aug 25, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id wylie-nonrenewal
Council packet, minutes and local reports read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
Council voted 7-0 to suspend the automatic renewal of its Flock contract, stopping the two-year renewal term that would otherwise begin when the initial term ends Oct 13, 2026 (the contract renews automatically unless either side gives notice at least 30 days before the term ends), and said it may revisit a new contract with new terms at a later work session; the city said it would send Flock a notice of non-renewal. Mayor Matthew Porter said the cameras are a good tool but "My concern is all of that data is being stored and shared with a lot of other departments"; a resident petition had more than 700 signatures, and an assistant police chief described cases the cameras had helped solve (CBS Texas).
Sources: Yahoo; CBS Texas; KERA/KETR; Wylie News
[verified] Stow, MA officer resigns after police say he misused Flock and state records databases
Announced Aug 25, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id stow-resignation
Stow Police releases of Aug 18 and Aug 25, 2026 read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
Stow officer Jason Rogers resigned ahead of a termination hearing, the department announced Aug 25, 2026. An internal investigation found he used the state's criminal-records (CJIS) system on at least five occasions, and Flock and CJIS on multiple dates, to look up a person known to him. The department filed a criminal complaint seeking charges, forwarded to the Middlesex County District Attorney, and sent the internal report to the state's police certification commission; and the chief ended the department's relationship with Flock and removed its last camera. The department said plate readers had helped it solve crimes and find missing people, but that it must review safeguards, policies and oversight before any future use.
Sources: Yahoo/Newsweek; NPR; findingflock tracker
[verified] Roseville, CA: 71% of high-stakes Flock alerts misread the plate, police records show; Flock disputes the figure
2023–24 data, reported Jul 31, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id roseville-misreads
Business Insider, Gizmodo and Jalopnik read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
Roseville PD's own records: of 1,427 stolen-vehicle and felony alerts in 2023-24, 71% misread the plate, Business Insider reported. One resident was flagged at least six times over a digit misread. The department told Flock about bad reads dozens of times over four years and spent about $450,000 on the system. A department spokesman said no wrong alert led to a stop or arrest; Roseville requires officers to verify the plate, or have independent reasonable suspicion, before a stop, which California law does not require. The records also show the cameras regularly missed vehicles, captured blurry images and sent delayed alerts. Flock blamed a "particularly unique deployment" (older hardware and non-standard camera placement; Roseville set its cameras to capture only the backs of vehicles, to avoid capturing faces), called the 71% figure a "mischaracterization," saying it covers only plates flagged as tied to felonies, said it measures over 96% plate-reading accuracy in optimal conditions, and said performance has since improved, which Roseville disputes. Roseville says it keeps contracting with Flock because the cameras have helped it solve crimes.
Sources: Business Insider; Techdirt, Aug 6, 2026; Gizmodo; Jalopnik; Davis Vanguard
[verified] Redmond, WA votes to end its Flock plate-reader program
Jul 21, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id redmond-cancels
City program page, council memo AM 26-119 and Legistar record read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
Redmond's city council voted 7-0 on July 21, 2026 to end its Flock contract and its plate-reader program, after a July 14 study-session vote to bring the question forward. The cameras, bought largely with grant money, had been deactivated months after installation, when Flock came under national scrutiny for sharing data with ICE, a local outlet reported. Local outlets reported 24 cameras; city records reviewed list 14 grant-funded Flock cameras plus a second grant. The city says its plate-reader data was never shared with ICE. A local outlet reported the vote as May 26; city records show May 26 was a study session on the grant funding. Without the vote the contract would have run until 2027. The city says the system was not used for general surveillance; 111things reported the records do not say whether past plate data was deleted. A city memo lists potential repayment of grants totaling $139,068.30, under staff review.
Sources: findingflock tracker
[verified] LAPD Inspector General audit: 161 alerts on cars that weren't stolen; LAPD lets its Flock agreement lapse
Jul 10, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id lapd-oig-audit
OIG report read in full from the Police Commission's copy (Oct 9, 2026), with seven news reports on the contract. Corrected Oct 9, 2026: earlier versions gave a 32.3% false-alert rate, which is not in the report (Straight Arrow News attributes it to the audit; it equals 161 of the 498 confirmed-match alerts), and said LAPD declined renewal; it let its Flock agreement lapse while negotiating a new one. The report dates the Flock agreement June 11, 2023 and says it ran until June 2026; news reports date the lapse July 11, 2026.
"REVIEW OF LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE READER SYSTEM AND USE IN THE FIELD," signed by Inspector General Matthew Barragan, BPC #26-184, dated July 10, 2026, review period Aug 1 to Sept 30, 2025. In that period LAPD's cameras made 210,568,103 plate reads. From in-car alerts, officers confirmed 161 accurate plate matches on cars that turned out not to be stolen; 337 alerts led to recovered stolen vehicles and 68 to 74 arrests. The report warns that slow record updates can leave a plate on a hot list after a car is recovered, raising the risk of unnecessary stops, "wrongful detentions, or a confrontation with serious consequences," and that its outcome data are incomplete. It recommends suspending new cameras and new plate-reader contracts pending public input. LAPD let its three-year Flock agreement lapse on July 11, 2026 while seeking a new one with stronger data protections. Its chief information officer cited "serious concerns around civil liberties and civil rights issues, particularly around privacy" (TechCrunch); the Los Angeles Times reported the concern was that the Trump administration was using the data to locate immigrants targeted for deportation. As of Oct 6, 2026 it had no access to Flock's cameras and no new deal. LAPD calls plate readers "a vital, lawful public-safety tool" that helps catch suspects, recover stolen cars and find missing people. Most of the 68 arrests OIG counted were for car theft or taking a vehicle without the owner's consent. Flock said it hoped to resume the partnership soon.
Sources: LAPD OIG, BPC #26-184 (PDF); 404 Media, Jul 13, 2026; SAN; TechTimes; Yahoo/AP
[verified] Chatrie: the citations both Schmidt briefs lean on
Jun 29, 2026 · checked v3.18 · id chatrie-citations
Supreme Court reporter citation resolved in v3.18, cited independently by two unrelated primary sources.
The Supreme Court decided Chatrie v. United States on June 29, 2026: 146 S. Ct. 2193 (2026). The superseded en banc Fourth Circuit decision is 136 F.4th 100 (4th Cir. 2025), with separate opinions by Wilkinson, Wynn, Berner, Richardson (concurring) and Gregory (dissenting). This Judge Gregory is unrelated to the Eleventh Circuit's United States v. Gregory. The sixteen-state brief, filed June 18, cited a panel opinion already vacated for en banc rehearing; eleven days later the Supreme Court decided Chatrie the other way.
Sources: X Corp. cert-stage amicus brief, No. 25-112; U.S. v. Riley, C.D. Cal. Doc. 181; Alisigwe (2d Cir.)
[verified] Who filed briefs in the Schmidt plate-reader appeal
Apr 20 and Jun 18, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id schmidt-amici
Confirmed against the Fourth Circuit docket (CourtListener 72357963). Cato, the U.S., and the Florida chamber brief resolved in v3.13 and v3.19. The Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability brief (Doc. 27) was missing until Sept 28, 2026.
For Plaintiffs-Appellants, filed April 20, 2026: ACLU, ACLU of Virginia, and EFF jointly; the New Civil Liberties Alliance; EPIC; the Innocence Project and The Center on Race, Inequality, and the Law at NYU School of Law jointly; The Policing Project at NYU School of Law; the Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability; and the Cato Institute.
For the City, filed June 18, 2026: a sixteen-state brief (South Carolina lead, joined by Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and DC); the Commonwealth of Virginia; Human Trafficking Training Center LLC, Operation Light Shine, and Safe House Project jointly; Major Cities Chiefs Association, Major County Sheriffs of America, the North Carolina Association of Chiefs of Police, North Carolina Sheriffs' Association, and Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police and Foundation jointly; the Florida State Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, Hispanic Outreach Taskforce, and Multicultural Business Alliance; and the United States ("Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees").
The plaintiffs-side brief adds record figures: over 1 million vehicle detections in March 2026 alone with a sub-1% hotlist match rate, and a police audit failure (logs undownloaded until Feb. 2025, unreviewed until May 2025, by which point the system had been queried 230,000+ times).
Sources: Fourth Circuit docket, No. 26-1227 (CourtListener 72357963) (docket 26-1227); Sixteen-state amicus brief; EFF/ACLU/ACLU of Virginia amicus brief; footnote4a.org
[verified] The sixteen-state brief backing Norfolk's plate readers leans on a two-camera pole-camera case
Jun 18, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id states-brief-gregory
Confirmed twice (v3.9 against Gregory itself, v3.10 against the brief). A full sentence-by-sentence fairness check of the brief was not done.
United States v. Gregory, 128 F.4th 1228 (11th Cir. 2025), concerns two warrantless pole cameras on one co-defendant's home for about 10 months. The Eleventh Circuit found no Fourth Amendment violation, reasoning in the line below. The sixteen-state brief opens on Gregory, saying police use modern technology to "more efficiently conduct their investigations." Judge Jordan's partial concurrence cautioned against reading the public-view doctrine as blanket immunity for pole cameras "regardless of the length of time they record"; the brief does not mention it. The states warn that without plate readers "our streets will be more dangerous, our investigations less effective."
“[n]othing in the Constitution forbids the government from using technology to conduct lawful investigations more efficiently” (United States v. Gregory, 128 F.4th 1228 (11th Cir. 2025))
Sources: United States v. Gregory, 128 F.4th 1228 (11th Cir. 2025); Sixteen-state amicus brief
[verified] Dayton, OH covers its Flock cameras with trash bags over immigration-enforcement data concerns
May 25–27, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id dayton-bags
Dayton Daily News, Fortune and the city's statements read directly (Oct 9, 2026). Settles the 72-camera count (lead grok-dayton-72).
City workers covered all 72 of Dayton's fixed plate-reader cameras with trash bags May 25-27, 2026. The city had already suspended their use over concerns the data was being used for immigration enforcement: the system had taken 7,100 search requests from law enforcement agencies citing immigration-related purposes (WYSO). The city later said that because restrictions had not been set up properly, outside agencies' nationwide searches were routed through its system, though they did not necessarily return Dayton data, and that it "cannot currently determine" whether any returned information or led to action. The police chief called it user error; City Manager Shelley Dickstein said "we failed to execute on that direction." A local coalition says it had warned the city commission the safeguards were missing before the cameras were bought. Flock denies having contracts with ICE or any federal immigration agency.
Sources: findingflock tracker
[verified] Javorsky v. Flock Group: California class action over plate-data sharing
Feb 26, 2026 (amended Apr 3) · checked v3.7 · id javorsky-complaint
Primary verified: 57-page complaint text-extracted directly (v3.6). Docket number and judge chain corrected and resolved in v3.7.
Filed by named plaintiffs Daniel Javorsky and Anthony Mayor in San Francisco Superior Court, dated February 26, 2026. Removed to federal court as No. 4:26-cv-02382-HSG (N.D. Cal.). Initially before Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler on consent; reassigned March 23, 2026 to Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr.; related to the consolidated case and reassigned to Judge Vince Chhabria on May 8, 2026; consolidated May 29, 2026 with Eldridge v. Flock and Dutcher v. Flock into In re Flock Group Inc. Automated License Plate Reader Litigation, No. 3:26-cv-02375 (N.D. Cal.).
Five causes of action: the California ALPR Privacy Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.90.5 et seq.); negligence; invasion of privacy under the California Constitution; intrusion upon seclusion; and the Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.). Damages sought: actual damages or not less than $2,500 in liquidated damages, plus punitive damages.
SFPD's database was queried by out-of-state and federal agencies more than 1.6 million times between Aug 2024 and a later cutoff. California ALPR data allegedly reached over 300 out-of-state law enforcement agencies, including 287(g) program participants. Flock's own marketing claims 20+ billion plate reads per month nationwide (Flock's self-description). Mountain View and Los Altos are cited as cities whose anti-sharing configurations Flock allegedly overrode.
Sources: Complaint PDF via Courthouse News; CourtListener docket 72513400 (docket 4:26-cv-02382-HSG); CourtListener docket 72512957 (docket 3:26-cv-02375); Justia; govinfo.gov; PacerMonitor
[verified] Mountain View shuts off its Flock cameras, saying Flock let outside agencies search them without permission
Feb 2, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id mountain-view-shutdown
City statements, the council report and the Feb 24 roll call read directly (Oct 9, 2026). The Javorsky complaint repeats the city's account through KQED's reporting; it is not an independent source.
Police Chief Mike Canfield ordered the city's 30 plate-reader cameras switched off effective Feb 2, 2026, after it emerged that outside agencies had searched its data without the department's knowledge (CBS reported hundreds of federal and state agencies; the council report says several federal agencies searched its one camera in 2024, and the city said ICE was not among them); California law bars sharing plate data with out-of-state or federal agencies without a court order. The city said Flock had enabled statewide and national lookup settings without its authorization, in a program designed to require the chief's approval for any sharing; the council report adds that MVPD was told there is "no way to determine how the settings were enabled or how the National Lookup setting was disabled," that Flock could not tell whether any Mountain View data was obtained, and that many other agencies had the same settings on without knowing it. The mayor said the city had been assured the data would not be used by the federal government; Flock said it was working through the city's concerns, has said the settings "are always under the control of the agency," and later said it had changed its California platform to block out-of-state searches; the council report says Flock disabled national lookups for all California agencies in March 2025. The chief said the pilot had shown "clear value" in protecting the community and solving crimes but that he no longer had confidence in the vendor. City Council voted 7-0 on Feb 24, 2026 to end the contract.
Sources: Mountainview.gov; CBS SF; Mountain View Voice; Palo Alto Daily Post; Javorsky complaint
[verified] Schmidt v. City of Norfolk: federal judge holds Norfolk's Flock network is not a search
Jan 27, 2026 · checked v3.10 · id schmidt-ruling
Fully verified: opinion read directly (v3.10). Plaintiffs are appealing (4th Cir. No. 26-1227).
Schmidt v. City of Norfolk, No. 2:24cv621, Document 191 (E.D. Va., Norfolk Div.), Judge Mark S. Davis. Two citations exist for this one document: 2026 WL 207513 and 819 F. Supp. 3d 492. The court granted summary judgment to the City and denied Plaintiffs' cross-motion.
Standing is split. Plaintiffs Lee Schmidt and Crystal Arrington, captured 475 and 325 times over four months in 2025, have standing to challenge the ongoing collection and storage of their vehicle images in Norfolk's 21-day rolling database. Their plates were never queried outside the litigation, so, following Scholl v. Ill. State Police, 776 F. Supp. 3d 701 (N.D. Ill. 2025), they lack standing to challenge the query practice. The merits ruling reaches only collection and storage.
On the merits: Norfolk's 176 ALPR cameras (75 fixed clusters, plus police access to 43 third-party cameras in city limits) do not reveal "the whole" of a person's movements. Plaintiffs' vehicles were captured 2 to 3 full-plate-match times per day on average, "30 to 50 times" fewer data points per day than Carpenter's roughly 101, typically 2.5 to 3.5 miles and 45 to 50 minutes apart. The court places the system closer to the bounded GPS tracking in United States v. Jones than to the "near continuous" tracking in Carpenter or Beautiful Struggle.
"Unblinking eyes" is Plaintiffs' complaint language. The court's answer, in footnote 15, is quoted below.
“[t]he City of Norfolk lives under the watch of a flock of unblinking eyes” (Plaintiffs' complaint)
“has many thousands more blind spots than it has 'unblinking eyes,'” (Judge Mark S. Davis, Doc. 191, footnote 15)
“a black sheet of paper with 75 (or 176) holes punched through it.” (Judge Mark S. Davis, Doc. 191, footnote 15)
Sources: Schmidt v. City of Norfolk, No. 2:24cv621, Doc. 191 (E.D. Va.) (docket 2:24cv621); Courthouse News
[verified] Hillsborough, NC cancels its Flock cameras over data-privacy concerns
Oct 28, 2025 · checked v3.35 · id hillsborough-ends
Town announcement and NPR read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
Hillsborough, NC canceled its contract for 10 Flock license plate reader cameras over data-privacy concerns, the town announced Oct 28, 2025; the two-year contract had cost about $81,500. NPR reported town leaders were concerned about contract language that could let Flock disclose data to any government entity or third party on a "good faith belief" of a need to do so. The town said the technology would benefit police and community safety but that it had to weigh potential harms to the community. Flock told NPR in February 2026 that each customer controls whether and with whom its data is shared. The town reported on Dec. 3, 2025 that all of the cameras had been removed.
Sources: Yahoo/Newsweek; NPR; findingflock tracker
[verified] Schemel v. City of Marco Island: district court dismisses Fourth Amendment challenge to bridge ALPRs
Oct 17, 2025 · carried forward · id schemel-ruling
District court opinion read directly. On appeal to 11th Circuit as of Sept 28, 2026.
Judge Kyle C. Dudek (M.D. Fla.) dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim with prejudice, and Florida state claims without prejudice. Schemel v. City of Marco Island, No. 2:22-cv-79-KCD-DNF, Doc. 90, 2025 WL 2958798 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2025).
Marco Island, Florida, operates ALPR cameras on the three bridges that connect the island to the mainland. Plaintiffs, represented by NCLA, argued the three-year data retention enables retrospective surveillance of everyone who crosses the bridges in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The case is on appeal in the Eleventh Circuit. 11th Cir. No. 25-13913.
Sources: Schemel v. City of Marco Island, No. 2:22-cv-79-KCD-DNF, Doc. 90 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2025) (docket 2:22-cv-79-KCD-DNF); 11th Cir. No. 25-13913 docket
[verified] Commonwealth v. Church: Virginia appeals court reverses Flock suppression
Oct 14, 2025 · checked v3.16 · id church-reversal
Read directly at trial and appellate level (v3.16). Unpublished opinion.
Commonwealth v. Church, Record No. 0737-25-1 (Va. Ct. App., Memorandum Opinion by Judge Randolph A. Beales, Oct. 14, 2025), unpublished. A criminal case: a Norfolk officer used the Flock database (172 cameras, 30-day retention, as of Jan. 2024) to check the defendant's account of his driving route and confronted him with three Flock images. The Norfolk Circuit Court (Judge Jamilah D. LeCruise) had granted suppression on April 25, 2025 (Case No. CR24000304), relying on her earlier Bell ruling. EFF, ACLU, ACLU of Virginia, and NACDL filed a joint amicus brief supporting suppression on appeal (Sept. 29, 2025), joined by People's Coalition (Legal Aid Justice Center).
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the Flock system "not as intrusive as" cell towers or aerial surveillance and that no warrant was required. It cites Neal v. Fairfax Cnty. Police Dep't, 299 Va. 253 (2020), and four district courts reaching the same pro-ALPR result, and it criticizes the Bell ruling by name through a quote from United States v. Martin.
Sources: Commonwealth v. Church, Record No. 0737-25-1 (Va. Ct. App.) (docket 0737-25-1); Norfolk Circuit Court order, Case No. CR24000304 (docket CR24000304); EFF deeplinks post, Sept 29, 2025
[verified] California AG sues El Cajon over out-of-state plate-data sharing
Oct 3, 2025 · checked v3.35 · id bonta-el-cajon
State enforcement action, separate from the Javorsky litigation. Attorney General's release and petition read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
California AG Rob Bonta sued the city of El Cajon on Oct 3, 2025 for sharing license plate data with more than 100 out-of-state law enforcement agencies in violation of SB 34, the state's plate-reader privacy law, asking a San Diego County court to order it to stop. On Jan 21, 2026 he filed a further motion, saying El Cajon was still sharing the data nationwide. The Attorney General says such data reveals people's driving patterns and the locations of their homes, places of worship, workplaces, medical providers and schools.
Sources: Cal. DOJ press release (cited in the Javorsky complaint)
[verified] Sedona, AZ cancels Flock after the company acknowledges federal access
Sept 9, 2025 · checked v3.35 · id sedona-cancels
Council minutes (a scan, read from the page image) and two local reports read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
Sedona's council voted 7-0 on Sept 9, 2025 to cancel its Flock contract and remove the 11 cameras, which had not begun operating, over concerns that data gathered in Sedona could be reached by federal agencies. Flock's public affairs director told the council on Aug 13 that "Flock will never make a decision to share your data with anyone else." After Illinois's Secretary of State announced on Aug 25 that Flock had let U.S. Customs and Border Protection access Illinois cameras, Flock acknowledged pilots with CBP and Homeland Security Investigations and its CEO paused them. The cameras had been installed without council direction (Red Rock News). Flock said it never shared data directly with federal agencies and called the decision "based on misinformation"; police had called the cameras an important tool against hit-and-runs and human and drug trafficking.
Sources: Yahoo/Newsweek; NPR; findingflock tracker
[verified] Evanston, IL cancels Flock after a state audit says CBP accessed Illinois data; Flock reinstalls cameras anyway
Aug–Sept 2025 · checked v3.35 · id evanston-cancels
City notice and letter, city statement and three local reports read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
Evanston gave Flock notice on Aug 26, 2025 that it was terminating its contract. In September Flock reinstalled the stationary cameras. The city reasserted the termination in a Sept 18 letter answering Flock's dispute, and sent a cease-and-desist on Tuesday, Sept 23 (Evanston Now, the RoundTable; the Daily Northwestern dates the cease-and-desist Sept 18). The RoundTable reported Flock's own transparency data suggested some cameras kept logging vehicles after the Aug 26 shutdown; Flock said the reinstalled cameras were not active. Flock denied breaching the contract or violating any law. Two cameras stayed up for months after the city ordered their removal; Flock took them down in late March 2026, the RoundTable reported. As of March 2026 the city was "still working out a resolution to the terminated contract."
Sources: Yahoo/Newsweek; NPR; findingflock tracker
[verified] Norfolk subpoenaed the Schmidt plaintiffs' phone location records; the court ordered one set destroyed
Aug 15, 2025 · carried forward · id schmidt-csli-subpoena
Order read directly (Doc. 104, read Sept 28, 2026). The order does not name the carrier or say what became of the other two subpoenas.
Defending the suit, the City sought the plaintiffs' cell-site location data, first through three subpoenas to their cellphone carriers and then through a motion to compel, which also asked each plaintiff to identify the ten people they interacted with most. The City told the court the location data was the most relevant information to the case. Magistrate Judge Lawrence R. Leonard denied the motion. Because both sides agreed that Schmidt's carrier had improperly disclosed his records in response to a subpoena, the court ordered the City to destroy them.
“the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs must surrender their own privacy interests to vindicate their constitutional rights.” (Magistrate Judge Lawrence R. Leonard, Doc. 104)
Sources: Schmidt v. City of Norfolk, No. 2:24cv621, Doc. 104 (E.D. Va.) (docket 2:24cv621)
[verified] Oak Park, IL ends its Flock contract; a trustee cites over 99% of alerts with no police action
Aug 5, 2025 · checked v3.35 · id oak-park-cancels
Board agenda, Wednesday Journal, Trustee Eder's post and the commission's July-December 2024 report read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
Oak Park's village board voted 5-2 on Aug 5, 2025 to cancel its Flock contract, renewed a year earlier on a 4-3 vote, and turn off its eight plate-reader cameras. Trustees cited the risk that the data could aid immigration enforcement in violation of the village's sanctuary ordinance and Illinois law, which bars using plate-reader data for immigration or abortion investigations; a memo from the police chief said another suburb had searched Oak Park's data in an immigration-related case. Trustee Derek Eder wrote that "over 99% of Flock alerts do not result in any police action," citing the village's Civilian Police Oversight Commission; we did not find that figure in the commission's report, which instead concluded that "no statistically significant crime prevention or resolution is realized" from the cameras. One trustee acknowledged the cameras had sometimes been useful, and the chief had already required her approval for out-of-state searches. Flock's CEO wrote in a blog post that the company had tightened controls on searches of Illinois data and barred 47 agencies from it after an internal audit. Eder later added that an Aug 25, 2025 audit by Illinois Secretary of State Giannoulias found Flock's sharing of Illinois plate data with U.S. Customs and Border Protection violated state law.
Sources: Yahoo/Newsweek; NPR; findingflock tracker
[verified] Wichita, KS: Flock held constitutional "as currently configured"
May 29, 2025 · checked v3.15 · id wichita-jackson
Opinion read directly (v3.15).
United States v. Sidney Jamar Jackson, No. 6:24-cr-10010-JWB (D. Kan.), Judge John W. Broomes. A DEA taskforce used Wichita PD's Flock system, through a Haysville officer's MOU-based access, to locate a suspect's vehicle: nine hits over four hours, leading to a stop and 2.38 kg of methamphetamine. Suppression denied.
From sworn testimony: Wichita moved to Flock at the end of 2020 (66, then 110, then 160 by Jan. 2024, now 190 cameras), about 500 lane miles; over 775,000 vehicles captured in Feb. 2025 alone; 2,705 Flock searches and 37,113 hot-list hits in the 30 days before the April 16, 2025 hearing; MOUs with about 150 other jurisdictions; 30-day retention.
The opinion holds only for Flock "as currently configured," warns that broader deployment "could eventually rise to the level of systemic and continuous tracking" barred by Carpenter, and argues Congress, not courts, should set ALPR rules, noting that no federal ALPR framework exists (CRS R48160).
Sources: U.S. v. Jackson, No. 6:24-cr-10010-JWB, Docs. 47-48 (D. Kan.) (docket 6:24-cr-10010-JWB)
[verified] Federal officials use local Flock access for immigration lookups
May 27, 2025 · checked v3.35 · id flock-side-door
404 Media's report read directly (Oct 9, 2026). "Side door" is 404 Media's phrase; NPR's Feb 17, 2026 piece does not use it.
No formal ICE contract needed: federal officials got local and state police to run Flock searches for them, including for immigration. 404 Media (May 27, 2025), using Flock search logs from a public records request to the Danville, Illinois police and statements from police departments, counted more than 4,000 nationwide and statewide lookups done for the federal government, as informal favors, or with a possible immigration focus. Officers typed reasons such as "immigration," "ICE" and "ICE WARRANT"; lookups mentioning ICE spanned the Biden and Trump administrations, but every one listing "immigration" came after Trump's inauguration. Flock had no contract with ICE at the time. Flock says its pilots with CBP and HSI have ended and that ICE has no "direct access" to its platform; it said federal agencies would no longer be given access to state or nationwide lookup networks. NPR reported in February 2026 that reviews of audit logs by researchers, journalists and officials have found local police departments appear to be conducting searches on behalf of federal agencies. At a Flagstaff council meeting, residents cited an Electronic Frontier Foundation analysis finding that a significant number of police departments had searched Flock's network in connection with protest activity (NPR). Flock's cameras are in more than 5,000 communities (404 Media).
Sources: 404 Media; NPR, Feb 17
[verified] Commonwealth v. Bell: Norfolk court holds Flock collection is a search
May 10, 2024 · checked v3.16 · id bell-suppression
Order read directly (v3.16). Whether Bell was separately appealed is not known.
Commonwealth v. Jayvon Antonio Bell, Case No. CR23001500-00, -01, -02 (Norfolk Cir. Ct., Judge Jamilah D. LeCruise), reported at 113 Va. Cir. 316 (2024). Police used a Flock hit to tie a getaway vehicle to robberies across Chesapeake, Norfolk, and Portsmouth, then ran the plate through DMV records, all without a warrant. The court granted suppression, reasoning from Carpenter and Jones and citing Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle. The "172 cameras, 30-day retention" figures used in Bell and Church come from The Virginian-Pilot, June 19, 2023.
“the collection and storage of license plate and location information by the FLOCK system constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and should require a warrant” (Judge Jamilah D. LeCruise, Order Granting Motion to Suppress)
Sources: Commonwealth v. Bell, Case No. CR23001500 (Norfolk Cir. Ct.) (docket CR23001500)
[verified] Historical: 99.9% of LAPD's stored plate images were not on a hot list when captured (2020)
Feb 2020 · checked v3.35 · id ca-auditor-2020
Background context from outside this timeline's window.
California State Auditor (Elaine Howle), report 2019-118: 99.9% of LAPD's then-320 million stored plate images were of vehicles that were not on a hot list at the time the image was made. The auditor noted the stored images can still be searched later to see which vehicles were at particular places and to track their movements, and found that none of the four agencies it reviewed had audited staff searches of the images. LAPD's chief replied that the department "has the utmost respect for individuals' privacy" and already had policies to safeguard it; the auditor noted LAPD was still working on the ALPR policy state law requires.
Sources: California State Auditor report 2019-118; TechCrunch, Feb 2020; KTLA; CBS LA
[verified] Norfolk says even its most-photographed cars are captured about once a day; the claim rests on its expert's partly redacted report
undated · checked v3.35 · id schmidt-capture-frequency
Updated Sept 28, 2026: the Estevez report was refiled publicly in redacted form (Doc. 180-1), and the appellate brief is now quoted in full. Earlier versions said the figure rested on a sealed declaration and shortened the brief's wording.
The opinion's "2 to 3 times per day" figure is footnoted to ECF No. 113 at 9, the City of Norfolk's own district-court summary-judgment brief, and describes the plaintiffs' own vehicles. The City's appellate brief adds a figure for all vehicles: "even the 5% of vehicles that were most photographed were on average photographed no more than once a day," citing the report of its expert, Valentin Estevez. That report was first filed under seal, then refiled publicly with redactions on Nov 21, 2025 (Doc. 180-1), where Estevez puts it as the top 5 percent being "captured once or less on 65% of days." The passage saying whose plates that analysis covered is still redacted. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Reply Brief (Doc. 59) never mentions or disputes the figure, most plausibly because their theory rests on the system's capability, not observed capture frequency. The city says it placed cameras where there are high rates of violent crime, many high-priority calls or many cars crossing into or out of Norfolk. Estevez's figure for other vehicles covers Norfolk police-operated cameras over 21-day periods from Feb 15 to June 9, 2025, where plates were captured 0.5 times a day on average, and he writes that "not even Plaintiffs' experts believe a single capture a day permits inferences regarding an individual's movements."
Sources: Schmidt, Doc. 191, citing ECF No. 113 at 9; Response Brief of Defendants-Appellees, 4th Cir. No. 26-1227 (June 11, 2026); Schmidt, Doc. 180-1 (E.D. Va.), redacted Estevez declaration and report (docket 2:24cv621); Plaintiffs-Appellants' Reply Brief, Doc. 59
[verified] Norfolk's Flock retention: 30 days in 2024, 21 days after a 2025 Virginia law
2024–2026 · carried forward · id norfolk-retention-change
Resolved Sept 28, 2026 from primary documents: both police orders (Schmidt Exhibits 16 and 18) and the statute on the official Virginia code site.
Norfolk police Special Order 23-002 (issued July 25, 2023) set Flock retention at 30 days, the figure in the Church and Bell records (Jan to May 2024). In 2025 Virginia enacted Va. Code § 2.2-5517 (2025 Va. Acts Ch. 720, H.B. 2724, approved May 2, 2025), which requires plate-reader data to be purged after 21 days unless it is part of an ongoing investigation, prosecution, or civil action. Norfolk replaced the 2023 order with General Order OPR-493, issued June 30, 2025, which purges data after 21 days. The Schmidt summary-judgment record (Jan 2026) describes the resulting 21-day rolling database.
Sources: Norfolk Police Special Order 23-002 (2023), Schmidt Doc. 114-16 (E.D. Va.); 2025 Va. Acts Ch. 720 (H.B. 2724), Schmidt Doc. 114-17; Va. Code § 2.2-5517(E); Norfolk Police General Order OPR-493 (2025), Schmidt Doc. 114-18; Bell and Church records; Schmidt, Doc. 191
[verified] "Ankle monitor": the Norfolk judge's test for Flock cameras, which the plaintiffs call the wrong one
undated · checked v3.35 · id ankle-monitor-origin
Re-checked Oct 9-10, 2026 against the opinion (Doc. 191), Beautiful Struggle and the appeal briefs. Corrected Oct 9, 2026: the v3.8 correction said the opinion does not use the phrase; it uses it five times.
The phrase comes from Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 311-12 (2018): "as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the phone's user." Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Dep't, 2 F.4th 330, 341 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc), borrows it, calling Baltimore's aerial surveillance data more like "attach[ing] an ankle monitor" to every person in the city. Judge Davis's opinion in Schmidt v. City of Norfolk uses the phrase five times and rejects the comparison: Norfolk's Flock cameras, which photograph nearly every passing car around the clock, are "not like an ankle monitor attached to that citizen (or even to their car)," noting that outside 75 camera locations the system captures nothing across nearly all of Norfolk's 66 square miles. On appeal, the plaintiffs count those five uses against one each in Carpenter and Beautiful Struggle, and argue that fixed cameras work differently from a device that moves with a person: they let police see who shows up at a place, such as a protest march or a political rally.
Sources: Schmidt, Doc. 191; Schmidt appellate briefs
[verified] Some cities swap Flock for Axon, which critics say changes nothing; Flock says it gains seven times more customers than it loses
undated · checked v3.35 · id flock-countervailing
The 7x figure is Flock's own claim. Guardian and NPR read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
Some cities are switching from Flock to Axon (The Guardian, Aug 20, 2026); NPR reports it is not clear how many, since Axon declined to say. EFF's Matthew Guariglia told NPR the switch means "replacing one color of camera for another color of camera, and those dangers that you were concerned about are still going to be there." Flock's CEO, Garrett Langley, told NPR the company would add seven times as many new customers as it lost this year.
Sources: Guardian; Yahoo/Newsweek
6. Protest surveillance
[verified] FBI memo warns of women "doxxing" ICE agents, on thin sourcing
Feb 2026 memo, reported Sept 2026 · checked v3.35 · id fbi-tradwife-memo
The Guardian and NBC News read directly (Oct 9, 2026); the memo itself was not located.
The Guardian, via a Property of the People state open-records request, revealed an FBI Chicago field office memo dated February 2026 warning that a small group of women was allegedly creating fake dating profiles to lure and dox ICE agents. The memo attributes the information to a "collaborative source," carries a disclaimer that it was "not finally evaluated intelligence," and does not say whether any agent was actually exposed; the FBI confirmed its authenticity to NBC News. Property of the People's Ryan Shapiro called it thinly sourced, and former FBI agent Michael German noted it had no footnotes or citations. The FBI said it does not comment on specific intelligence products and shares information with law enforcement partners to keep officers safe. DHS said its officers are "under constant threat from violent agitators" and that publicizing their identities puts them and their families at risk.
Sources: The Guardian, ~Sept 17-19, 2026; NBC News, Sept 19; Washington Examiner
[verified] Suit alleges DHS keeps records on legal observers and revoked their Global Entry; CBP denies retaliation
Jul 24, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id la-protester-policy-suit
Complaint read directly (Oct 9, 2026). The Los Angeles Times reported the suit; it was filed in the Southern District of California. The Times names one plaintiff "April Walker"; the complaint says Anna Walker.
A federal suit filed July 24, 2026 in San Diego (S.D. Cal. No. 3:26-cv-04232, EPIC v. Mullin) by EPIC and three legal observers alleges DHS adopted a "secret Protester Surveillance Policy": agents scanned observers' faces and license plates while they watched immigration operations, kept the records in DHS systems, and used them to revoke Global Entry and TSA PreCheck. The complaint quotes a memo telling agents to "capture all images, license plates, identifications, and general information on hotels, agitators, protestors, etc., so we can capture it all in one consolidated form." The complaint says HSI agents kept their vehicles around observer Anna Walker's car for about 20 minutes, without ever asking for identification. Each observer lost her trusted-traveler status 3 to 10 days after an encounter with agents; two were later reinstated without explanation. The suit says DHS also rescinded earlier policies limiting facial recognition and data collection on protesters. The suit brings claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, the federal mandamus statute and the First Amendment. CBP said trusted-traveler memberships "are not revoked because someone exercises their First Amendment rights" and can be revoked for reasons such as criminal activity, customs or immigration violations, or failing to show low-risk status.
Sources: LA Times; WIRED; Reveal
[verified] U.S. Attorney Pirro subpoenas Reddit and X over anonymous ICE critics
May 2026 · checked v3.35 · id pirro-subpoenas
Court filings in N.D. Cal. 3:26-mc-80074 read directly (Oct 9, 2026). The grand jury subpoenas themselves are not public.
U.S. Attorney Jeanine Pirro (D.C.) used grand jury subpoenas to seek from Reddit and X the names, addresses, and banking information of at least two anonymous accounts critical of ICE tactics. No underlying crime was specified; the account holders' lawyers believe the investigations may concern allegedly revealing a federal officer's location or other perceived threats, and dispute that their clients committed crimes. They followed DHS administrative summonses for the same kind of information that were withdrawn after a court challenge in Northern California (summons issued Feb 19, 2026, withdrawn Mar 30). Grand jury subpoenas get no judicial review unless someone challenges them; both users' lawyers moved to quash and unseal, before Chief Judge James Boasberg (Bloomberg Law). Reddit said it has "a proven track record of vigorously defending our users' anonymity." Lauren Regan, executive director of the Civil Liberties Defense Center, told The Intercept "The only valid use of a grand jury is to investigate federal crimes" and that the administration is "able to hide what they are doing under the guise of a federal grand jury."
Sources: Bloomberg, May 28, 2026; MediaPost; Bloomberg Law; Engadget; IBTimes UK
[verified] Newark police sent undercover detectives into ICE protests at Delaney Hall; the FBI then asked arrested protesters to inform
May–Jun 2026 · checked v3.35 · id delaney-hall
The Intercept's reports of June 18 and June 20, 2026 read in full (Oct 10, 2026), including the police complaint and city statement they quote; The New York Times (June 4, 2026; text supplied by the owner) and the detainees' letter published by Movimiento Cosecha read for context. Corrected Oct 10, 2026: earlier versions cited a Lawfare piece that does not mention Delaney Hall, described several "ambush arrests" (one is documented) and said the FBI contacted protesters' families (not reported).
Delaney Hall, a privately run ICE detention center in Newark that holds hundreds of people, drew daily protests in May and June 2026 around a detainee hunger strike; most protesters opposed the immigration crackdown and some supported it. Gov. Mikie Sherrill joined protesters on Memorial Day after saying she was denied access to the center. In a letter published by the immigrant-rights group Movimiento Cosecha and signed by nearly 300 people inside, detainees describe arrests at routine check-ins, inadequate medical care and poor food. The protests turned violent at times: DHS said 17 people were charged with assaulting and impeding federal officers, fires were set, and Newark imposed a curfew. At least 90 people were arrested in two weeks, most on riot and curfew charges that the public defender said rested on boilerplate complaints. On June 3, Newark police deployed two undercover detectives in the crowd to monitor protesters and report in real time to surveillance units, according to a police criminal complaint obtained by The Intercept. The operation was aimed at arresting protester Samuel Becker, whom police accuse of dragging a tarp into a fire days earlier; Becker says an ICE agent's baton fractured his shoulder two nights before. Becker and two eyewitnesses say ICE agents led the arrest; the complaint credits Newark and Essex County police and does not mention ICE. That matters because a New Jersey law passed in March bars local police from helping enforce immigration law, with exceptions for state crimes. A Newark public safety spokesperson said the city deploys "plainclothes officers, cameras, drones, etc." at the site to identify people who damage property, start fires or commit other crimes; Mayor Ras Baraka said police were there "to bring calm," not to protect the facility. Afterward, the public defender said, at least half of the people arrested got calls from federal agents seeking information; one protester said the FBI asked him to inform on "anybody planning to go to Delaney Hall with not the right intentions." The public defender's office wrote that these contacts violate its clients' right to counsel. The FBI declined to comment.
Sources: Schneier/Cohn via Lawfare
[verified] Maine suit: agents threatened legal observers with watchlist placement
Feb 23, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id maine-observer-suit
Complaint read directly (Oct 9, 2026); the docket was read on CourtListener Oct 11, 2026; Politico's report was blocked.
DHS agents threatened legal observers with placement on a domestic-terrorist watchlist, a class action filed in federal court in Maine alleges (Hilton v. Noem, D. Me. No. 2:26-cv-00092). The government moved to dismiss on Sept 18, 2026; the plaintiffs opposed on Oct 9, with the government's reply due Oct 23 (court docket). DHS told NPR there is "NO database of 'domestic terrorists' run by DHS" and that it refers threats, assaults and obstruction of officers to law enforcement: "Obstructing and assaulting law enforcement is a felony and a federal crime. Our law enforcement methods follow the U.S. Constitution." NPR reports DHS officials had labeled two U.S. citizens fatally shot by federal agents in Minnesota domestic terrorists, and an Attorney General memo lists "doxing" law enforcement as domestic terrorism. Agents can identify people in the field with facial recognition and a Motorola app that scans plates; some Minnesota observers say agents led them to their own homes.
Sources: Politico
[verified] DHS subpoenas Google, Meta, Reddit, and Discord for ICE critics' identities
Feb 2026 · checked v3.35 · id dhs-platform-subpoenas
Court filings read directly (Oct 9, 2026); The New York Times reports of Feb. 13 and Feb. 25, 2026 read in full via ProQuest (Oct 11, 2026).
DHS sent hundreds of administrative subpoenas, which are not signed by a judge (a court order is needed to force compliance), demanding names, emails, phone numbers, and other identifying details for accounts that criticized ICE or reported agent locations. Google, Meta, and Reddit reportedly complied with some requests (The New York Times). Some companies gave users 10 to 14 days to fight a subpoena first, the Times reported. The ACLU filed motions to quash on behalf of individual users in federal court in Northern California; magistrate judges ordered Meta not to disclose the data, and DHS withdrew the subpoenas each time. In one case, a man emailed a DHS attorney urging "common sense and decency" toward an Afghan asylum seeker; DHS subpoenaed Google for his information four hours later. Google alerted him and had not fulfilled it, and about two weeks after he was notified, two DHS agents and a local police officer came to his home to question him about the email (ACLU). Echoing past statements, Google says it notifies users when it can and pushes back on subpoenas it considers overbroad; Meta says it pushes back on requests that are not consistent with law or its policies and will challenge or reject unlawful ones; Reddit declined to comment and pointed to its law-enforcement guidelines, which say it reviews all legal process for facial validity and legal sufficiency. DHS told the Times it has "broad administrative subpoena authority" but did not address questions about its requests; in court, its lawyers have argued the information helps keep ICE agents safe. In one case, DHS asked Meta on Sept. 11 to identify the people behind Montco Community Watch, Facebook and Instagram accounts that posted ICE sightings in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, to about 10,000 followers; after the ACLU moved to quash, a Justice Department lawyer said DHS had the power "to investigate threats to its own officers or impediments to their officers," and the subpoena was withdrawn two days later. The Times notes ICE agents told protesters in Minneapolis and Chicago they were being identified with facial recognition, and border czar Tom Homan said he was pushing to "create a database" of people "arrested for interference, impeding and assault." On Feb. 25, three House Homeland Security Committee Democrats asked ten tech companies how many such subpoenas they had received and how often they complied, and Sen. Ron Wyden and Rep. Adriano Espaillat said they would introduce a bill to restrict administrative subpoenas (Times).
Sources: The New York Times, Feb 13, 2026; The New York Times, Feb 25, 2026; Engadget; Boing Boing; Military.com; IBTimes UK; PCGamer; Gizmodo
7. Funding and spending
[verified] Brennan Center: DHS committed at least $2.9B to surveillance and data
Data through Jul 26, 2026 · checked v3.32 · id brennan-surveillance-tally
Brennan Center report and interactive charts read directly Oct. 3, 2026. The report was published Sept. 16 and says its data are current through July 26. Earlier versions dated the entry July 29 and included figures not present in the current report.
The Brennan Center found that DHS committed more than $2.9 billion to surveillance, data collection and analytics from January 2021 through July 26, 2026, and cautioned that the total is a minimum because federal contracting data are incomplete. Its current category totals are $1.1 billion for biometrics, $793.2 million for video surveillance, $622.8 million for data analytics, $228.6 million for data purchases, $130.4 million for access to phone content, and $44.8 million for location tracking.
Sources: Brennan Center, Sept. 16, 2026
[partial] Secure America Act: $70B more for DHS, mostly ICE and CBP, passed by reconciliation after the fight over ICE reforms
June 2026 · checked v3.35 · id secure-america-act
Partial: the law, CRS and the House committee summary read directly (Oct 9-10, 2026); the $118 billion unspent and the $183 billion are the Brennan Center's figures, from data it does not show. Corrected Oct 9, 2026: earlier versions stated the $200B as reached and called $183B our own sum.
The Secure America Act (P.L. 119-98, signed June 10, 2026) appropriates about $69.5 billion to DHS, available until Sept. 30, 2029: about $38.5 billion for ICE, $26 billion for CBP and $5 billion for the Secretary. Not all of it is for immigration enforcement: $9.55 billion pays Border Patrol agents "to conduct functions other than immigration enforcement and customs functions," and $7.45 billion goes to Homeland Security Investigations, including $108.5 million for child-exploitation investigators. Its two largest appropriations, $31.1 billion for ICE and $13 billion for CBP, start with hiring and equipping personnel "to carry out immigration enforcement activities." ICE's share pays for hiring, deportation transport, IT including body-worn cameras, and expanding 287(g) agreements under which local police help enforce immigration law. At least $350 million is for arrests in jurisdictions that don't cooperate with ICE, and except as existing law requires, that money can't be used to release people or place them on alternatives to detention. CBP's $3.45 billion technology line covers border surveillance technologies, artificial intelligence and the biometric entry and exit system, and can't be spent on surveillance towers that CBP has not tested and accepted as autonomous, able to track targets "without the active engagement of personnel."
How it passed: DHS's annual funding lapsed in February 2026, the longest lapse in the department's history, and the law that ended it funded everything except ICE and the Border Patrol (CRS). The Brennan Center says Democrats had blocked that money to demand ICE and CBP reforms after federal agents killed U.S. citizens Renee Good and Alex Pretti in Minneapolis. Republican leaders then used budget reconciliation, which needs only 51 Senate votes. CRS calls funding ICE and CBP outside the appropriations committees a departure from precedent; the Brennan Center says "Congress surrendered its most powerful check" over DHS, and that half of the Secretary's $5 billion carries no constraints. Republicans unanimously voted down Sen. Gary Peters's amendment to bar DHS from using spyware like Graphite on U.S. citizens, his committee office says.
Money available: the Brennan Center adds the new money to the $118 billion it says ICE and CBP had unspent in April 2026 and reports "$183 billion available." The House Appropriations Committee, which says its bill provides "the resources required to protect the homeland," would add about $28 billion more for ICE and CBP in its FY2027 bill, which Brennan says "would push available funds over $200 billion"; the House Appropriations Committee reported it 34-27 on June 12, the Senate committee had not marked up its version, and as of Sept. 30, 2026, it had not been enacted (CRS). The same bill would put $70.5 million into a department-wide biometric database (Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology), cut the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties by $4.8 million and the citizenship and immigration services ombudsman by $4.5 million, and give nothing to the immigration detention ombudsman.
Sources: Brennan Center
[partial] DHS's FY2027 request: $118.4B a year, on top of $191B in multi-year reconciliation money
Apr 3, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id dhs-budget-growth
DHS Budget in Brief, the 2002 "Securing the Homeland" budget book, CRS and Prism Reports (Sept 10, 2026) read directly (Oct 9-10, 2026). Corrected Oct 9, 2026: earlier versions compared the two figures as DHS budgets.
DHS's FY2027 budget request, released April 3, 2026, asks for $118.39 billion in total budget authority, of which $99.39 billion is gross discretionary, including $28.4 billion for disaster relief; net discretionary funding is $63.0 billion. The House Appropriations Committee reported its FY2027 DHS bill 34-27 on June 12, and an interim continuing resolution was signed Sept 2 (CRS). DHS describes its goal as "keep America safe" and says the request "works in tandem with historic funding provided by" P.L. 119-21, the July 2025 reconciliation law that gave DHS $191 billion to spend through 2029. CRS says that law was "almost double the funding provided in the FY2024 annual appropriations process," and that the FY2027 request did not take into account the multi-year ICE and CBP money the Secure America Act added in June 2026. Among the requested items: $30 million for Persistent Wide Area Air Surveillance, a C-130J surveillance aircraft, and airport ID checks using facial biometrics, which DHS says stay voluntary for travelers.
The $19.5 billion that Prism Reports gives as DHS's 2002 budget was the Bush administration's count of homeland-security funding across all agencies, before DHS existed, so the two figures are not a like-for-like series.
Sources: PRISM Reports; Public Law 119-98, Secure America Act, June 10, 2026
[partial] Brennan Center: ICE and CBP had $118B unspent in April 2026
April 2026 · checked v3.35 · id ice-cbp-unspent
Partial: the Brennan Center's figure, read directly (Oct 9, 2026); not reproduced from primary data.
The Brennan Center reported (June 25, 2026) that ICE and CBP had a combined $118 billion unspent in April 2026, citing federal spending data. It does not say what it counts as unspent or how much of it came from the July 2025 reconciliation law, and the data it links updates monthly, so the April figure cannot be reproduced. Adding the Secure America Act's money for the two agencies, Brennan reports "$183 billion available," which can be spent until September 2029, and a pending House bill would add $28 billion more.
Sources: Brennan Center
[verified] OBBBA: $191B for DHS, including $45B for immigration detention and $6.2B for border technology including surveillance
July 2025 · checked v3.35 · id obbba-dhs
Law text, CRS R48704, Richardson and the Brennan Center read directly (Oct 9-10, 2026). Corrected Oct 9, 2026: an earlier version said both $170B and $191B were confirmed.
The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (P.L. 119-21, signed July 4, 2025; DHS calls it the Working Families Tax Cut Act) appropriated $191.02 billion to DHS, counting $24.59 billion for the Coast Guard. CRS calls it "the largest single package of DHS supplemental appropriations" Congress has acted on, though it funds parts of seven of DHS's 15 components, not the whole department. ICE received $74.85 billion: $45 billion for "single adult alien detention capacity and family residential center capacity," with adult detention standards "set in the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security," and $29.85 billion for operations. CBP received $64.73 billion, including $46.55 billion for the border wall and $6.17 billion for border security, technology and screening, including border surveillance technologies, AI and machine learning, and the biometric entry and exit system. Towers bought with the $6.17 billion must be tested and accepted as autonomous. Another $2.06 billion through the Secretary covers immigration-enforcement hiring, 287(g) assignments of state officers, and collecting fingerprints and DNA from people who enter without a visa, children included, under a heading on "protecting alien children from exploitation." FEMA got $500 million for state and local drone detection.
Figures: Heather Cox Richardson reported the $191 billion with "about $75 billion for ICE and $65 billion for CBP." The Brennan Center says Congress gave DHS "$170 billion"; that figure doesn't match any total we can derive from the law, and Brennan doesn't say what it counted. CRS's summary says "more than $178 billion"; its detailed count gives $178.19 billion as the bill passed the House and $191.02 billion as signed.
Sources: Brennan Center; Richardson
[verified] GAO: DHS lacks policies to assess bias risk across its public-surveillance technologies
Dec 3, 2024 · checked v3.35 · id gao-25-107302
Confirmed by direct fetch (v3.7). One report, not two; background from before this timeline's 2026 window.
GAO-25-107302, "Law Enforcement: DHS Could Better Address Bias Risk and Enhance Privacy Protections for Technologies Used in Public." Reviews DHS law enforcement components' use of 20+ detection and monitoring technologies (face recognition, ALPRs, drones, pole cameras). Finds DHS has no policies to assess bias risk across all of them (it is developing some for AI-based tools), CBP/ICE/Secret Service policies "did not always address key privacy protections," and there are no requirements for civil-rights review, so that review has varied. DHS first agreed with the first two recommendations, then in June 2025 asked GAO to close them after sending layoff notices to staff of its Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties; GAO kept them open, and its page lists all five recommendations as open. GAO notes the technologies are used in public, "where a warrant is not necessarily required," and that CBP, ICE and the Secret Service all have agreements to query third-party plate-reader networks, "a nationwide source of license plate data." GAO says ICE and the Secret Service described steps that do not address its recommendations; CBP agreed and estimated it would finish by November 2025. GAO notes the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is "a position provided for in statute."
Sources: GAO-25-107302
[partial] ICE and CBP surveillance-tech contracts: about $310M in 2025, then about $513M in four months of 2026, by an advocates' count
2025 – Apr 2026 · checked v3.35 · id mijente-contracts
Partial: the report and The Guardian read directly (Oct 9, 2026); the underlying contract list is unpublished. Corrected Oct 9, 2026: the 2026 figure covers January to April only.
"The Tech Behind ICE," a June 2026 report commissioned by Mijente, Just Futures Law and the Surveillance Resistance Lab with research by Empower, tracked ICE and CBP contracts with 11 companies (Peraton, LexisNexis, Cellebrite, Msab Group, Pen-Link, Thomson Reuters, RELX, Clearview AI, BI2 Technologies, Palantir and Anduril) from January 2013 through April 2026. Awards roughly doubled from 2024 to 2025, to just over $310 million, and in the first four months of 2026 already exceeded all of 2025 by 65%, about $513 million (The Guardian's figures; the report's chart gives no exact values). The report says the growth was "driven primarily by massive new contracts growth for Palantir" for ICE's data analytics and people-tracking apps, and for Anduril's autonomous border towers, drones and sensors. The report names its vendors, period and data source but not the award-level list behind its totals, so they could not be reproduced exactly, and it says some of its data "may not be precise up to the date of publication." A Palantir spokesperson told The Guardian the company "is not in the business of collecting or storing data, we do not conduct surveillance, and we are not involved in setting immigration policies." In the Guardian interview, the authors said DHS seems to be "creating a database of people who object to their actions"; ICE has denied maintaining "any kind of database of US citizens protesting ICE activities." DHS did not respond to The Guardian before publication.
Sources: Mijente / Just Futures Law / Surveillance Resistance Lab
8. Oversight and pushback
[verified] Pentagon vs. Anthropic: a district court vacates one designation, the D.C. Circuit upholds the exclusion
Feb 27 – Sept 25, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id pentagon-anthropic
Court records read directly: the D.C. Circuit opinion and dissent, and Judge Lin's order, relief order and judgment. Not yet confirmed: whether either side has sought further review, and what happens to the government's Ninth Circuit appeal of the March 26 preliminary injunction (No. 26-2011), which was on hold pending the D.C. Circuit's ruling. Updated Oct 1, 2026; earlier versions ended with the Aug 27 ruling.
The Pentagon asked Anthropic to allow its Claude AI models for "all lawful uses." Anthropic refused to drop two contract limits: no use for "lethal autonomous warfare" and no "mass surveillance of Americans." On Feb 27, 2026, President Trump directed every federal agency to stop using Anthropic's technology, and Secretary of War Hegseth directed the Department to designate Anthropic a supply chain risk. Hegseth made the formal determinations on March 3. A March 6 Department of War memo ordered Claude removed from its systems and barred contractors from using it in their work for the Department. Anthropic challenged the actions in two courts, under two different laws.
On Aug 27, Judge Rita F. Lin (N.D. Cal., No. 26-cv-01996) largely ruled for Anthropic in a 59-page opinion, finding the broad measures "illegal and baseless." She vacated the "supply chain risk" designation under 10 U.S.C. § 3252 and the order barring military contractors from any commercial activity with Anthropic, and declared the actions First Amendment retaliation and a denial of due process. The government won on Anthropic's separation-of-powers claim and on claims against some agencies.
On Sept 25, the D.C. Circuit, which Congress gave exclusive jurisdiction to review procurement actions under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act (41 U.S.C. § 4713), denied Anthropic's petitions 2-1 (Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War, No. 26-1049). Judge Katsas, joined by Judge Rao, pointed to a record in which Claude's built-in restrictions had "stopped Claude from performing tasks requested by government users," and to a dispute over whether Anthropic's contract barred Claude's use "in an ongoing overseas military operation." The court held that the Department "reasonably feared that Anthropic might manipulate Claude's design to prevent it from performing national-security functions" it considers authorized. It said it had "no quarrel" with Judge Lin's finding that Anthropic acted with no bad motive, but held that section 4713, unlike section 3252, does not require one. It also rejected Anthropic's First Amendment claim, finding the exclusion turned on a contract term, not on Anthropic's advocacy.
Judge Henderson dissented, writing that under the majority's reading a contractor faces a choice: "Agree to the Secretary's demands or risk being designated a national security threat under FASCSA."
“the Department reasonably feared that Anthropic might manipulate Claude's design to prevent it from performing national-security functions that the Department deems contractually authorized and necessary” (Judge Katsas for the majority, Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 2026))
“a contractor's honest and upfront enforcement of restrictions on a covered article's use disfavored by the government” (Judge Henderson, dissenting, describing the conduct the majority treats as a supply chain risk (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 2026))
Sources: Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War, No. 26-1049, opinion and Henderson, J., dissenting (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 2026) (docket 26-1049); Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War, No. 26-cv-01996, order on cross motions for summary judgment (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2026) (docket 26-cv-01996); Same case, order of final relief (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2026) (docket 26-cv-01996); CNN, Aug 27; TechCrunch, Aug 28 & Mar 5; Washington Post, Feb 26; NBC News; Arms Control Association; Mayer Brown; Fortune, Mar 6
[verified] White House bans CNN, MS NOW and Politico reporters from its grounds; outlets sue
Sept 18–21, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id press-ban
Complaint and temporary restraining order read directly (Oct 9, 2026). Updated Oct 9, 2026 with the order.
A Truth Social announcement banned CNN, MS NOW, and Politico; their hard passes were apparently deactivated that night, and reporters were denied access from the next morning. The outlets sued in D.C. district court on Sept 21 (D.D.C. No. 1:26-cv-03287), saying Trump banned them over coverage he dislikes. The government's letters to the outlets cited reporting that "threatened national security and/or spread falsehoods." On Sept 24 the court granted the outlets' motion for a temporary restraining order, which sought immediate reinstatement of their passes, for 14 days, finding the outlets likely to show their passes were revoked without the due process the Constitution requires. The court said it was skeptical that national security was the actual motivation, noted that in most cases the reporters who wrote the cited stories "did not even hold hard passes," and set expedited briefing on a preliminary injunction.
Sources: Al Jazeera
[verified] Executive Order 14409: voluntary early government access to AI models with advanced cyber capabilities
Jun 2, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id eo-14409
Order text, CRS summary and CISA's directive read directly (Oct 9-10, 2026). The Anthropic suspension CRS mentions has not been checked against a primary source.
"Promoting Advanced Artificial Intelligence Innovation and Security." The order credits U.S. leadership in AI partly to refusing "to stifle this innovation with overly burdensome regulation" and treats advanced AI as a national-security matter. Within 60 days, agencies are to build a classified benchmarking process for AI models' cyber capabilities, with the Director of the NSA, in consultation with other officials, deciding which count as "covered frontier models," and to design a voluntary pre-release access framework (up to 30 days before release to other trusted partners, subject to confidentiality, cybersecurity, intellectual-property and nondisclosure protections). It directs the AG to prioritize enforcement of 18 U.S.C. §§1028, 1030, 1343 against AI-enabled illegal computer access, and says nothing in its framework section authorizes a mandatory licensing or preclearance regime. It also directs CISA to issue directives and guidance that, among other things, help agencies, state and local authorities and critical-infrastructure operators get cybersecurity tools, including covered frontier models where appropriate. CRS notes the voluntary structure "potentially creates coverage gaps if major developers decline to participate," and that the administration has taken other approaches, "such as requiring Anthropic to suspend access to a frontier AI model showing advanced cyber capabilities." CRS also notes that earlier NIST agreements with Anthropic and OpenAI already gave NIST access to "major new models from each company prior to and following their public release," without public transparency on testing and without covering all frontier AI companies. CRS also says concentrating sensitive model details and threat data in federal systems "creates a potential risk for targeting by malicious actors." CISA's BOD 26-04 (June 10, 2026), binding on federal civilian executive-branch agencies (not national-security systems), is a confirmed follow-on with a three-day-plus-forensic-triage window for the highest-risk tier.
Sources: WhiteHouse.gov; CRS IF13268; CISA BOD 26-04
[verified] Federal government refuses to share shooting evidence with Minnesota; Minnesota sues
Jan–Sept 2026 · checked v3.29 · id federal-evidence-blockade
The allegations are Minnesota's. The refusal letters and the government's motion were read directly.
After federal agents shot three people in Minneapolis during Operation Metro Surge in January 2026 (Renée Good and Alex Pretti, killed; Julio Cesar Sosa-Celis, wounded), federal authorities refused to share evidence with Minnesota's investigators. On March 24, 2026, the State of Minnesota, the Hennepin County Attorney and the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension sued the Justice Department and DHS (D.D.C. No. 1:26-cv-01007).
The state alleges that federal agents first agreed to joint investigations, then reneged; that the U.S. Attorney told the BCA the night Good was killed that there would be "no joint investigation"; that Good's car sits "shrink-wrapped" in an FBI facility, never examined, despite a state search warrant; that federal officers "physically blocked" state investigators from the Pretti scene, even after a judge issued a warrant; that the government has not identified the masked agents who shot Pretti; and that in February the U.S. Attorney said evidence would be shared "in only one direction."
The government's own letters show the refusals. On March 3, ICE declined to treat Hennepin County's request for evidence in Good's death as a formal demand and referred the county to DOJ. On June 3, the U.S. Attorney denied the request, citing an open federal investigation. A day earlier, the same office had asked the BCA for all the evidence it collected in the Sosa-Celis shooting.
In court, the government argues that sharing investigative records with state law enforcement is discretionary and not reviewable, that Minnesota didn't follow the agencies' request procedures, and that the Tenth Amendment gives states no right to federal investigative materials (motion to dismiss or transfer, Sept 28, 2026). Before Judge Emmet G. Sullivan; Minnesota's response is due Oct 13, 2026.
Sources: State of Minnesota v. U.S. Department of Justice, No. 1:26-cv-01007, Amended Complaint, paras. 6, 55, 61, 62, 75, 79 (D.D.C. June 18, 2026) (docket 1:26-cv-01007); Complaint (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2026) (docket 1:26-cv-01007); ICE letter to the Hennepin County Attorney, Mar. 3, 2026 (Doc. 1-8); U.S. Attorney's denial, June 3, 2026 (Doc. 17-13); U.S. Attorney's request to the BCA, June 2, 2026 (Doc. 17-16); Defendants' memorandum in support of motion to dismiss or transfer, Sept. 28, 2026 (Doc. 23-1); Docket, D.D.C. No. 1:26-cv-01007 (CourtListener 72590076) (docket 1:26-cv-01007)
[verified] CIA speeds up tech buying and plans AI "coworkers" for analysts
Feb–Apr 2026 · checked v3.35 · id cia-ai
CIA's Feb 9 release, Federal News Network and GovExec read directly (Oct 9, 2026); Politico (from the owner's saved copy) and The Record read directly (Oct 11, 2026). These are two separate events.
Feb 9, 2026: the CIA announced a new acquisition framework, with centralized vendor vetting and a faster IT authorization process, to speed up how quickly it gets commercial technology; it did not release details on specific acquisition authorities or contracting approaches (Federal News Network). Apr 9, 2026: CIA Deputy Director Michael Ellis said: "Within the next couple of years, we will have AI co-workers built into all of the agency's analytic platforms — a kind of classified version of generative AI that will help our analysts with basic tasks" (Politico). "It won't do the thinking for our analysts, but it will help draft key judgments, edit for clarity and compare drafts against tradecraft standards," he said (GovExec); the tools would also triage information and flag trends for analysts, and he said the agency will ensure "human beings are the ones making key decisions." He said the agency had more than 300 AI projects last year and recently used AI to create its "first-ever autonomous intelligence report" (Politico; GovExec reports it as AI being used to generate a report), and that within a decade the CIA will treat AI as an "autonomous mission partner," with officers managing teams of AI agents. Ellis named the CIA's Center for Cyber Intelligence, which oversees the agency's clandestine hacking operations, as a key driver of the effort; Director John Ratcliffe made it a full mission center in October 2025, reporting directly to him (The Record). Ellis said the move is helping the agency "deploy new tools to the field and gain more access to priority targets" and that "The battle of cybersecurity will be a battle of artificial intelligence." Ellis also said the CIA "cannot allow the whims of a single company" to constrain its use of AI and will "not let private companies dictate how and when the CIA will make lawful use of their technologies," spreading its work across vendors. He named no company; GovExec and Politico tied the remarks to Anthropic's refusal, earlier in the year, to ease restrictions on its tools being used for domestic surveillance or fully autonomous weapons, which led to a "supply chain risk" designation and a White House order for agencies to phase out Anthropic's tools; Anthropic has challenged the move in court. Politico notes that Trump and Ratcliffe have vowed to root out an alleged left-wing tilt in the intelligence community, and that the speech hinted at how fights over the politics of intelligence analysis may look different in an AI-centric future.
Sources: Federal News Network; Politico; GovExec; The Record (Recorded Future News), Apr 8, 2026
[verified] ICE Out of Our Faces Act would ban ICE and CBP from face recognition and other biometric ID (S.3779)
Feb 4, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id ice-out-of-our-faces
Bill text and GovTrack read directly (Oct 9, 2026); the sponsors' releases are dated Feb 5 and 6.
Markey, with Wyden, Merkley, Alsobrooks and Sanders, in the Senate; Jayapal's companion in the House (H.R. 7363). Would ban ICE and CBP from acquiring or using face recognition and other biometric identification; require deletion within 30 days of biometric data already collected; and let individuals and state attorneys general sue to enforce it. EPIC endorsed. Introduced Feb 4, 2026; GovTrack listed it at the first stage, not yet taken up in committee (checked Oct 9, 2026).
Sources: Markey, Merkley, Jayapal press releases; Congress.gov S.3779; EPIC
[verified] Warner and Kaine ask DHS's Inspector General to investigate its surveillance-technology purchases
Jan 29, 2026 · checked v3.35 · id warner-kaine-letter
Letter, both senators' releases and the Inspector General's Feb 5 reply read directly (Oct 9, 2026).
Senators Warner and Kaine asked DHS Inspector General Cuffari on Jan 29, 2026 to audit DHS immigration-related procurements of surveillance technology. Footnotes cite the BI2 sole-source notice (Aug 6, 2025), the Clearview purchase order (Sept 5, 2025), Penlink licenses (Sept 30, 2025), an OSINT/social-media RFI (Oct 2, 2025), the FY26 Big Data & Ad Tech RFI (Jan 23, 2026), ICM additional capabilities (Apr 17, 2025), the Paragon contract reactivated under a sole-source exception, USCIS's proposed biometrics rule (Nov 3, 2025) and DHS's use of software it had no official access to, including Flock's plate-reader software. The Inspector General replied Feb 5, 2026, pointing to an audit of DHS's security of biometric data and personal information announced Feb 4, which it said would address a number of the senators' questions.
Sources: kaine.senate.gov
[verified] Fatal shootings of US citizens during Minneapolis immigration enforcement operations
Jan 2026 · checked v3.29 · id minneapolis-shootings
Framing corrected in v3.0 (not "during traffic stops") and in v3.29 (not a "confrontation").
During Operation Metro Surge: Renée Good (ICE, Jan 7, shot in her car as she backed up and then pulled forward steering away from the agent, moments after telling him "That's fine, dude. I'm not mad at you"; not a routine traffic stop) and Alex Pretti (CBP, Jan 24, shot on foot while filming, not vehicle-related).
Sources: State of Minnesota v. U.S. Department of Justice, No. 1:26-cv-01007, Complaint, paras. 1, 49, 70 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2026) (docket 1:26-cv-01007); Testimony of Renee Good's family and of Stella Carlson, who recorded Alex Pretti's killing, congressional spotlight forum, Sept. 22, 2026 (videos linked from Sen. Tina Smith's release); The Washington Post, "The ICE agent's cellphone video: Five key moments" (Jan. 10, 2026), captioning the agent's 47-second video published by Alpha News; ABC News, "Minneapolis ICE shooting: A minute-by-minute timeline of how Renee Nicole Good died" (Jan. 9, 2026), video analysis
[verified] Other pushback against ICE spyware, phone tracking, shock gloves and the new counterterrorism strategy
Oct 2025 – Sept 2026 · checked v3.35 · id pushback-list
Each item read against its primary or the outlet (Oct 9-10, 2026). Corrected Oct 9, 2026: the Paragon letter's signers were misnamed.
Shock gloves: ICE signed a $16.7 million no-bid contract for 6,000 electric-shock gloves in August 2026 (CBS News). Sixteen senators led by Catherine Cortez Masto urged ICE to cancel it, citing "necessity, proportionality, medical safety, training, accountability, and constitutional rights." ICE calls the gloves "conductive distraction and de-escalation devices" that give officers a lower-impact option during arrests, to be used under approved policies and training, though CBS News found the procurement documents do not detail those safeguards. The senators' letter notes the manufacturer warns the gloves "may cause or contribute to death or serious injury." A DHS spokesperson called the senators' pushback "despicable and a deliberate attempt to undermine and endanger our officers."
Paragon spyware: in Oct 2025, Reps. Summer Lee, Shontel Brown and Yassamin Ansari asked DHS about ICE's reactivated $2 million contract for Paragon's Graphite, which can take over a phone without its owner knowing, citing Riley v. California and Carpenter v. United States. In April 2026, ICE confirmed it uses Paragon's spyware: acting Director Todd Lyons wrote, without naming Paragon, that he had authorized "cutting-edge technological tools" for Homeland Security Investigations' fentanyl cases and that "Any use of the technology will comply with constitutional requirements." The three replied that "ICE's feigned compliance with existing standards doesn't mean much" without proof of safeguards, and EFF's Cooper Quintin said the letter "leaves open the door" for ICE to treat using the spyware under administrative subpoenas as constitutional. On July 23, 2026, Sen. Gary Peters asked ICE whether Graphite has been used against Americans; his staff had received no substantive response to requests made since December 2025.
Penlink phone tracking: on Feb 19, 2026, Rep. Shontel Brown and 12 other Democrats asked DHS Secretary Noem for a briefing on Penlink, a tool reported to collect and search cellphone location data across entire neighborhoods, including any legal basis for using it without a warrant.
Counterterrorism strategy: Bruce Schneier and Cindy Cohn (Lawfare, Sept 14) criticized the 2026 U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy, which says the government will prioritize "the rapid identification and neutralization of violent secular political groups whose ideology is anti-American, radically pro-transgender, and anarchist" and will use "all the tools constitutionally available to us to map them at home, identify their membership, map their ties to international organizations like Antifa, and use law enforcement tools to cripple them operationally." They argue it points national-security tools, likely including mass surveillance, at Americans' rights to organize and speak.
Community groups: the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, a coalition of more than 240 national organizations, asked a Senate committee on Feb 12, 2026, for no additional ICE or CBP funding and binding limits on DHS surveillance and data sharing. Munira Lokhandwala of LittleSis told Prism Reports (Sept 10) that resistance runs "from neighborhood ICE watch groups to community-driven efforts to pressure state and local governments to block funding for surveillance technologies."
Sources: shontelbrown.house.gov; Prism Reports, Sept 10; Lawfare
Cases
Schmidt v. City of Norfolk
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (appeal from E.D. Va.) · 4th Cir. No. 26-1227, E.D. Va. No. 2:24cv621 · as of 2026-09-28
On appeal. The district court granted the City summary judgment on Jan 27, 2026.
Next: Oral argument, tentatively Dec 8-11, 2026 (not settled). Tentatively calendared for Dec 8-11, 2026, with an unresolved scheduling conflict likely to push it to January or March 2027. Not a settled date.
Sealed or restricted: The opening of paragraph 41 of the Valentin Estevez report, which says whose plates the top-5% capture analysis covered, is redacted in the public refiling (Doc. 180-1).
Pending: Whether argument stays in December or moves to January or March 2027. Whether the Supreme Court takes Porter v. United States (No. 26-5121), which Norfolk named as the similar pending case. Distributed for the Sept 28, 2026 conference.
State of Texas v. Zachary Klein
159th Judicial District Court, Angelina County, Texas · Case No. 2026-0455 · as of 2026-10-01
Pleaded guilty to all 100 counts of misuse of official information (Tex. Penal Code § 39.06(e)) on Sept 30, 2026; convicted and committed directly to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 5 years on each count, with 42 days of jail credit. Case disposed.
Next: none recorded
Sealed or restricted: The indictment image is restricted on the county's public portal ("Your user does not have permissions to view this document"); only the register of actions is public. No probable-cause affidavit appears on the register of actions. KTRE (Sept 28, 2026) cites an arrest affidavit, which is not on this docket.
Pending: Whether the 11-people and seven-plates figures reconcile. The scope behind the "more than 10,000" search figure, which KTRE attributes to the arrest affidavit. Whether the 100 five-year sentences run concurrently; the register does not say.
In re Flock Group Inc. Automated License Plate Reader Litigation (Javorsky v. Flock Group, Inc.)
U.S. District Court, N.D. Cal. · No. 3:26-cv-02375, No. 4:26-cv-02382-HSG, S.F. Superior Court (original filing) · as of 2026-09-24
Consolidated May 29, 2026 with Eldridge v. Flock and Dutcher v. Flock.
Next: none recorded
Pending: No next date is recorded in this file.
United States v. Riley Thomas
U.S. District Court, N.D. Cal. · No. 5:25-cr-00095-PCP · as of 2026-09-23
Evidentiary hearing ordered Sept 9, 2026 (Doc. 79). Government moved Sept 22 for leave to seek reconsideration.
Next: Evidentiary hearing, date not set in this file (not settled). The reconsideration request was unresolved as of Sept 23, 2026.
Pending: Ruling on the government's request for leave to seek reconsideration.
Department of Homeland Security v. League of Women Voters
Supreme Court of the United States · No. 26A308, D.C. Cir. Nos. 26-5243 & 26-5301 · as of 2026-10-02
Stay granted Sept 25, 2026, Justices Jackson, Sotomayor and Kagan dissenting. Judge Sooknanan's June 22 order is on hold through the D.C. Circuit appeal and any petition for certiorari.
Next: D.C. Circuit decision on the appeal (No. 26-5243) (not settled). No argument date was scheduled as of Oct. 2, 2026. The parties filed a proposed briefing schedule that day; the source reviewed does not show whether the court adopted it.
Pending: Consolidated D.C. Circuit appeals, Nos. 26-5243 and 26-5301.
United States v. Melvin L. Riley and Kenneth Michael Holly, Jr.
U.S. District Court, C.D. Cal. · No. 2:25-cr-00380-VAP · as of 2026-09-24
Suppression denied Sept 10, 2026 (Doc. 181).
Next: none recorded
Pending: No next date is recorded in this file.
CNN, MS NOW, and Politico v. the White House press ban
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia · docket not in file · as of 2026-09-24
Filed Sept 21, 2026.
Next: none recorded
Pending: Docket number and next date are not in this file yet.
Schemel v. City of Marco Island
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (appeal from M.D. Fla.) · 11th Cir. No. 25-13913, M.D. Fla. No. 2:22-cv-79-KCD-DNF · as of 2026-09-28
On appeal. District court dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim with prejudice on Oct 17, 2025 (2025 WL 2958798, Doc. 90).
Next: No argument date set (not settled). Fully briefed as of early 2026. Last docket activity: Jul 17, 2026 (City's Chatrie 28(j) response). No argument date set as of Sept 28, 2026.
Pending: 11th Circuit argument date and decision. Whether the 11th Circuit applies Chatrie v. United States (SCOTUS June 29, 2026) to the three-bridge network.
Los Angeles suit over the DHS "Protester Surveillance Policy"
Federal court, Los Angeles · docket not in file · as of 2026-09-24
Filed Jul 24, 2026.
Next: none recorded
Pending: Docket number and next date are not in this file yet.
State of Minnesota v. U.S. Department of Justice
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia · 1:26-cv-01007 (D.D.C.) · as of 2026-09-29
Government moved to dismiss or transfer to Minnesota on Sept 28, 2026.
Next: Minnesota's opposition and cross-motion due (firm). Minute order of Sept 17, 2026; government reply due Oct 20, Minnesota's reply Oct 27.
Pending: Motion to dismiss or transfer (Docs. 23-24)
Schott v. Bexar County, Texas
U.S. District Court, Western District of Texas · No. 5:23-cv-00706 · as of 2026-10-01
Jury verdict for Schott Sept 28, 2026: county policy or custom drove the unconstitutional stop, extension and search; $76 awarded. Judgment not yet entered.
Next: Entry of judgment, post-trial motions and any appeal to the Fifth Circuit (not settled). No judgment on the docket as of Oct 1, 2026.
Pending: Entry of judgment and Schott's request for an order against further stops of this kind.
United States v. Kyle
U.S. District Court, N.D. Okla. · No. 4:26-cr-00189-SEH · as of 2026-10-09
Motion to suppress granted Oct 1, 2026 (Doc. 62). The Oct 6 trial was stricken; Kyle was released on conditions Oct 5.
Next: Any government appeal to the Tenth Circuit (not settled). A government appeal of a suppression order is normally due within 30 days. No notice of appeal as of Oct 9, 2026.
Sealed or restricted: Doc. 48 (defense filing, Aug 3, 2026) Doc. 56 (government motion, Aug 26, 2026)
Pending: Whether the government appeals the suppression order.
Elser v. Flock Group, Inc.
U.S. District Court, D. Colo. · No. 1:26-cv-04977-NYW · as of 2026-10-09
Complaint filed Oct 5, 2026. Bow Mar has waived service; no defendant has responded.
Next: Bow Mar's answer due (not settled). Set by Bow Mar's waiver of service (Doc. 8). The other defendants' deadlines are not yet on the docket. A telephonic scheduling conference is set for Jan 6, 2027.
Pending: Responses from Flock, Columbine Valley, Milliman and Cottrell.
Corrections
v3.35 · confirmed · The $57 million ICE skip-tracing figure is verified
Was: "$57M skip tracing in a single month" (Aug. 2026). We kept the claim visible as retracted and on the cut list because Project Salt Box's chart did not identify the underlying awards and we had not reproduced the figure from primary records.
Now: ICE obligated $57,081,241.30 on Aug. 26, 2026, across fourteen task orders explicitly described as skip-tracing services for Enforcement and Removal Operations.
Why: The owner found all fourteen USAspending award records. Their exact obligations sum to $57,081,241.30. Project Salt Box's chart was explicitly the top ten: those orders total $54,277,325.30, and the four smaller orders add $2,803,916.00. The records support "obligated," not proof that the money was paid out or the work completed.
v3.34 · correction · Riley Thomas: a paraphrase was shown as the judge's words
Was: The order holds the record insufficient to decide "whether the particular Flock database search intruded on Thomas's protected privacy rights."
Now: Without more information on how Flock works and how the detective used the data, the court "cannot determine whether its use constituted an intrusion into Thomas's constitutionally protected privacy rights."
Why: The order (Doc. 79) was re-read in full from the court record on Oct 9, 2026. The words we had in quotation marks are not in it; the second version is the order's own wording, at page 10. The meaning was close, but a paraphrase should never be presented as the judge's words.
v3.32 · correction · The D.C. Circuit did rule on IRS-to-ICE address sharing
Was: Retracted as "D.C. court initially allows IRS sharing" (Feb. 25/26, 2026) because no matching ruling had been found.
Now: On Feb. 24, 2026, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction and held that federal tax law permits IRS to disclose taxpayer addresses to ICE only in response to written requests that meet the statute's requirements.
Why: The ruling is Centro de Trabajadores Unidos v. Bessent, No. 25-5181. A later D.C. Circuit opinion cited it, leading us to the full opinion. The old date and "initially allows" wording were inaccurate, but the underlying event was real.
v3.32 · correction · DHS took down its facial-recognition directive in February 2025, then expanded use
Was: DHS deleted its facial-recognition oversight policy, dated February 2026, without explaining what happened before or after the takedown.
Now: DHS removed Directive 026-11 from its website in February 2025. It called the removal routine website maintenance and denied a policy change, but had not publicly replaced the directive a year later. DHS fast-tracked Mobile Fortify less than two months after the directive disappeared, and the Brennan Center still found no clear public governing policy as of July 2026 while biometric deployment and spending expanded.
Why: Direct reads of WIRED, Biometric Update and the Brennan Center corrected the date and supplied the missing sequence. The earlier proposed correction overemphasized the technical distinction between public removal and formal rescission; that distinction did not explain the continuing absence of public guardrails or the expansion that followed.
v3.32 · correction · Brennan surveillance tally: publication date and current category totals
Was: The entry was dated July 29, 2026, remained partial because the report had not been fetched directly, and included a $1.36 billion second-term total and $95 million social-media figure that are not in the current report.
Now: The Brennan Center published the report Sept. 16, 2026, using data current through July 26. Its current chart reports more than $2.9 billion total: $1.1 billion biometrics, $793.2 million video surveillance, $622.8 million data analytics, $228.6 million data purchases, $130.4 million phone-content access and $44.8 million location tracking.
Why: The live report and interactive charts were read directly Oct. 3, 2026. The entry now reports the source's own current figures and distinguishes publication date from the data cutoff.
v3.31 · confirmed · ICE's 287(g) coordination center exists
Was: Listed as unconfirmed. Unconfirmed. Related but distinct: the Javorsky complaint alleges California ALPR data reached over 300 out-of-state agencies including 287(g) participants. That is about Flock data sharing, not evidence for a dedicated "287(g) coordination center."
Now: ICE hired Koniag Services to run its 287(g) National Coordination Center: task order signed July 28, 2026, $17.5 million obligated, up to $63.0 million with options through August 2030.
Why: Federal award record 70CDCR26FR0000034 (USAspending), found through Project Salt Box's Sept 18 report and Tennessee Lookout's Aug 11 report.
v3.31 · correction · Palantir's DHS deal: which agencies were named for what
Was: CBP, ICE, FEMA, and CISA skip competitive bidding. The CTO pitched expansion to the Secret Service and TSA internally.
Now: Orders under the agreement need no separate competition; WIRED named CBP and ICE as able to "essentially skip the competitive bidding process." Palantir's CTO, Akash Jain, named the Secret Service, FEMA, TSA and CISA in an internal email as places to expand.
Why: WIRED's article puts FEMA and CISA on the CTO's expansion list, not the bidding list.
v3.31 · correction · TechCrunch did not report that the leaked DHS files look genuine
Was: DHS never confirmed a breach; cybersecurity researchers told TechCrunch the files look genuine.
Now: DHS and ICE did not respond to TechCrunch's request for comment, and we have found no independent authentication of the data.
Why: TechCrunch's article, in its first archived copy (Mar 2, 2026) and as updated Mar 4, has no such statement. The line came from stateofsurveillance.org, which attributed it to TechCrunch.
v3.31 · correction · The DIA did not confirm buying location data
Was: DIA confirmed the same.
Now: Asked the same question, DIA Director James Adams did not say whether DIA still buys location data; he said its purchases of commercially available information go through legal channels and follow the law.
Why: Biometric Update's account of the hearing: Adams "did not give a yes-or-no answer on current purchasing."
v3.31 · correction · The Army's Clearview licenses are not documented as "analysts only"
Was: Scale: 5 licenses, about $339k, analysts only.
Now: Five licenses, bought through the reseller Octaris Technologies: $78,750 for the first year, up to $339,415 with options through March 2030. The records do not say who uses them.
Why: "Analysts" was Biometric Update's inference from the seat count and delivery address; the Army's award record and solicitation do not say it.
v3.31 · correction · Penlink PLX: signed March 31, and what it does is disputed
Was: Dated Apr 1, 2026. PLX intercepts and aggregates calls, texts, and web activity for real-time location tracking.
Now: Dated March 31, 2026, the signing date; work began April 1. Prism Reports wrote that PLX "could enable DHS to track people's movements in real time"; Penlink says PLX does not provide real-time communications or location data.
Why: The federal award record gives the signing date. Prism changed "enables" to "could enable" on May 4, 2026 and added Penlink's denial on May 5; our wording followed the original.
v3.31 · correction · Mobile Fortify: two separate cases, not misidentified US citizens
Was: Documented misidentifications of US citizens (Oregon, Oct 2025).
Now: A CBP official testified that the app returned two different, incorrect names for a woman detained in Oregon (404 Media). Separately, a US citizen in Chicago told Reveal agents scanned his face.
Why: 404 Media's Oregon report does not say the woman was a US citizen or give a month; Reveal's US citizen was scanned, not reported as misidentified.
v3.31 · correction · "Dying on Camera": two phrasings were stronger than the investigation
Was: 138 California deaths, 81 in direct camera view. CBP has never audited tower effectiveness against deaths, and plans $1B for 1,497 more towers by 2034.
Now: At least 138 California deaths from 2022 through 2025 within a tower's nominal range, at least 81 of them most likely within a camera's field of view. CBP has done little to assess how its towers are working or how many people have died where they keep watch.
Why: Those are the investigation's words; "in direct camera view" and "never audited" went further than it does.
v3.31 · correction · ICE signed the shock-glove contract Aug 26, not Aug 27
Was: Dated Aug 27, 2026. $16.7M no-bid award to Compliant Technologies (KY) for 6,000 pairs of electric-shock gloves. Sixteen senators urged cancellation the same day; DHS called critics "despicable."
Now: Dated Aug 26, 2026, the signing date in the federal award record. Aug 27 is the day it was reported and the day sixteen senators urged ICE to cancel it.
Why: The USAspending award record gives the signing date as Aug 26, 2026; the earlier date came from news coverage.
v3.30 · correction · Klein search counts: not three measures of different things
Was: Three different search counts measure three different things, not one contested number: about 45,000 total Flock queries across all purposes; "more than 10,000"; and more than 3,400 searches on a single plate over 10 months.
Now: The reported counts are given beside the official ones: about 45,000 (Yahoo/Newsweek; haveibeenflocked.com 45,318), 22,813 queries in the audit logs Lufkin PD released to us, and more than 25,000 non-law-enforcement inquiries per the District Attorney.
Why: Lufkin PD's released logs and the District Attorney's release both count total queries well below 45,000, so the figures do not measure different things.
v3.30 · confirmed · Judge Lin's Aug 27 ruling: 59 pages, "illegal and baseless"
Was: Sourced to news reports (CNN, TechCrunch).
Now: Checked against the order itself (N.D. Cal. No. 26-cv-01996, Dkt. 250): 59 pages, finding the broad measures "illegal and baseless."
Why: The court record was read directly for the Sept 25 D.C. Circuit update.
v3.29 · correction · Renée Good's killing was not a "confrontation"
Was: Renée Good (ICE, Jan 7, a vehicle-involved street confrontation, not a routine traffic stop).
Now: Renée Good (ICE, Jan 7, shot in her car as she backed up and then pulled forward steering away from the agent, moments after telling him "That's fine, dude. I'm not mad at you"; not a routine traffic stop).
Why: No source we hold describes a confrontation. The ICE agent's own video, published by Alpha News and captioned by The Washington Post, shows Good telling the agent "That's fine, dude. I'm not mad at you." ABC News' analysis of the videos shows her car backing up a few feet, then moving forward with the wheels turned away from the agent, just over a second before the first shot.
v3.29 · correction · Norfolk's "similar case" is Porter, not Chatrie
Was: Norfolk says a similar case is pending elsewhere, without naming it. Working hypothesis, not confirmed: Chatrie v. United States.
Now: Norfolk named Porter v. United States, No. 26-5121, a pending Supreme Court petition on whether accessing plate-reader data is a Fourth Amendment search.
Why: We read Norfolk's filing (Doc. 63) directly. It names Porter. Our working guess was wrong.
v3.29 · correction · The Schmidt amicus list was missing one brief
Was: Plaintiffs-side amicus briefs listed without the Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability.
Now: The Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability also filed for Plaintiffs-Appellants (Doc. 27).
Why: A recheck of the Fourth Circuit docket found the brief we had left out.
v3.29 · correction · Norfolk's capture figure comes from an expert report that is now public
Was: Norfolk's more favorable capture figure rests on a sealed declaration, quoted as "top 5% of vehicles... photographed no more than once a day."
Now: The figure cites the report of Norfolk's expert, Valentin Estevez, refiled publicly with redactions (Doc. 180-1). The brief's full wording: "even the 5% of vehicles that were most photographed were on average photographed no more than once a day."
Why: The report was refiled publicly on Nov 21, 2025, which our earlier text missed, and our quote of the brief was shortened.
v3.29 · confirmed · Why Norfolk cut Flock retention to 21 days
Was: 30 days in 2024, 21 days by 2026; when and why not found.
Now: Norfolk's 2023 order set 30 days. A 2025 Virginia law (Va. Code § 2.2-5517) requires a 21-day purge, and Norfolk's General Order OPR-493 (June 30, 2025) adopted it.
Why: Both police orders (Schmidt Exhibits 16 and 18) and the statute were read directly. The earlier explanation was likely right; now it is sourced.
v3.28 · confirmed · IJ cancellation count confirmed at 227
Was: IJ Flock cancellation count now 224 as of Sept 21. Not corroborable; last confirmed figure 163 as of Sept 3, 2026.
Now: 227 local governments as of Sept. 22, 2026, confirmed by direct fetch of IJ.org's own live database.
Why: The earlier figure outran our ability to verify it at the time. It was likely right, not wrong. The live database page, read directly, settles it.
v3.27 · correction · Klein's charged conduct runs to May 2026, not December 2025
Was: The alleged searches ran from July 2024 through December 2025.
Now: The 100 individually dated counts run from 07/31/2024 to 05/19/2026.
Why: The county register of actions, a primary court record, supersedes the next-day news report on the end date. The start date matched.
v3.26 · correction · The "K. Zac" Flock operator is Zachary Klein after all
Was: The haveibeenflocked.com operator "K. Zac" (45,318 searches) is almost certainly NOT Officer Klein, because the site's naming convention would render his name as "Z. Kle."
Now: "K ZAC" is Klein. USA TODAY's own database ties this exact operator, plate, and count to the agency investigation described in its article.
Why: We treated "doesn't fit one site's naming pattern" as "is not this person," even though the site itself warns names don't always follow the pattern. A direct source settled it. How the name came to render as "K. Zac" is still not confirmed.
v3.20 · correction · Carson's five-year retention is the agency's choice, not Motorola's limit
Was: Carson, CA's Motorola ALPR system has a five-year retention period.
Now: Five years is Carson's own configured policy. Motorola's platform has no vendor-side retention ceiling at all. (v3.24 adds: LASD's written policy deletes at 5 years.)
Why: The court order only said the data "was maintained for five years." We assumed a system limit without saying so. Motorola's own FAQ, fetched directly, says retention is set by the agency.
v3.10 · correction · The sixteen-state brief was filed June 18, not the day Chatrie was decided
Was: Sixteen-state brief filed June 29, 2026, the same day the Supreme Court decided Chatrie.
Now: Filed June 18, 2026, eleven days before the Chatrie decision.
Why: The brief's own cover page and signature block read June 18. June 29 was the publish date of an article about it.
v3.8 · correction · A citation we called dead was a wrong URL path
Was: footnote4a.org/blog/schmidt-amici does not exist as cited.
Now: The article exists at footnote4a.org/news/schmidt-amici. The domain was right; the path segment was wrong.
Why: A 404 means the exact URL is dead, not that the source is fabricated. We stopped at the first failed fetch.
v3.8 · correction · "Ankle monitor" is not the Norfolk judge's phrase
Was: The court rejected [the ankle-monitor] comparison.
Now: The phrase is a verbatim quote from Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Dep't (4th Cir. 2021), invoked in the Schmidt appeal's briefing.
Why: Checked against the district court opinion itself, which discusses Beautiful Struggle but does not use the phrase.
v3.7 · correction · One GAO report, not two
Was: GAO (2x): DHS lacks internal controls, privacy enforcement, oversight of surveillance tech.
Now: One on-point report: GAO-25-107302 (Dec 3, 2024), on bias risk and privacy protections for DHS technologies used in public.
Why: The only GAO product first located was a general management report with no surveillance content. A second search found the real one. It predates this timeline's 2026 window.
v3.7 · correction · Javorsky's federal docket number
Was: 3:26-cv-02382
Now: 4:26-cv-02382-HSG
Why: Confirmed by direct fetch of the CourtListener docket.
version not recorded · correction · The California Flock class action's case name
Was: Gibbs Mura v. Flock Safety
Now: Javorsky v. Flock Group, Inc., confirmed from the complaint itself.
Why: The earlier name came from secondary reporting. The complaint's caption settles it.
version not recorded · correction · "Side door" belongs to the reporting, not the lawsuit
Was: The "side door" framing attributed to the Javorsky litigation.
Now: The mechanism is real, but the phrase appears to come from 404 Media and NPR reporting. Attributed there.
Why: The phrase does not appear in the complaint text searched.
v3.5 · correction · ICE social-media monitoring: an RFI-stage plan, 28 people
Was: ICE hiring 30 social media workers.
Now: ICE is seeking contractors for an RFI-stage plan with 28 planned personnel across two centers (12 in Williston, VT; 16 in Santa Ana, CA).
Why: "About 30" was journalistic rounding, and "hiring" overstated a contractor solicitation. Framing corrected v3.1, headcount v3.5.
v3.5 · confirmed · Rep. Shontel Brown's Penlink letter is real
Was: Rep. Shontel Brown's Feb 19 Penlink letter is unverified.
Now: The letter is real, primary-sourced from shontelbrown.house.gov.
Why: Checked directly; the doubt was wrong.
v3.4 · correction · A tower-range statement was Anduril's, not CBP's
Was: CBP's Hilton Beckham said tower range varies with terrain and obstructions.
Now: That statement is Anduril's.
Why: Misattributed. CBP's and Anduril's statements have been attributed correctly since v3.4.
v3.3 · retraction · Retracted: a CBP alert about civilian smart glasses
Was: CBP issued a May 2026 alert about civilian smart glasses.
Now: Retracted. It stays cut.
Why: No support found.
v3.0 · correction · ICE's Clearview contract was signed in 2025
Was: ICE Clearview $9.2M contract, June 2026.
Now: Signed September 5, 2025.
Why: Date corrected against contract reporting.
v3.0 · correction · Wyden's Penlink quote, word for word
Was: "invasive surveillance dragnet"
Now: "surveillance dragnet"
Why: The earlier wording was a paraphrase presented as a quote. Corrected to Wyden's verbatim text.
v3.0 · correction · The Minneapolis shootings were not traffic stops
Was: Fatal shootings during traffic stops.
Now: Fatal shootings of US citizens during Minneapolis immigration enforcement operations: a vehicle-involved street confrontation (Good) and a man shot on foot while filming (Pretti).
Why: Neither was a routine traffic stop.
v3.0 · retraction · Retracted: a D.C. Circuit ruling that halted a DHS face database
Was: D.C. Circuit halted DHS nationwide FR database on Fourth Amendment grounds.
Now: Retracted as likely fabricated. Do not cite.
Why: It traces to one low-quality site with no docket number, a fabricated case name, and an uncorroborated quote.
version not recorded · confirmed · Section 702 lapsed June 12
Was: Section 702 lapse actually happened June 15, not June 12.
Now: Checked: the statute lapsed at midnight on June 12, 2026.
Why: The challenge was checked and found wrong.
v3.35 · correction · Patel confirmed buying commercial data, not location data as such
Was: FBI Director confirms warrantless purchase of Americans' location data.
Now: FBI Director confirms buying commercial data when asked about Americans' location data.
Why: Asked whether the FBI would stop buying Americans' location data, Patel said the FBI does "purchase commercially available information." He did not say the words location data, and he did not address warrants. Sen. Wyden read his answer as a yes; the entry now attributes that reading to Wyden.
v3.35 · correction · "Dying on Camera": the AI-tower requirement is real, in a narrower form
Was: Cut list #10, "Law requires all new towers to be AI-equipped": still cut, checked three times, not supported.
Now: Restored in narrower form: the 2025 and 2026 reconciliation laws bar spending their border-technology money on surveillance towers CBP has not tested and accepted as "autonomous."
Why: We said the investigation never made this claim. It does, and the law it doesn't cite exists: P.L. 119-21 (July 2025) and P.L. 119-98 (June 2026) both carry the condition. The text supports it for towers bought with that money; whether it covers every tower in CBP's plan is not established.
v3.35 · correction · "Ankle monitor": the Norfolk judge did use the phrase; our v3.8 correction was wrong
Was: The "ankle monitor" line is from Beautiful Struggle, not the Norfolk judge. Judge Davis's opinion does not coin the phrase.
Now: The phrase comes from Carpenter v. United States (2018). Judge Davis's opinion in Schmidt v. City of Norfolk uses it five times, rejecting the comparison for Norfolk's Flock cameras.
Why: The opinion was re-read in full. Our v3.8 correction (c-3.8-ankle-monitor) said the judge did not use the phrase; he did. It originates in Carpenter, and Beautiful Struggle borrows it. This reverses c-3.8-ankle-monitor.
v3.35 · correction · Mountain View: "Flock enabled the settings" is the city's account
Was: Mountain View switched its cameras off after learning Flock, not the department, had enabled statewide and national lookup settings without authorization.
Now: The city says Flock enabled the settings without its authorization; the council report says there is "no way to determine how the settings were enabled."
Why: We stated the city's account as fact. The city's own council report says it could not be determined how the settings were turned on, and Flock says the settings are controlled by the agency.
v3.35 · correction · LAPD's 99.9%: not on a hot list when the image was captured
Was: 99.9% of LAPD's stored plate images were of vehicles not on any hotlist.
Now: 99.9% were of vehicles that were not on a hot list at the time the image was made.
Why: The State Auditor's figure is about the moment of capture. We dropped that qualifier, which matters: the auditor's point is that the stored images can still be searched later to track movements.
v3.35 · correction · GAO on DHS bias-risk policies: "required" and "most" were our words
Was: DHS lacks required bias-risk-assessment policies for most of the technologies, and civil-rights review isn't consistently required.
Now: DHS has no policies to assess bias risk across the technologies, and there are no requirements for civil-rights review, so that review has varied.
Why: GAO does not say the policies are required or that DHS lacks them for "most" technologies, and it found civil-rights review is not required at all, not inconsistently required.
v3.35 · correction · Warner and Kaine letter: an RFI, not a contract, and three cited items left out
Was: The letter's footnotes cite six items, including "an OSINT/social-media contract (Oct 2, 2025)."
Now: The Oct 2, 2025 item is a request for information, not a contract. The letter also cites the reactivated Paragon contract, USCIS's proposed biometrics rule and DHS's unofficial use of Flock software. Sent Jan 29, 2026; the Inspector General replied Feb 5.
Why: Checked against the signed letter. The Oct 2 item was mislabeled and three of its cited items were missing; the date and the Inspector General's reply are added.
v3.35 · correction · ICE Out of Our Faces Act: who sponsors it and who can enforce it
Was: Markey, Merkley and Wyden in the Senate; creates a private right of action plus state attorney general civil-penalty authority.
Now: Markey, with Wyden, Merkley, Alsobrooks and Sanders; individuals and state attorneys general can sue to enforce it. Introduced Feb 4, 2026.
Why: Two cosponsors were missing, and the bill lets state attorneys general sue to enforce it rather than giving them civil-penalty authority.
v3.35 · correction · Paragon letter: signed by Reps. Lee, Brown and Ansari
Was: House Democrats (Lee, Jacobs, Garcia) opened a Paragon inquiry in Oct 2025.
Now: Reps. Summer Lee, Shontel Brown and Yassamin Ansari asked DHS about ICE's Paragon spyware contract in Oct 2025.
Why: The letter's signers were named wrong.
v3.35 · correction · EO 14409 does not ask companies for 30 days' early access
Was: A voluntary 30-day pre-release framework for "covered frontier models."
Now: It tells agencies to design a voluntary framework for access up to 30 days before release to "other trusted partners," and to decide which models count as covered by their cyber capabilities.
Why: Checked against the order's text. It does not itself set a 30-day framework; it directs agencies to build one, and the covered models are defined by cyber capabilities, not by being the most powerful.
v3.35 · correction · S.4082: the data-broker section is a purchase ban, not a warrant rule
Was: Bans data-broker purchases without a warrant.
Now: Bars federal law enforcement agencies from buying Americans' data from data brokers, with listed exceptions; the bill also reauthorizes Section 702 for four years.
Why: Checked against the bill text (GPO). The data-broker section is a ban with exceptions, not a warrant requirement, and we left out that the bill reauthorizes Section 702.
v3.35 · correction · Florida plate-reader permits: FDOT's memo, Aug 31, cameras removed
Was: Aug 31 memo, widely reported Sept 1: DeSantis and FDOT revoke the permits. Cameras off within 30 days.
Now: FDOT memo No. 26-01 (Aug 31, 2026) revokes the permits; the cameras must be removed within 30 days.
Why: The memo and the first reports are both dated Aug 31. It is FDOT's memo, signed by its chief operating officer, and it orders the cameras removed, not switched off.
v3.35 · correction · Wylie: suspend the automatic renewal, not a "30-day notice"
Was: Council voted 7-0 to submit a 30-day non-renewal notice.
Now: Council voted 7-0 to suspend the automatic renewal of its Flock contract.
Why: The minuted motion is "to suspend the automatic renewal." The 30 days is the contract's deadline for giving notice, not a notice period.
v3.35 · correction · Roseville misreads: what Flock blamed, and what followed
Was: One resident was flagged six separate times. Flock blamed Roseville's rear-plate-only deployment.
Now: One resident was flagged at least six times. Flock blamed a "particularly unique deployment" and disputes the 71% figure; the department says no wrong alert led to a stop or arrest.
Why: Checked against Business Insider (July 31, 2026). Flock's stated reason was misquoted, "six" is "at least six," and the department's statement and Flock's dispute were missing.
v3.35 · correction · SB 1013 died Aug 31 without a floor vote
Was: Killed in the Assembly on the final day of session.
Now: Died in the Assembly on the last day of session, Aug 31, 2026, when the Assembly Majority Leader stopped it before a floor vote.
Why: "Killed" read as voted down. It never reached a floor vote. Date added.
v3.35 · correction · Redmond: the binding vote was July 21
Was: Redmond city council voted unanimously to cancel all 24 readers.
Now: The council voted 7-0 on July 21, 2026 to end its Flock contract. Local outlets reported 24 cameras; city records list 14 grant-funded cameras plus a second grant.
Why: A local outlet dated the vote May 26, which city records show was a study session on grant funding. The 24-camera count appears only in local press.
v3.35 · correction · Dayton bagged all 72 cameras in May, after suspending them
Was: City workers covered cameras with trash bags.
Now: City workers covered all 72 of Dayton's fixed plate-reader cameras with trash bags May 25-27, 2026, after the city had already suspended their use.
Why: The bagging was in May, not June, it covered every camera, and the cameras were already suspended over immigration-enforcement concerns.
v3.35 · correction · Oak Park: the 99% is one trustee's statement
Was: Oak Park canceled after more than 99% of alerts produced no police action.
Now: A trustee wrote that "over 99% of Flock alerts do not result in any police action," citing the village's oversight commission; we did not find the figure in the commission's report.
Why: We stated the figure as a finding. It is one trustee's statement, and the commission's report does not contain it.
v3.35 · correction · Sedona: the CBP acknowledgment was national, not about Sedona's data
Was: Sedona canceled after CBP access was acknowledged.
Now: Sedona's council voted 7-0 on Sept 9, 2025 to cancel; its cameras never began operating. Flock had acknowledged pilots with CBP nationally.
Why: The old wording implied federal access to Sedona's data. Flock's admission was about its national pilots, and Sedona's cameras were never switched on.
v3.35 · correction · About 90 jurisdictions ended Flock contracts in August, not 200
Was: More than 200 cities and agencies ended plate-reader contracts in August 2026 alone.
Now: Secure Justice counted 90 jurisdictions that ended Flock contracts in August 2026 (updated to 93), out of 214 since 2021.
Why: CalMatters' "more than 200" matches neither count. 214 is Secure Justice's total since 2021, reported by Ars Technica alongside the August figure.
v3.35 · correction · Flock's "7x" claim: who said it
Was: Flock claims it has gained 7x more customers than it has lost.
Now: Flock's CEO, Garrett Langley, told NPR the company would add seven times as many new customers as it lost this year.
Why: The claim is a forecast for this year from Flock's CEO, not a record of customers gained.
v3.35 · correction · Flock "side door": 404 Media's count, from May 2025
Was: 4,000+ lookups for immigration purposes as of summer 2026.
Now: 404 Media (May 27, 2025) counted more than 4,000 lookups done for the federal government, as informal favors, or with a possible immigration focus.
Why: The count is 404 Media's, from May 2025, not summer 2026, and it is not limited to immigration lookups.
v3.35 · correction · Section 702: the CBDC rider did not cause the June lapse
Was: Renewal failed in the Senate over an unrelated CBDC-ban rider, and a 45-day stopgap passed instead. The statute lapsed at midnight on Jun 12.
Now: Thune said the Senate could not move the House bill because of its CBDC provision, and a stopgap passed. Talks fell apart after the Pulte nomination, and the statute lapsed at the end of Jun 12.
Why: The CBDC provision blocked the House bill in April; the June lapse followed the nomination of Bill Pulte as acting DNI. The Senate never voted the bill down.
v3.35 · correction · CBP Clearview: a planned purchase, later cancelled; no award on record
Was: CBP and Border Patrol get Clearview AI access. The quote "total contract value of $225,000" was attributed to CBP's Statement of Work.
Now: CBP posted, then cancelled, a notice of intent to buy Clearview AI licenses for Border Patrol. No $225,000 award is on record. The Statement of Work reads "Total Contract Value: $225,000."
Why: The February 2026 documents are a notice of intent, and the notice's latest version is marked cancelled; federal award records show no $225,000 award as of Oct 10, 2026. The quote we published was Biometric Update's wording, not the Statement of Work's.
v3.35 · correction · BI2 iris scanners: a fixed-price contract, fully obligated
Was: ICE awarded a no-bid ceiling contract to BI2 Technologies.
Now: ICE awarded BI2 Technologies a no-bid, firm-fixed-price contract on May 22, 2026, fully obligated at $25,112,150. The "47 US states" description of the database is The Register's.
Why: Checked against the award record: it is not a ceiling contract, and the money is fully obligated. The database description is The Register's wording and is now attributed.
v3.35 · correction · Rapid DNA: a sentence about Capgemini removed
Was: An adjacent Capgemini figure may be larger than the $4.8M cited (a possible ~$14.45M additional task order, ~$19.3M obligated to date per two deep-research reports), not independently re-verified.
Now: Removed. The entry now says what the tests are for: ICE ordered them for field offices "to verify biological relatives."
Why: The Capgemini figures were real but were skip-tracing orders, not Rapid DNA. The sentence was removed on Oct 10, 2026 without a ledger entry; this records it.
v3.35 · correction · ICE social media RFI: no source gives a $20M-$50M value
Was: Estimated contract value $20M to $50M.
Now: Removed. The only figure in the sources is up to $1.1 million a year for subscription databases and search tools.
Why: No dollar estimate appears in the request for information, the draft work statement, either SAM.gov version, or any of the articles.
v3.35 · correction · Delaney Hall: what the record shows about undercover police
Was: Undercover Newark PD detectives made targeted ambush arrests with ICE. The FBI contacted arrested protesters and their families attempting informant recruitment.
Now: A police criminal complaint says Newark police deployed two undercover detectives in the crowd on June 3, aimed at arresting one protester; witnesses say ICE agents led the arrest, and the complaint does not mention ICE.
Why: The entry cited the wrong source, overstated the arrests, and said the FBI approached protesters' families, which the sources do not support (they report the FBI asking arrested protesters to inform). The record is also stronger than we said: the police complaint itself describes the undercover plan, and the city confirms plainclothes officers, cameras and drones.
v3.35 · correction · DHS platform subpoenas: DHS withdrew them each time
Was: Google, Meta, and Reddit complied with some requests. The ACLU filed a motion on affected users' behalf.
Now: Google, Meta, and Reddit reportedly complied with some requests (The New York Times). The ACLU filed motions to quash, and DHS withdrew the subpoenas each time.
Why: The companies' compliance is the Times' reporting and is now attributed. The ACLU filed several motions, in three federal cases that ended after DHS withdrew.
v3.35 · correction · FBI tradwife memo: thin sourcing, not none
Was: Revealed via a Property of the People FOIA request; critics criticized it for lacking any sourcing.
Now: Revealed via a state open-records request. The memo attributes its information to a "collaborative source"; Ryan Shapiro called it thinly sourced, and Michael German noted it had no footnotes or citations.
Why: It was a state open-records request, not FOIA, and the memo does name a kind of source; the critics said thin, not absent.
v3.35 · correction · Legal observers' suit is in San Diego, not Los Angeles
Was: A federal suit in Los Angeles alleges a DHS "secret Protester Surveillance Policy."
Now: A federal suit filed July 24, 2026 in San Diego (S.D. Cal. No. 3:26-cv-04232) alleges it.
Why: The complaint was filed in the Southern District of California. The map place moves to San Diego.
v3.35 · correction · $118B unspent is the Brennan Center's figure
Was: As of April 2026, ICE and CBP had $118B unspent from OBBBA.
Now: The Brennan Center reported ICE and CBP had $118 billion unspent in April 2026. It does not say how much came from the July 2025 law.
Why: Brennan doesn't define "unspent" or tie the money to OBBBA, and its linked data updates monthly, so the figure can't be reproduced. It is now attributed.
v3.35 · correction · Secure America Act: "funds pass $200B" was a projection
Was: Leaves about $183B available to ICE and CBP (derived). House Appropriations FY2027 adds $28B more, pushing available funds over $200 billion.
Now: Brennan reports $183 billion available to ICE and CBP; a pending House bill would add $28 billion more.
Why: The FY2027 bill has not been enacted, so the total over $200 billion is a projection. The $183 billion is Brennan's reported figure, not one we derived.
v3.35 · correction · OBBBA: $191B is the law's DHS total; $170B can't be derived from it
Was: OBBBA: $170B to $191B for DHS. Both figures are real, with different scopes.
Now: The law appropriated $191.02 billion to DHS. The Brennan Center's $170 billion doesn't match a total that can be derived from the law.
Why: Checked against P.L. 119-21 and CRS. "Both figures are real" overstated it.
v3.35 · correction · DHS budget: $19.5B in 2002 was not a DHS budget
Was: DHS baseline: $19.5B (2002) to $118.39B (FY2027 request).
Now: The FY2027 request is $118.39 billion. The $19.5 billion was government-wide homeland-security funding in 2002, before DHS existed.
Why: The two figures are not a like-for-like series, so the comparison is removed.
v3.35 · correction · ICE and CBP surveillance contracts: the 2026 figure is four months
Was: Contracts with 11 tracked surveillance companies grew from $310M (2025) to $513M (2026).
Now: About $310 million in 2025, then about $513 million in the first four months of 2026, by an advocates' count; the exact figures are The Guardian's reading of the report's chart.
Why: The 2026 figure covers January to April only. The report's chart has no exact values and its contract list is not published.
v3.35 · correction · CIA: vetting is part of the framework, not its core
Was: A CIA acquisition framework centralizes vendor vetting.
Now: The CIA announced a new acquisition framework, with centralized vendor vetting and a faster IT authorization process, to speed up how quickly it gets commercial technology.
Why: Federal News Network reports vetting as one part of a framework meant to speed up buying. Ellis's remarks are now quoted from Politico and GovExec.
v3.35 · correction · LAPD audit: 32.3% isn't in the report; the agreement lapsed
Was: 161 false alerts against 337 accurate (about 32.3%). LAPD declined renewal in July 2026.
Now: Officers confirmed 161 accurate plate matches on cars that turned out not to be stolen; 337 alerts led to recovered stolen vehicles. LAPD let its Flock agreement lapse on July 11, 2026 while seeking a new one.
Why: The Inspector General's report gives no percentage; 32.3% was computed by Straight Arrow News. LAPD did not decline renewal; it let the agreement lapse while negotiating.
Open questions
- "Dying on Camera": core statistics are reconfirmed twice, but the investigation is recent enough to watch for corrections or agency responses.
- Schmidt v. Norfolk's Fourth Circuit argument date. Only tentatively calendared for Dec 8-11, 2026, with the City's counsel unavailable for the whole session. Re-check the docket before citing a date.
- Whether the Supreme Court takes Porter v. United States (No. 26-5121), the plate-reader question Norfolk flagged as similar to Schmidt. Distributed for the Sept 28, 2026 conference; no order yet.
- Whether Commonwealth v. Bell was separately appealed.
- What the IJ.org "more than 10,000" search figure for Klein actually counts. Likely a narrower subset of his roughly 45,000 total queries.
- Whether "11 people" (Lufkin Daily News) and "seven license plates" (USA TODAY) reconcile, for example through shared household vehicles. Needs the indictment text.
- Still not re-verified by direct fetch: the Mijente $310M to $513M figure; Mobile Fortify's "200M+ images." The Brennan Center's $2.9B tally and current category totals were read directly Oct. 3, 2026 and are no longer open.
- The Riley order cites "Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1960)." That citation is the 1914 case. Flagged as a likely error in the order, not corrected on our authority.
- Whether other California agencies on Motorola's platform set long or indefinite retention, and when LASD adopted its 2-year active / 5-year maximum policy.
Cut
- #5: D.C. Circuit halted a DHS face-recognition database on Fourth Amendment grounds. Still cut. Fabricated or unsupported.
- #8: A June 2026 district court ruling on Section 702 backdoor searches. Still cut. No primary source.
- #10: "Law requires all new towers to be AI-equipped." Restored Oct 2026 in narrower form: the 2025 and 2026 reconciliation laws bar spending their border-technology money on towers CBP has not accepted as "autonomous." Whether that covers every tower in CBP's plan is not established.
- #12: "Senate passed a same-night 60-34 FISA renewal about 40 minutes after the June 12 lapse." Still cut. No primary source.
- #13: "CBP issued a May 2026 alert about civilian smart glasses." Retracted, stays cut.